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I. INTRODUCTION
The courts have experienced no little difficulty in construing instru-
ments and statutes which grant, reserve, or otherwise deal with min-
rals.' When confronted with such a task, courts will commonly pre-
face their opinions on the subject with some general remarks of
which the following is a synthesis:
The word "mineral" is a word of general language and
is not per se a word of art. It is not a definite term and has
no definite and certain meaning which can be applied in all
cases. On the contrary it is used in many senses. It is a
word which is incapable of a definition which would be uni-
formly applicable, but rather is susceptible of limitation ac-
cording to the intention with which it is used in a particular
instrument or statute. Each case must be determined upon
its own facts. No rigid and arbitrary definition of the word
"minerals" may be adopted, but due regard must be given to
the language of the instrument or statute in which it occurs,
the relative position of the parties, the substance of the trans-
action or arrangement in question, the business in which the
parties are engaged, the existing circumstances, and the inten-
tion of the parties, if it can be ascertained.2
Having unburdened themselves of these remarks, the courts ar-
rive at decisions which are in many respects irreconcilable because
of differences not merely in the underlying facts of each case but
in the principles applied.
There is, of course, a distinction between the meaning of the
word "mineral" as used in the abstract and the meaning of the
word "mineral" as used in a particular instrument or statute.3 A
* Associate Counsel, Minerals, Houston Oil & Minerals Corp., Denver, Colorado; E.M.
1956, Colorado School of Mines: LL.B. 1964, University of Arizona.
1. See, e.g., Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 128, - , 64 Am. Dec. 448, 451, 3 Morr.
Min. Rep. 229, - (1854) where the court stated, "I admit that I have experienced
very great embarrassment in giving an answer to this question satisfactory to myself."
2. The quotation in the text has been, synthesized from the following cases: Bumpus v.
United States, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1964) ; United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority v. Harris, 115 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1940) ; Dierks Lumber Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp.
157 (W.D. Ark. 1949) ; Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E.
537 (1923) ; Hans v. Great Bend Brick & Tile Co., 172 Ran. 478, 241 P.2d 475 (1952) ;
Sellers v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1952) ; Kalberer v. Grassham, 282
Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d 940 (1940) ; Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La.
197, 91 So. 676 (1922) ; Vang v. Mount, 300 Minn. 393, 220 N.W.2d 498 (1974); Cole v.
McDonald, 236 Miss. 168, 109 So. 2d 628 (1959) ; Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640,
69 So. 2d 384 (1954); Brady v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am. St. Rep. 531,
2 Ann. Cas. 636 (1905) ; Adams County v. Smith, 74 ND.. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946);
Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832 (1906) ; Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.,
150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924) ; Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960) ; White v. Sayers, 101 Va. 821, 4.5 S.E. 747 (1903) ; Puget Mill.
Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wash. 2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939) ; Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh
Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684, 17 A.L.R. 144 (1918).
3. Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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particular substance may unquestionably be a mineral in the ab-
stract meaning of the word, and yet for one reason or another a
court may hold that it does not fall within the scope of the grant or
reservation in a given instrument.4 It is the purpose of this article
to examine the various factors upon which the courts have relied in
determining whether a particular substance is a mineral within the
meaning of an instrument or statute. This article does not discuss
the questions of whether a substance which is conceded or determined
to be a mineral is effectively granted or reserved by the particular
instrument,5 or whether the grant or reservation is of an interest
in fee as distinguished from a profit a prendre,6 nor does it discuss
the right of the mineral owner to injure or destroy the surface in
extracting the mineral7 except to the extent that the possibility of
injury to or destruction of the surface may affect the classification
of a particular substance as a mineral.8 Furthermore, this article
does not discuss the factors involved in a determination of whether
public land is mineral in character under the United States public
land laws", or whether a discovery of a valuable mineral deposit
has been made, 0 except to the extent that those matters depend
upon the threshold question of whether the particular !substance in-
volved is a mineral."1
I. NECESSITY FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SUBSTANCE
IS A "MINERAL"
The great majority of cases in which the question of whether a
particular substance is a mineral arises are cases dealing with min-
eral estates which have been severed either by lease or by deed. 1 2
These cases almost invariably involve a dispute between the owner
of the surface estate and the owner of the mineral estate. The dispute
is usually one of two kinds: (1) The primary purpose of the surface
owner may be to prevent the extraction of a particular substance
4. Horse Creek Land & Min. Co. v. Midkiff, 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918).
5. See, e.g., Resler v. Rogers, 272 Minn. 502, 139 N.W.2d 379 (1965) (the phrase
"also excepting mineral reservations" is not a reservation of minerals) ; Reiss v. Rummell,
232 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1975) Olson v. Dillerud, 226 1N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1975). Compare
Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946) (no implied or constructive
reservation of coal in conveyance by county) with Argo Oil Corp. v. Lathrop, 76 S.D. 70,
70 N.V.2d 431 (1955) (reservations of minerals read into conveyance).
6. See, e.g., Builders Supplies Co. v. Gainey, 282 N.C. 261, 192 S.E.2d 449 (1972).
7. See Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support and the Righit to Totally Destroy Surface ln
Mining Operations, 6 ROCKY MTN. MrN. L. IsN'r. 497 (1961).
8. See, e.g., River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d
878 (La. App. 1976).
9. See 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 98 (3rd ed. 1914); 1 AM. LAW OF MINING §§ 4.50-4.55
(Rocky Mt. Min. L. Foundation ed., Matthew Bender 1977).
10. See I AM. LAW OF MINING §§ 4.13-4.27 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Foundation ed., Matthew
Bender 1977) : Reeves, The Law of Disc-overy Since Coleman, 21 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
415 (1975); Reeves, The Origin and Development of the Rules of Discovery, 8 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 1 (1973).
11. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903).
12. See Annot., 86 A.L.R. 983 (1933) ; Annot., 17 A.L.R. 156 (1922).
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in order to prevent its extraction by the owner of the mineral es-
tate; (2) The primary purpose of the surface owner may be to ex-
tract the particular substance himself, either directly or by means
of a lease; he therefore asserts ownership of the substance in order
to confirm his right to extract it.
Federal statutes granting or authorizing the disposal of public
lands to states, corporations, or individuals frequently except from
their operation lands which are mineral in character.13 Since the
validity of such grants depends upon the nonmineral character of
the land granted, it may be necessary to determine whether a
particular substance is a mineral in order to determine whether the
grant is valid. 14 Other federal statutes authorizing the disposal of
public lands provide, in various terms, for the reservation of min-
erals. 1 5 The ownership of a particular 'substance in lands disposed
of under such statutes requires a determination of whether that sub-
stance is included in the reservation of minerals. 6 Mining claims
may be located on valuable mineral deposits discovered on public
lands. 17 The validity of a mining claim therefore depends in the
first instance upon whether the substance located is a mineral. 8
State and local governments are frequently prohibited by consti-
tution or statute from disposing of mineral rights. For this and
other reasons, in interpreting grants or reservations of minerals
made by a state or local government it may be necessary to deter-
mine whether a particular substance is a mineral. 9
Private agreements of various kinds may relate to "minerals"
and therefore may reguire a determination of what substances are
included. 20
State taxation statutes may impose a tax upon, or exempt from
certain forms of taxation, "mines" or "mining," or equipment or
supplies used in "mining.'21 In cases arising under such statutes,
13. See, e.g., Act of June 21, 1866, ch. 127, § 1, 14 Stat. 66 (Homestead Act amend-
ment) ; Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365 (grant to Northern Pacific) ; Act of July
2, 1862, ch. 130, § 1, 12 Stat. 503, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) (donating lands to
state providing colleges for the benefit of agricultural and mechanical arts) ; Act of July
1, 1862, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492 (grant to Union Pacific).
14. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903); Dunbar Lime Co. v. Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co., 17 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1926).
15. 1 AM. LAW OF MINING §§ 3.23-3.41C (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Foundation ed., Matthew
Bender 1977).
16. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971):
United States v. Isbell Construction Co., 4 IBLA 205 (1972).
17. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1970).
18. United States v. Toole, 224 F. Supp. 440 (D. Mont. 1963)(peat and organic soil
are not minerals) ; Earl Douglass 44 L.D. 325 (1915) (fossil remains of prehistoric s.nl-
mals are not minerals) ; Hughes v. Florida, 42 L.D. 401 (1913) (shell rock is not a min-
eral).
19. Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1960) ; Abbey v. State.
202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972) ; Salzselder v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959) ; Adams
County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946) ; State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of
Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
20. White v. Sayers, 101 Va. 821, 45 S.81. 747 (1903) (partnership).
21. See Carter Oil Co. v. Blair, 256 Ala. 650, 57 So. 2d 64 (1951) (exemption for "ma-
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"mining" may be defined as the extraction of minerals from the
earth, and a determination of whether a substance is a mineral may
be necessary in order to determine whether the operation being con-
ducted is "mining. '22 Similarly, for the purpose of taxation real
property may be defined to include mines and minerals. 23
The state or federal government may, in eminent domain pro-
ceedings, take an interest in land which does not include minerals.
It may later become necessary to determine whether a particular
substance has been taken by the condemnor or left with the land-
owner.
24
State statutes commonly provide double or triple damages for
the trespassory removal of minerals. In an action brought pursuant
to such a statute it may become necessary to determine whether a
particular substance ils! a mineral.25 If there has been a severance
of the mineral estate and if the removal of the substance in question
is done under a claim of right by either the owner of the mineral
estate or the owner of the surface estate, the word "minerals" in
the statute should be given the same meaning that it has in the
conveyance by which the mineral estate was severed.26
III. CRITERIA
In their efforts to determine whether a particular substance is
a mineral, the courts have used as a starting point for their analysis
one or more criteria which exist separate and apart from the instru-
chines used in mining"); West Lake Quarry & Material Co. v. Schauffner, 451 S.W.2d
140 (Mo. 1970) (exemption for machinery and equipment used in "mining") ; Lillington
Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 203 N.C. 151, 165 S.E. 351 (1932) (purchaser of gasoline used in
"mining machinery" entitled to refund of tax) ; Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County,
33 Utah 114, 93 P. 53, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1043 (1907) (tax on net proceeds of "mines and
mining claims").
22. Lillington Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 203 N.C. 151, 165 S.E. 351 (1932). See Etchison
Drilling Co. V. Fluornoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867 (1912) ; J.M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v.
Murrel, 127 La. 466, 53 So. 709 (1910) ; West Lake Quarry & Material Co. v. Schauffner,
451 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1970) ; Certain-Teed Products Corp. v. Comly, 54 Wyo. 79, 87 P.2d
21 (1939). But see Carter Oil Co. v. Blair, 256 Ala. 650, 57 So. 2d 64 (1951) ("But the
fact that oil is generally recognized as a mineral is not decisive of the question at hand").
23. See Ferguson v. Steen, 293 S.W. 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
24. See Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1963). If minerals are taken
in eminent domain proceedings, it may become necessary to determine who should be
compensated for the taking). West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 226 S.E.2d
717 (W. Va. 1976).
25. See Henry v. Lowe, 73 Mo. 96 (1880) Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R., 209 Pa. 263,
58 A. 488 (1904). Cf. Commonwealth v. Hipple, 7 Pa. Dist. 399 (1898) (criminal prosecu-
tion).
26. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R., 209 Pa. 263, 58 A. 488 (1904). Other contexts in which
the meaning of the word "minerals" must be determined are as follows: Alien Land Laws:
State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565 (1907) (alien land laws not ap-
licable to "lands containing valuable deposits of minerals, metals, iron, coal, or fire
clay"). Conditional Sales Laws: Cornwell v. Buck & Stoddard, 28 Cal. App. 2d 333, 82
P.2d 516 (1938) (although oil is a mineral, oil well machinery is not "equipment and ma-
chinery used or to be used for mining purnoses" under act relating to conditional sales).
Criminal Laws: People v. Silver, 16 Cal. 2d 714, 108 P.2d 4 (1940) (defense of justifiable
homicide derendent upon showing that pronerty constituted "mine"). Customs Laws:
Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11 (1885) (tariff applicable to "mineral and bituminous sub-
stances in a crude state"). See United States v. Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co., 172 U.S.
339 (1899).
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ment or statute in question. These criteria provide a general defini-
tion or meaning of the word mineral which may then be restricted by
limitations imposed by the law of the forum and by the language of
the instrument or statute to be construed.
A. ANIMAL, VEGETABLE, OR MINERAL
The moist fundamental criterion for classification of a substance
as a mineral is the commonly known and elementary division of all
material substances into "animal," "vegetable," and "mineral." 27
Under this division, the word "mineral" would include almost all
material substances of the earth,28 including oil and gas, 29 rock,30
marble, 31 serpentine,3 2 limestone,3 3  sand, 34 gravel,3 5 building ma-
terials,3 6 clay,37 the soil itself,38 water,39 and even air.40 The broad-
est definition of the word "mineral," therefore, would include all in-
organic matter.4'1 For reasons which are not altogether apparent,
some courts refer to this meaning of the word "mineral" as its "tech-
nical ' '42 or "scientific ' 4 3 meaning, although it is more properly re-
27. Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97 SW.2d 35 (1936) ; Board of County Commissioncrs
of Roosevelt County v. Good., 44 N.M. 495, 105 P.2d 470 (1940) ; Dunham v. Kirkpatrick,
101 Pa. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882) ("common understanding of mankind") ; Certain-Teed
Products Corporation v. Conly, 54 Wyo. 79, 87 P.2d 21 (1939).
28. Hans v. Great Bend Brick & Tile Co., 172 Kan. 478, 241 P.2d 475 (1952); State
Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
29. Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832 (1906); Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
30. State ex rel State Hwy. Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971) ; State
ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163 (1907) (sili-
cated rock).
31. Deer Lake Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 89 Mich. 180, 50, N.W. 807 (1891).
32. Id.
33. Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928) ; State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans,
46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163 (1907).
34. Harper v. Talladega County, 279 Ala. 365, 185 So. 2d 388 (1966) ; Hendler v. Lehigh
Valley R., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904).
35. Lillington Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 203 N.C. 151, 165 S.E. 351 (1932); Beck v. Har-
vey, 196 Okla. 270, 164 P.2d 399 (1944) ; United' States v. Aitken, 25 Phil. 7 (1913).
36. Deer Lake Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 89 Mich. 180, 50 N.W. 807 (1891).
37. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907) (silicated clay).
38. Bambauer v. Menjoulet, 214 Cal. App. 2d 871, 29 Cal. Rptr. 874, 95 A.L.R.2d 839
(1963); Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 128, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229
(1R54) ; Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 212 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959).
39. State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
See Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
40. Id.
41. White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 1065, 140 Am. St. Rep. 618 (1910) ; Brady
V. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am. St. Rep. 531, 2 Ann. Cas. 636 (1906) ; Dun-
ham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882): Campbell v. Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924) Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co.,
112 W". Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966 (1932); Murphy v. Van Voorhis, 94 "r. Va
475. 119 S.E. 297 (1923) Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 "1.
Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684, 17 A.L.R. 144 (191S). Cf. Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d
897 (Ky. 1952) ("all organic and inorganic substances that can be taken from the earth").
42. Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & By. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924);
Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 SW.2d 994 (1949). Cf. Beury v. Shelton, 141 Va. 28,
144 S.E. 629 (1928)("geological sense").
43. Northern Pac. By. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903) ; Hartwell v. Camman, 10
N.J. Eq. 129, 64 Am. Dec. 448. 3 Morr. Min. Ren. 229 (1854): Brady v. Smith, 181 N.Y.
178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am. St. Rep. 531, 2 Ann. Cas. 636 (1905) ; Dunham v. Kirkpatrick,
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ferred to as "a broad, general, popular definition.'" In conveyanc-
ing, the word "minerals" is not used in such a broad comprehensive
sense,' 5 for if it were to be so interpreted, a grant or reservation
of minerals would be a grant or reservation of the entire estate.4 6
B. COMMON MEANING
To avoid an overly broad definition which would include all in-
organic matter, the courts have had recourse to the common mean-
ing,47 or as it is variously expressed, the plain, 48 ordinary 4 9 usual,50
natural,51 accepted, 52 or popular 3 meaning of the word "mineral;"
that is, a comprehensive term including every description of stone
101 Pa. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1R82) Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994
(1949) ; Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
44. Puget Mill. Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wash. 2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939).
45. Hans v. Great Bend Brick & Tile Co., 172 Kan. 478, 241 P.2d 475 (1952) ; Hendler
v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904). See Rudd v.
Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97 S.W.2d 35 (1936); Murphy v. Van Voorhis, 94 V. Va. 475, 119
S.E. 297 (1923).
46. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co.
v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949): Deer Lake Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron
Co., 89 Mich. 180, 50 N.W. 807 (1891); Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 128, 64 Am.
Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229 (1854): Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 47 Am.
Rep. 696 (1882) ; Psenelk v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. Anp. 1947) Rock House
Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684, 17 A.L.R. 144
(1918); Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928); Puget Mill Co.. v. Duecy, 1
Wash. 2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939).
47. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Roosevelt County v. Good, 44 N.M. 495, 105 P.2d 470
(1940) ; Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 V. Va. 567, 137 S.'E. 895 (1927). See
Thomas v. Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Sup. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1973) ("common speech
and usage"); Missouri Pac. fy. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 64,5, 152 S.W.2d 563 (1941) ('sub-
stances commonly recognized are minerals") : Resler v. Rogers, 272 Minn. 502, 139 N.V.2d
379 (1965) ("commonly understood meaning") Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502
(N.D. 1959) ("commonly understood meaning"): Psenclk v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658,
660-61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ("such minerals and mineral substances as are commonly
regarded as minerals as distinguished from the soil In general").
48. Burdette v. Bruen, 118 V. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937).
49. Burke v. Southern Pac. Ry., 234 U.S. 669 (1914); Stowers v. Huntington Develop-
ment & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934) : Lovelace v. Southwest Petroleum Co., 267
F. 513 (6th Cir. 1920): Bd. of County Comm'rs of Roosevelt County v. Good, 44 N.M.
495, 105 P.2d 470 (1940) : Salzselder v. Brunsdle, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959) : Holland
v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975): Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla.
1964) Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960) Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex.
512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (194,9): Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.V. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921)
("ordinary acceptation"): Beury v. Shelton., 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928) ("ordinary
usage") ; Stat, ex rcl. Atkinson v. Evans. 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907) ; Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937) : Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone
Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966 (1932) ; Waugh v. Thompson Land
& Coal. Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927).
50. Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ("usual view").
51. Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975): Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389
P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); State
ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans. 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163 (1907).
52. Dierks Lumher & Coal Co.. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W,.D. Ark. 1949) ("generally
accepted commercial meaning") Cronkhlte v. Falkonstein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960);
Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882); Western Development Co.
v. Nell, 4 11tah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955): Burdette v. Bruen, 118 MI. Va. 624, 191 SI,.
360 (1937) .Ieffry v. Snruce-Boone Lan9 Co., 112 V. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R.
966 (1932) Waulgh v. Thomnson Land & Coal Co., 103 WV. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927).
53. B~urke v. Southern Pan. Ry., 234. U.S. 6G9 (1914) : Lovelace v. Southwest Petroleum
Co., 267 F. 513 (6th Cir. 19241 Hartwell v. Ca.mman, 10 N.J. Eq. 12R, 64 Am. Dec. 448,
3 Mn,r. Min. lep. 229 (1R4)' r)nnhau, v. Kirkiatrick. 101 Pa. 96, 47 Am. Rep. 696
(1882) ("pop,lar estimation" and "epular understanding") : Carothers v. Mills, 231 S.V.
155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ("popular view"): Suit v. Hoehstetter Oil Co., 63 AV. Vs.
817, 61 S.E. 107 (1908) (oil and gas "'olnularly" eonsldered to be minerals).
THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MINERALS"
and rock deposit, whether containing metallic or nonmetallic sub-
stances. 54 These cases generally hold that a grant or reservation of
minerals includes all substances commonly regarded as minerals, in
the absence of some limitation or restriction in the conveyance. 55
Applying this criterion the courts have found such substances as
coal, 56 stone,5 7 caliche,5" and oil and gas5 9 to be minerals. On the
other hand, it has been held that the common meaning of the word
"mineral" does not include oil and gas, 60 limestone, 61 gypsum, 6 2
common sand, gravel, 63 clay, 64 or water.65 As these cases illustrate,
there is no generally accepted common meaning of the word "min-
erals," and a rule of interpretation based upon such "common mean-
ing" leaves the question largely to the discretion of the court.
Some cases refer to the meaning given to the word "minerals"
by the custom of the country in which the deed is to operate.68 For
example, where oil and gas have been discovered in a particular
vicinity, there may arise a custom to use the word "minerals" to
refer to oil and gas to the exclusion of other minerals, and particu-
larly to the exclusion of substances such as sand and gravel.'-
C. STANDARD AUTHORITIES
In determining whether a particular substance is included in the
common meaning of the word "minerals," some courts state merely
that it is so included, or that it is not, as the case may be, without
any reference to the manner in which the common meaning is de-
54. Bd. of County Comnm'rs of Roosevelt County v. Good, 44 N.M. 495, 105 P.2d 470
(1940) ; Waugh v, Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 WV. Va. 567, 137 S.E. S95 (1927).
55. Sec note 149 infra, and text accompanying.
56. S-c Henry v. Lowe, 73 Mo. 96 (18S0) ("coal is a well known mineral').
57. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 11:2 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, S6 A.L.R. 9r,6
(1932).
5S. See Bd. of County Conm'rs of Roosevelt County v. Good, 44 N.M. 495, 105 P.2d
470 (1955) : Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36. 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1S82).
59. Lovelace v. Southwest Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513 (6t Cir. 1920); Western Dev.
Co. %. Noll, 4 Utah 2d 112, 2S8 P.2d 452 (19155.
60. Stowers %-. Huntington Des-. & Gas Co.. 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934); Missouri
Pac. Ry. %-. Furzueron, 210 Ark. 460, 196 S.E.2d 588 (1946) : Missouri Pac. Ry. %-. Stro-
hacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.Et.2d 63 (1941) : Hudson %'. MeGuire. 18 Ky. 712, 223 SW.
1101. 17 A.LR. 14S (1920). Soe Dunhamn v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696(1892) ("In popular estimation pe.troleunm Is not rega rded as a mineral substance. ... .
61. Heinatz v. Allen. 147 Tx, .512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
62. Cronklhite v. Falkenstein. 3i2 P.2d 396 (Okia. 1960).
6. Resler v. Rocers. 272 .Minn. 502, 139 N.W.2d 379 (1965) ; Psencik v. Wessels, 205
S.\.2d 658 (Tox. Civ. App. 1947).
64. Rosier %-. Rot'ers. 272 Minn. 502. 119 N.V.2d 379 (1965).
65.,. See NMack Oil Co A.. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964) : Stephen Hayes Estate.
Inc. v. Togliattl, S5 Utah 137, -. 38 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1914)("The characteristics of
Water conlialin.L colpper if' sotitIon are so unliike the charaeteristics of minerals that to
say water Is a inineral would be to extend the neanng of the word "minera l' beyond what
Is generally under I)%tood h:t tet-im.").
66. Gibson v. Tyson. 5 Watts 34. 13 ,lorr. Min. Rep. 72 (Pa. 1M6) : Reu- v. Shelton,
151 Vn. 2Z, 144 S.E. 629 (192S): Darvlll V. Roper, 3 Drew. 294. 61 Eng. Rep. 915. 10
Mort. Mlin. Rep. 406 (Ch. 1S55). Ser Nance v. Donk Brothers Coal & Coke Co.. 13 Il1. 2,1
399. 151 N.l.2d 97 (195S); :ollowa- Gravel Co. %. MeKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. Ld 22S
1942) ("the "Sage of the trade").
67. %ltlerspoot v. Caul bell, 219 Miss. 640. 69 So. 2d 384 (1954).
429
430 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
termined.6 s Other courts, however, have sought the common mean-
ing of the word "minerals" by consulting dictionaries and other
authorities.6 9 In some cases, definitions formulated by mineralogists
are consulted for assistance in determining whether a particular
substance is a mineral. 70 It is frequently said that the word "min-
eral" includes whatever is recognized by the standard authorities as
mineral.7'1 Conversely, the fact that a particular substance is not con-
sidered to be a mineral by the standard authorities may cause a
court to refuse to include it within a grant or reservation of min-
erals. 72
D. ECONOMIC VALUE
In determining whether a substance is a mineral, an important
criterion is whether the substance has economic value; 73 that is,
whether the substance is more valuable than the land in which it
is contained 74  and for that reason is sought after and extracted
from the land by mining, quarrying, or other special means for re-
moval. 7 Thus, a mineral may be defined as any inorganic substance
found in nature having sufficient value, separate from its situs as
part of the earth, to be mined, quarried, or dug for its own sake,
or its own specific use.76 This, no doubt, 's the sense in which the
68. See, e.g., Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 26, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882).
69. See, e.g., Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11 (1885); Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100,
43 S.W. 355, 66 Am. St. Rep. 740, 39 L.R.A. 249, 19 Mor. Min. Rep. 169 (1897).
70. Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 128, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229
(1854) ; Circular, July 15, 1873, in H. CoPp, U.S. MINING DECISIONS 316 (1874).
71. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2710.0-5(e), 3812.1 (1976) ; Circular, July 15, 1873, in H. Copp, U.S.
MIN.ING DECISIONS 316 (1874); 1 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 98 (3d ed. 1914). This definition
has been characterized as "probably the least misleading." United States v. Aitken, 25
Phil, 7 (1913).
72. United States v. Aitken, 25 Phil. 7 (1913).
73. Vang v. Mount, 300 Minn. 393, 220 N.W.2d 498 (1974).
74. The comparison is between the substance in question and the matrix of earth, soil,
or rock in which it is found. This comparison should not be confused with the rule, formerly'
applied for the purpose of classifying public lands of the United States as mineral or non-
mineral in character, which compared the value of the lands for mining purposes with
their value for agriculture or other nonmineral purposes. See generally 1 AM. LAW OF
MINING § 4.53 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. Foundation ed., Matthew Bender 1977) ; Reeves, The
Or'igin and Development of the Rules of Discovery, 8 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 21-26,
28-30 (1973).
75. State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d, 707 (1965).
76. Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832 (1906) : Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209
Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904) : Horse Creek Land & Min. Co. v. Mid-
kiff, 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918). See Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick
& Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684, 17 A.L.R. 144 (1918). In this context, value is
not the value of the substance to the miner, i.e., whether he can make a profit by Its
extraction and sale, but rather its value to the user, i.e., its "special or peculiar value in
trade, commerce, manufacture, science, or the arts." Stanislaus Electric Power Co., 41
L.D. 655 (1912). See U.S. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 537 (1903)("deposits of a mineral
character, which are useful in the arts or valuable for purposes of manufacture"). Lind-
ley incorpor,.ted the "economic value" concept as one portion of his definition of minerals,
which is as follows:
[S]uch substance as-
(a) Is recognized as a mineral, according to its chemical composition, by
the standard authorities on the subject:
(b) Is classified as a mineral product In trade or commerce : or-
(c) Such a substance (other than the mere surface which may be used, for
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word "minerals" is most commonly used in conveyances.7 7 Where
this criterion is applied, it has been held that a substance having no
commercial value at the time of the conveyance is not included in
a grant or reservation of "minerals. ' ' 78 Some cases holding that
a particular substance is not a mineral mention the absence of com-
mercial value without according that fact any particular signifi-
cance.7 9 It should be noted, however, that if under some positive
rule of law a substance is determined not to be a mineral, its economic
value is immaterial. 80
Substances of widespread occurrence such as clay, sand, gravel,
and limestone are not'usually considered to be minerals unless they
are of an exceptional character or possess a property giving them
special value."' For example, potter's clay or porcelain clay,8 2 clay
valuable for making cement, 3 sand valuable for making gloss, 84 or
limestone of such quality that it may profitably be manufactured
into cement85 may be considered to be minerals, while the same :sub-
stances, if they are useful only for building and road construction
purposes, would not ordinarily be considered to be minerals. 86
E. STATUTES
A number of state statutes define the word "minerals,"s7 fre-
quently by setting out a list of minerals which appears to have been
agricultural purposes) as possesses economic value for use in trade, manu-
facture, the sciences, or in the mechanical or ornamental arts.
1 C. LINDLEY, MINES § 98 (3rd ed. 1914).
Lindley's definition was quoted with approval In Earl Douglass, 44, L.D. 325 (1915).
and has been incorporated in the regulations dealing with public sales, at 43 C.F.R. §2 710.0-5(e) (1976).
77. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904).
78. Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924)(limestone) ; White v. Sayers, 101 Va. 821, 45 S.E. 747 (1903) (coal) As to whether, as a
general rule, it is necessary that the value of the mineral be established or known on the
date of the conveyance, see notes 258-72 infra, and text accompanying. In United States
ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Harris, 115 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1940), a condemnation
award of $1.00 per acre was granted for a mineral estate consisting solely of a sand
and gravel deposit "of little commercial value."
79. See, e.g., Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d' 190 (1954).
80. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
81. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
82. See Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005
(1904).
83. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907).
84. See Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 416, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005(1904) ; Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
85. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907).
86. Resler v. Rogers, 272 Minn. 502, 139 N.W.2d 379 (1965); Holland v. Dolese Co.,540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975); Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103
Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904) ("common mixed sand, merely worth dizging and removing as
material for grading") : Heinatz v. Allen. 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949) ; Eldridge
v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty
Gravel & Sand Co., 128 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (building sand).
87. Appendix I, infra, contains all of the statutes defining the word "minerals" whichhave come to the attention of the author. However, the vagaries of legal Indexing and
the continuing enactment and amendment of mined land reclamation legislation preclude
any representation as to the completeness of the material contained in Appendix I.
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taken from a report on the mineral production of the state and attach-
ing to the list general words such as "and all other minerals." These
statutes are usually intended to have a limited application, and the
statutory definitions are of little or no value in construing the word
"minerals" as used in private conveyances.88 It is of some interest
to note that mined land reclamation statutes have generated more
definitions of the word "minerals" than all other statutes together.
IV. LIMITATIONS
A. METALLIC SUBSTANCES
Some decisions have limited the word "minerals" to metallic or
metalliferous substances."9 Nevertheless, nonmetalliferous substances
were recognized as minerals at an early date, 90 and most decisions
apply the word "mineral" to metallic and nonmetallic substances
alike.Y' Some cases have gone so far as to use the rule of ejusdem
generis to exclude all metallic and metalliferous substances from
the scope of the word "minerals" when that word is used in
such phrases as "oil, gas and other minerals. ' ' 92 Occasionally the
context of a statute or instrument itself will make it clear that the
term "minerals" was not intended to be limited to metallic or metal-
liferous substances.9 3
B. CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
The term "mineral" is defined by the mineralogist as follows:
88. lamitn.,er v. Mt-njoi'let, 29 ('al. App. 2d 87, 29 C:1. ltlptr. 874. 95 A.L.R.2d 839(1963). Buat sc,' Tloilnwa~v (ravel (o. v Mc'Kown. 200 La,. 917, 9 So. 21 228 (1942).
89. Inlon Oil (o., 23 L.D. 222 (1896), r11'd 111 rcPi'u, 25 IL.D). :351 (1897) : Wheeler
v. Smith, 5 Wa:sh. 704, 32 I'. 784 (1893). Sc I:.ray v,. Snith, 181 N.Y. 17R, 73 N.E. 963,
10G Am. St. Rep. 531, 2 Ann. cuas. 6;6 (1905):; (lbson v. 1'y.on, 5 Vatts, :14, 13 Morr.
Min. Rep. 72 (I'la. 1.936). (,f. 11,-ry v. Sly-laon, 151 Va. 2S, - , 144, S.i. 629, 623 (192S)
("n(!ih(!r t.h. laynlaj, nor the iawyer wild I]llyk or Itielsthne wt,.v'n metals ad. TinmriT
ar" referred to") : I'itgo't Mill. c.. v. iiii('y, 1 Wi.,li4. 2d 421, -- , 96 '.2,11 571, 573 (1939)
("ind,.r it mtrt.t di rinitin [tm worid 'Imi n.(rils'] 11igit be, Iladlt(.d to metallic su!-
x4taln .-. ).
90. ,c,',c Y.11. ]1i. 17 EIw. iII, No. 21 (1342), where' "'minrae d polirre'' nnd "de char-
hjon' " ' a ,r iiln.
91. Urited c 0 i S ' x rl. T(iinemsvii' Villev Auth. v. TIlarrI., 115 F."fd 343 (5(h ( fi. 1940)
I',. v. 111.,, 233, III. 5G, X4 N.,. .1; ( O11S); i:trlw',ll v. (',,mmn i, 10 N..T. Eq. 12S, 64
Al.,. Trh.-. 448, 3 Mort. MI.. llp. 229 (1851- I) I td. of county (oiin'l-x of laoosp,' it ' l.iny
v. ( , 44 N.M. 495, llS, lP.2d 470 (19.1S) Armntrong v. i.:, Chplaitlln C(ratnite (o.,
147 N.Y. 495, 42 N.I'. IN6, 49 Am. St. Iltep. 683. 18 Morr. Mll. netp. 279 (1895) : Mitrray
v. Allarld, 100 ''.iin. 10l, 4: S.W . :t55, 66 Am. St. It.1 . 740, 39 I.R.A. 249, 19 Mor'. Min.
It(;i. I;9 (1897) ; N,'pil il-ati.r & Mfr". 'o. v..i110 C i,.llly, :13 Ilntah 114, 93 1'. 53, 14
T.lt.A. (N.S.) ili3 (1907); it-fr',.y V. Itl,'-Iiioi,,, i.aiaii co., 112 W . Va.. 36O, 164 S.E.
29 I,8k Al.it. 9; (19:12); W nu. v. !o'.,;n ,, iinli & ( ,l ('i.. 11)3 WV. Va. 567. 137
S.H, 895 (1927). X-: Warnr v. lillion, 19 S.W.2d. liii ('l'ox. CIv. App. 1929). Tn Ilart-
will V. (0,- mi , ill N.i. i:.. 129. 64 An. De,'. 41. 152, 3 Morr. Min. Iiep. 221.
- --- 18 ). Ill,- voorIt' mnh/ld |im follow.s-: "No,- -,unIi ee4 anny propri-ly Inl ('onflnlln. theI
foonlilov#, or th"tI 'IP ler lol '( Iom I illy, oo1v or' tih'. stlbol'dI fll U. 4ivislons Into which the, l1lne'rall
Iflol- rfl l I111H two'll ,notl lvhh.eI by ('h-qlll.t-I[ . 111,1, f 'irflily, n ettllh. Klillno, or hllttlno nsl
9'. All,,| '. ti",,,i li .Iia, (',J-oiL loy l| '... 148 iP.2d 2014 (( nk . 1975): 1' linhfn dl,
1"1. NorI iiV ,,, I ly C' o. v . S. lll .l' l "I'l , 1 . !15 i5 .2d lO.X W il . 197),' Of. ' l\,-r i igtO ,.IMil, rdm.W. v \or:l. 'v I{,,m ,,nf'M~i~,d :131 So. 2d 97.8 (Lit.. App. 1976).
93~. Norlh.P i . 1,' , y . y'. S+t*ll+ M, INS U.S . 526 ( 1903)(ll'oll fi11 oll(] r a 'x,'llud I'1oil
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A body produced by the processes of :inorganic nature, having usually
a definite chemical composition and, if formed under favorable con-
ditions, a certain characteristic atomic structure which is expressed
in crystalline form and other physical properties. 4 Some courts have
therefore required that a substance have a definite chemical compo-
sition in order to be classified as a mineral.9 5
C. EXCLUSION OF "THE SOIL ITSELF"
Substances such as stone, sand, and gravel, which in some cases
comprise all or a substantial part of the surface, are in such cases
invariably held not to be included in a grant or reservation of min-
erals for the reason that to include such substances would be tanta-
mount to granting or reserving the land itself.9 Such a construction
would, in the case of a reservation of minerals, completely nullify
the grant fo the surface estate, 97 and would therefore be unreason-
able.98
In Bumpus v. United States,9 9 the Declaration of Taking in an
eminent domain proceeding reserved all oil, gas, and other minerals
to "the owner or owners of the subsurface estate." In holding that
gravel was not included in the reservation, the court said as follows:
"It would be more reasonable to conclude that a reservation to the
owners of the subsurface estate would be limited to minerals lying
below the sufrace and not those exposed at the surface and lying near
the surface of the land."'01° The fallacy inherent in this reasoning is
that no "subsurface estate" was reserved in the Declaration of Taking,
meaning of word "mineral").
94. E. DANA, A TEXTBOOK OF MINEROLOGY 1 (4th ed. 1932). See Carothers v. Mills, 233
S.W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
95. United States v. Aitken, 25 Phil. 7 (1913).
96. Harper v. Talladega County, 279 Ala. 365, 185 So. 2d 388 (1966); Farrell v. Sayre,
129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954); Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928).
See Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 128, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229: (1854) ;
Psencik v. Vessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Rock House Fork Land Co. v.
Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684, 17 A.L.R. 144 (1918). In Waring v.
Foden, [1932] 1 Ch. 276, - . 86 A.L.R. 969, 979 (1931), a case much cited by American
courts, Lord Justice Lawrence said: "[TIhe word 'minerals' when found in a reservation
out of a zrant of land means substances exceptional in use, in, value and in character . . .
and does not mean the ordinary soil of the district which if reserved would practically
swallow uo the grant .... "
97. Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954); Little v. Carter, 408 S.W.2d
207 (Ky. 1966); Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384 (1954) ; Holland
v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975); Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.,
150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962); State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707(1965): West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 228 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1976).
See Hartwell v. Canmran, 10 N.J. Eq. 128, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229 (1854).
The courts have seldom, if ever, expressed any concern about nullifying the mineral reser-
vation. Cf. Kalberer v. Grassbam, 282 Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d 940 (194,0) (grant of minerals,
reserving coal, natural gas, and coal oil).
9S. Carson v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.V.2d 97, 1 A.L.R.2d 784 (1948)
Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923); State Land
Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d: 707 (1954). See Campbell
v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924).
99. 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963).
100. Id. at 267.
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but rather the reservation was of "all oil, gas and other minerals."
The term "subsurface estate" was apparently used in the Declara-
tion of Taking to refer to the reserved mineral estate, under the er-
roneous assumption that the two phrases are identical in meaning.101
The court was therefore not justified in considering the term "sub-
surface estate" as a limitation upon the reserved mineral estate.
D. MINERALS REMOVED BY "MINING" 10 2
The word "mineral" is derived from the word "mine," and a
strict etymological interpretation would define "mineral" as a sub-
stance dug out of the earth by means of a mine. 10 3 Therefore, a
question closely related to the question of whether a grant or reser-
vation of "minerals" is limited to those substances not comprising
the soil itself is the question of whether a grant or reservation of
"minerals" is limited to those substances which are removed by
mining.'' °104 In thi's regard, two distinctions may be made. First,
"mining" may be limited to underground operations and thus distin-
guished from operations on the surface, such as strip mining and
quarrying.10 5 Second, "mining" may be limited to the extraction of
minerals in the solid state and thus distinguished from the pro-
duction of minerals such as oil and gas by means of wells.10 6
1. "Mining" v. Quarrying"
Some courts limit the word "minerals" to those substances which
can be removed by mining operations underground which would not
destroy the surface for agricultural purposes. 0 7 Most of these cases
101. It appears that some legislators, lawyers, and judges labor under the misappre-
hension that the term "subsurface estate" is a recognized term in the field of mineral
conveyancing. See, e.g., Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963); Act of
Aug. 13, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-587, § 8(b), 68 Stat. 718; 43 U.S.C. § 1613(f) (Supp. V
1975). The term "surface" or "surface estate" has a well recognized meaning which en-
compasses not only the superficies of the land but also all of the land not included in
the mineral grant or reservation. Gearhart v. McAlester Fuel Co., 199 Ark. 981, 136 S.W.2d
679 (1940) ; Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Neosho,
75 Kan. 335, 89 P. 750 (1907' ; Wilkes-Barre Twp. School Dist. v. Corgan, 402 Pa. 383,
170 A.2d 97 (1961). However, the complement of "surface" or "surface estate" is not
"subsurface" or "subsurface estate" but rather "mineral" or "mineral estate."
102. See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 787 (1948).
103. DarvIlle v. Roper, 3 Drew. 294, 61 Eng. Rep. 915, 10 Morr. Min. Rep. 406 (Ch. 1855).
104. The fact that a substance is not part of the soil itself does not necessarily mean
that it may he removed, by "mining," that is, by underground mining methods. Rock House
Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684, 17 A.L.R. 141
(1918).
105. See White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 1065, 140 Am. St. Rep. 618 (1910) ; Beury
v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928).
106. See Hudson v. McGuire, 188 Ky. 712, 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148 (1920)" Huie
Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922). Cf. Cornwell
v. Buck & Stoddard, 28 Cal. App. 2(1 331, 82 P.2d 516 (1918).
107. Carson v. Missouri Pac. By., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97. 1 A.L.R.2d 784 (1948)
Kinder v. LaSqale County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Il. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923): Acker V.
Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971); Rteinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994
(1949): Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 .E. 629 (1928). See Witherspoon v. Campbell,
219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384 (1954); Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ.
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deal with sand and gravel, building stone, and the like, substances
which are in any event difficult to classify as being mineral or non-
mineral, and which must be removed, if at all, by surface mining or
quarrying methods. In these cases the courts assume that inorganic
substances removed from the earth may be classified into two cate-
gories, those which must be removed by underground mining methods
and those which must be removed by surface mining methods, and
limit the word "minerals" to the former category. The fallacy of
this approach was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Northern
Pacific Railroad Company v. Soderberg'8 as follows;
Nor do we approximate much more closely to the meaning
of the word by treating minerals as substances which are
"mined," as distinguished from those which are "quarried,"
since many valuable deposits of gold, copper, iron and coal
lie upon or near the surface of the earth, and some of the
most valuable building stone, such, for instance, as the Caen
stone in France, is excavated from mines running far be-
neath the surface. 10 9
The better rule, therefore, is that in determining whether a par-
ticular substance is a mineral, it is immaterial whether the mining
operations employed to remove the substance are conducted entirely
underground or substantially on the surface. 1" 0
2. The Texas Rule: Acker v. Guinn
The difficulties which can arise when the rule limiting minerals
to those removable only by underground mining methods is applied
App. 1952). Occasionally the court Is influenced by the use of the term "mines and min-
erals." White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 1065, 140 Am. St. Rep. 618 (1910); Brady
V. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am. St. Rep. 531, 2 Ann. Cas. 636 (1905). Cf'.
Puget Mill. Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wash. 2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939)("Under a definition
coupling [the word 'minerals'] with mines it would include all substances taken out of the
bowels of the earth by the processes of mining."). The result mentioned In the text would
not follow if the surface were not adaptable to agricultural purposes. Dierks Lumber &
Coal Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949); Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 168,
109 So. 2d 628 (1959).
108. 188 U.S. 526 (1903).
109. Id. at 530. Accord, Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W
Va. 20, - 97 S.E. 684, 686, 17 A.L.R. 144, 146-47 (1918), where the court stated as
follows:
It would not do to say that the term includes only such substances as are
procured by tunneling and shafting, for it is well known that much gold was
procured by the process of placer mining, and surely no one would contend
that the term 'mineral' did not include gold, whether found upon the surface.
in the bed of a stream, or as a result of shafting and tunneling for the ore.
It is also well known that rich deposits of manganese and other like ores
are found upon the surface of the earth, and are sometimes secured without
either quarrying or mining, and it could not be contended that such ores when
so found are not minerals, but when secured by the process of tunneling and
shafting, or other similar mining processes, are minerals.
The court went on to hold, however, that the grant of mining rights appropriate to under-
ground mining evidenced the intent of the parties to limit the word "minerals" to those
substances removed by underground mining methods.
110. Diercks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W,.D. Ark. 1949).
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to substances otherwise generally recognized as minerals become
evident upon consideration of several recent Texas cases. The Texas
court held in Acker v. Guinn"' that a substance is not included in
a reservation of minerals if any portion of the substance lies so near
the surface that to be extracted it must be removed by methods
that will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface estate. The court
reasoned as follows:
The parties to a mineral lease or deed usually think of the
mineral estate as including valuable substances that are re-
moved from the ground by means of wells or mine
shafts. . . . It is not ordinarily contemplated, however, that
the utility of the surface for agricultural or grazing purposes
will be destroyed or substantially impaired. Unless the con-
trary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed, there-
fore, a grant or reservation of "minerals" or "mineral
rights" should not be construed to include a substance that
must be removed by methods that will, in effect, consume
or deplete the surface estate." 2
Several facets of the Texas rule should be noted. First, it is not
sufficient that the substance "may" be produced by surface mining
methods. It must be proved that, as of the date of the instrument
being construed, if the substance near the surface had been extracted,
that extraction would necessarily have consumed or depleted the sur-
face. 113 It is obvious, therefore, that in Texas every inquiry into the
meaning of the word "minerals" will involve a determination of the
mining methods available at the time of the conveyance and the
relative economics of those methods. Thus, if on the date of the
conveyance severing the mineral estate, a seam of coal could have
been economically extracted by underground mining methods, but
surface mining methods were unkown or uneconomical, the coal
could have been mined economically by surface mining methods, but
underground mining methods would have been uneconomical or tech-
nically impractical, then the coal would not be included in the reserva-
tion of minerals. But what of the situation where both surface mining
methods and underground mining methods are economical and tech-
nically practical, but the use of surface mining methods would be
more profitable than the use of underground mining methods? Does
the fact that underground mining methods are feasible take the case
out of the rule of Acker v. Guinn, even though the owner of the coal
will undoubtedly use surface mining methods? Or does the fact that
the use of surface mining methods is almost a certainty, even though
underground mining methods are feasible place the case within the
111. Acke' v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
112. d. at 352.
113. Reed v. W'Vylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
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rule of Acker v. Guinn? Or does the effect of the mineral reservation
depend upon the method by which the coal is actually mined?
Second, since the scope of a reservation depends to a great ex-
tent upon the economics and technology of mineral production at the
time of the conveyance, successive grants or reservations of minerals
using identical language may have different effects. For example,
at a time when surface mining of deep seams of coal is not practical
because no equipment large enough to economically remove the
overburden is available, A conveys blackacre to B, reserving "all
minerals" and warranting title to the interest conveyed. Later, after
equipment which can economically remove the overburden becomes
available, and at a time when underground mining of the coal in
question is uneconomical, B conveys blackacre to C, reserving "all
minerals" and warranting title to the interest conveyed. Under the
rule of Acker v. Guinn, A has reserved the coal, but B has purported
to convey and has warranted title to the coal.
Third, the rule of Acker v. Guinn had its inception in a desire to
prevent, in the first instance, the destruction of "the surface for ag-
ricultural or grazing purposes." Therefore, if the method of extraction
would have required the removal of the surface soil, it is immaterial
that it would have been possible to restore or reclaim the surface.",
The as yet unanswered question is whether the rule of Acker v. Guinn
has any application to lands the surface of which is in any event un-
suitable for agriculture or grazing.
Fourth, "The thinking or intention or knowledge of the parties,
or the lack of knowledge, would also be immaterial." ' 15 Thus, the
Texas rule is a rule of law, not a rule of construction. 116 Furthermore,
it would appear that it is a rule of law based upon the geological
facts as they exist at the time of the conveyance in which the mineral
estate is severed, even though those geological facts are not known
to the parties. Thus, for example, suppose the parties know only of
a deep-lying vein of high-grade copper ore, mineable only by under-
ground mining methods, and on the basis of that knowledge insert a
reservation of "all minerals," intending to reserve the vein of copper.
If it is subsequently determined that there exists on the property a
large low grade copper porphyry deposit which, on the date of the
conveyance in question could have been economically mined only by
surface mining methods, under the rule of Acker v. Guinn the reser-
vation of "all minerals" would not include copper. The owner -of the
mineral estate can therefore never be certain whether a particular
mineral is included in the mineral estate until he has established
114. Id. ,Sec also Villiforcd v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
115. R,,ed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169. 172 (Tex. 1977).
116. WVilliford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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that the land contains no deposits of the particular mineral which, if
mined on the date of the conveyance, would necessarily have been
mined by surface mining methods.
Fifth, the value of the substance in question, either on the date
of the instrument or at any subsequent date, is immaterial. 1 7 Also,
presumably, the value of the substance in question as compared with
the value of the surface for grazing or agricultural purposes is for
the extraction of the substance in question, the rule of Acker v. Guinn,
which was designed to prevent the destruction of the surface, would
merely permit the surface to be destroyed by the owner of the sur-
face estate rather than by the owner of the mineral estate.
Sixth, once it is determined that a particular substance is not in-
cluded in a grant or reservation of minerals, that determination ap-
plies to all deposits of that substance in the particular property, at
whatever depths they may be found. As the Texas court said:
It is improper therefore to declare that the surface owner
is entitled to only so much of the substance as may be pro-
duced by strip mining or pit mining. We are not dividing the
right to produce the substance; we are construing the instru-
ment of conveyance to ascertain the ownership of the sub-
stance.118
It is not clear whether the rule of Acker v. Guinn would apply to
all land described in a particular deed or only on a parcel by parcel
basis. Where several parcels of land are being conveyed with a
reservation of minerals, it may be prudent to execute a separate
deed for each parcel, to avoid the possibility that a near-surface
deposit of minerals on one parcel would cause the rule of Acker v.
Guinn to be applied to all land included in the transaction.
It appears that the rule of Acker v. Guinn contains enough mis-
chief to provide employment for several generations of Texas real
property and mineral lawyers.
E. STATUTES
In several states, statutes have placed a limitation upon the word
"minerals" as used in private conveyances and in other contexts.
1. Colorado
A Colorado statute relating to conveyancing provides as follows:
As respects instruments executed prior to May 17, 1974,
which convey title to real property or an interest therein, it
117. Reed v. WVylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
118. Id. at 172.
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shall be presumed that reference to minerals or mineral
rights does not include geothermal resources unless geother-
mal resources are specifically mentioned. As respects such
instruments executed on or after May 17, 1974, reference to
minerals or mineral rights shall not include geothermal re-
sources unless specifically mentioned. 119
2. Florida
A Florida statute enacted in 1959 provides as follows: "When-
ever the word "minerals" is hereafter used in any deed, lease or
other contract in writing, said word or term shall not include any
of the following: topsoil, muck, peat, humus, sand and common clay,
unless expressly provided in said deed, lease or other contract in
writing."'120
3. Illinois
The Illinois Uniform Principal and Income Act, in providing for
the disposition of proceeds of an interest in minerals or natural re-
sources, provides as follows: "For purposes of this section, the terms
'minerals' and 'natural resources' do not include soil, sod, dirt, turf,
water or mosses."'
'1 2
4. Michigan
A Michigan statute dealing with the sale or lease of state lands
provides as follows: "For the purpose of this section, 'mineral rights'
shall not include 'sand, clay or other nonmetallic minerals.' ,,122
5. North Dakota
A North Dakota statute enacted in 1969 provides as follows:
No conveyance of mineral rights or royalties separate
from the surface rights in real property 'in this state, ex-
cluding leases, shall be construed to grant or convey to the
grantee thereof any interest in and to any gravel, coal, clay
or uranium unless the intent to convey such interest is spe-
cifically and separately set forth in the instrument of convey-
ance.
No lease of mineral rights in this state shall be con-
strued as passing any interest to any minerals except those
minerals specifically included and set forth by name in the
119. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-121 (Supp. 1976).
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.20 (West 1969).
121. ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 30, § 168 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). Section 9(c) of the Re-
vised Uniform Principal and Income Act provides: "This section does not apply to tim-
ber, water, soil, sod, dirt, turf, or mosses."
122. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13-441 (1973).
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lease. For the purposes of this paragraph the naming of
either a specific metalliferous element, or nonmetalliferous
element, and if so stated in lease, shall be deemed to include
all of its compounds and by-products, and in the case of
oil and gas, all associated hydrocarbons produced in a liquid
or gaseous form so named shall be deemed to be included
in the mineral named. The use of the words "all other min-
erals" or similar words of an all-inclusive nature in any lease
shall not be construed as leasing any minerals except those
minerals specifically named in the lease and their compounds
and by-products. 123
In Reiss v. Rummel'J2 4 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that this
statute did not apply in the case of a reservation or exception of
mineral interests. Thereafter, in 1975, North Dakota enacted the fol-
lowing statute:
In any deed, grant, or conveyance of the title to the
surface of real property executed on or after July 1, 1975, in
which all or any portion of the minerals are reserved or ex-
cepted and thereby effectively precluded from being trans-
ferred with the surface, the use of the word "minerals" or
the phrase "all other minerals" or similar words or phrases
of an all-inclusive nature shall be interpreted to mean only
those minerals specifically named in the deed, grant, or con-
veyance and their compounds and byproducts.1 2 3
V. INTERPRETATION
A. CHOICE OF LAW
Except where a federal statute is involved,' 86 the interpretation
of the word "minerals" in a grant or reservation is a question of
state law and the federal courts are controlled by the law of the
particular state in which the question arises.'2 7
B. DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATUTES AND PRIVATE CON-
VEYANCES
In determining the meaning of the word "minerals" in a statute,
it is appropriate to look to the intended purpose of the statute and
123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (Supp. 1977).
124. 232 N.W.2d 40 (N.D. 1975).
125. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-25 (Supp. 1977).
126. See United States v. Bumpus, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963),.
127. Sloan v. Peabody Coal Co., 547 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1977) Western Coal Min. Co.
v. Middleton, 362 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1966) ; Mothner v. Ozark Real Estate Co., 300 F.2d
617 (8th Cir. 1962); Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412
(8th Cir. 195S); New York State Nat. Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Dev. Corp., 278
F.2d 577 (3rd Cir. 1950); Rowe v. Chesapeake Min. Co., 156 F.2dl 752 (6th Cir. 1946);
Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1943); Cran v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F.2d 824
(8th Cir. 1928) ; Thomas v. Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1973);
Mining Corp. of Arkansas v. International Paper Co., 324 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Ark. 1971) ;
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to the means of accomplishing that purpose by the proper applica-
tion of the language used.1 2 8 If a grant or reservation is made pur-
suant to a federal or state statute, it must be construed in light of
the statute pursuant to which it was made.J29 Public grants receive
a construction which supports the claim of the government rather
than that of the individual. Nothing passes by implication, and un-
less the language of the grant is clear and explicit as to the property
conveyed, a construction will be adopted which favors the sovereign
rather than the grantee.1 30 In construing private grants, on the other
hand, the intention of the parties controls, 31 and such grants are
frequently construed most strongly against the grantor. 32 Therefore,
cases interpreting public grants may not be particularly helpful in
interpreting a private grant,'3 3 even where a public grant and a pri-
vate grant relate to the same lands.'3 4
C. CONSTRUCTION OF LANGUAGE OF INSTRUMENT OR STATUTE
1. Generally
It is remarkable that, considering the number of cases in which
the question of whether a particular substance is a mineral arises,
the courts have infrequently addressed themselves to whether the
question is one of law or of fact. The Supreme Court, in a case
involving the application of a tariff act using the words "mineral
and bituminous substances in a crude state," said as follows: "The
words used are not technical, either as having a special sense by
commercial usage, nor as having a scientific meaning different from
their popular meaning. They are the words of common speech, and,
as such, their interpretation is within the judicial knowledge, and,
therefore, matter of law.' '13 5
In Texas the word "minerals" includes oil and gas as a matter
of law,136 and in North Dakota whether coal and lignite are -minerals
Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949). See Delta Drilling
Co. v. Arnett, 186 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1950) ; United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth.
v. Harris, 115 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1940).
128. State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
129. Burke v. Southern Pac. Ry., 234 U.S. 669 (1914) ; Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co.,
118 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1960) ; Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972) ; Salzseider
V. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959) ;,Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d
873 (1946) ; State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d
707 (1965).
130. United States v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526(1903).
131. See notes 157-70 infra, and text accompanying.
132. See notes 222-32 infra, and text accompanying.
138. See Geothermal Kinetics v. Union Oil Co., - Cal. App. 3d- , 141 Cal. Rptr. 879
(1977) ; Whittel v. Wolff, 249 Ore. 217, 437 P.2d 114 (1968) ; Campbell v. Tennessee Coal,
Iron & Ry. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924) ; Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217
S.W.2d 994 (1949). But cf. Rowe v. Chesapeake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1945).
134. See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 563 (1941).
135. Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11, 12 (1885).
136. Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.
1964) ; Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800, 127
A.L.R. 1217 (1940) ; Rio Bravo Oil Co. V. McEntire, 128 Tex. 124, 95 S.W.2d 381, af]d in
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has been held to be a question of law. 13 7 A lower Texas court, on
the other hand, has stated that whether a given substance is or is
not a mineral within the meaning of a grant or reservation is usually
a question of fact, 13 and the Arkansas courts have maintained that
whether a substance is included in a grant or reservation of "min-
erals" is a question of fact. 1 9 It is probably more correct to say that
it is a mixed question of law and fact. In any event, it is a question
to be decided in light of the purpose of the instrument,'14 0 the circum-
stances of the particular case,' 4 ' and the context in which the words
of grant or reservation are used.'4 2 The entire instrument must be
considered, 4 3 and therefore it is essential that the court have before
it not only the granting clause or reservation itself but all of the
provisions of the instrument containing the grant or reservation. 14
Effect must be given to each relevant word and clause," 5 and when
a particular word or phrase is used, it should not be interpreted so
as to vitiate specific provisions of the conveyance. 14 6
As a general rule, where language of certain import is used in
an instrument, it will be presumed that the parties intended the
language to have its ordinary and accepted meaning, unless there
is a clear expression of intent that the language was used in a dif-
ferent sense.147 Therefore, where there is a grant or reservation of
"minerals" without other words of limitation or restriction, 48 it is
generally held that all substances legally cognizable as minerals
part, rev'd in part on rehearing, 128 Tex. 124, 96 S.W.2d 1110 (1936).
137. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973) (lignite); Abbey v. State, 202
N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972) (coal).
138. Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
139. Mothner v. Ozark Real Estate Co., 300 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Brizzolara v.
Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949).
140. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
141. Id. See also Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.
1960).
142. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); State Land Bd. v.
State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
143. Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973) ; River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v.
Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 1976) ; Praeletorian Diamond
Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Murphy v. Van Voorhls, 94
W. Va. 475, 119 S.E. 297 (1923); Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973) (the term
"mineral lease" construed in light of reservation of "oil, gas and kindred minerals"). In
Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. at -, 508 P.2d at 900, the Kansas court attached unusual
importance to the title of the document. The court said :
Of Importance is the fact that the original parties to the lease designated
It an "OIL AND GAS LEASE". These words in themselves are limiting. If
the parties, at the time the lease was executed, desired the lessees to have
more than a simple lease for oil and gas, they would have broadened the
title of the leasing Instrument.
144. It is error to sustain a demurrer to a complaint if the entire document is not In-
corporated in the complaint. Puget Mill. Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wash. 2d 421, 96 P.2d' 571 (1939).
145. Schreier v. Chicago & N. Rv., 96 Il. App. 2d 425, 239 N.E.2d 281 (1968) ; Beck v.
Harvey, 196 Okla. 270, 164 P.2d 399 (1944): State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash.
219, 89 P. 565 (1907) ; Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937).
146. Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958)
MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957).
147. Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684,
17 A.L.R. 144 (1918).
148. Cf. Besing v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 155 Tnd. App. 527, - , 293 N.E.2d 510, 513-14,
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are granted or reserved, 1"" and that if the ordinary and accepted
meaning 'is to be changed or restricted, the langugae used to do so
must be reasonably clear to show that intent.15° The burden of proof
is upon the party who contends that the grant or reservation encom-
passes less than the law would attribute to the word "minerals. ' 151
In Oklahoma, on the other hand, it is held that "all rights. . . which
are not conferred in direct terms or by fair implication are to be
considered withheld.'0 5 2
The rule discussed in the preceding paragraph is of limited use
in borderline cases, for there remains the problem of determining
what substances are "legally cognizable as minerals." As a Texas
court said in Psencik v. Wessels: 153
No doubt every inorganic component of the earth's crust is
legally cognizable as mineral, if the parties affected choose
so to deal with it; and this no doubt is true regardless of
whether it may be removed or extracted for commercial or
other profitable purposes. We know of no rule which would
deny the owner of the soil the right to sever the title of any
such component from the general title to the soil. Such sev-
erance would unquestionably constitute a mineral title. The
term "legally cognizable as minerals" must therefore be re-
stricted to such minerals and mineral substances as are com-
monly regarded as minerals as distinguished from the soil
in general.15'
The intent of the parties, therefore, is not their subjective intent
59 A.L.R.3d 1137, 1143 (1973) : "In the instant case there was not a grant of all minerals
without qualifying language, but rather a grant of 'other minerals' as qualified by the
words 'oil, gas, and' immediately preceding 'other minerals'."
149. Rowe v. Chesapeake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Stowers v. Hunting-
ton Dev. & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934); Dingess v. Huntington Dev. & Gas
Co., 271 F. 864 (4th Cir. 1921); Lovelace v. Southwest Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513 (6th
Cir. 1920); Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941);
Kalberer v. Grassham, 282 Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d 940 (1940); Maynard v. McHenry, 271
Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13 (1938) ; Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v. Preece, 260 Ky. 601,
86 S.W.2d 163 (1935) ; Bolen v. Casebolt, 252 Ky. 17, 66 S.W.2d 19 (1933) ; Scott v. Laws,
185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81, 13 A.L.R. 369 (1919); Kentucky Diamond Min. & Developing
Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910); Weaver v.
Richards, 156 Mich. 320, 120 N.W. 818 (1909); Bulger v. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316, 138
N.W.2d 18 (1965) ; White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 1065, 140 Am. St. Rep. 618 (1910)
Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4
Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955); Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 166 Va. 524, 186 S.E.
20 (1936) ; Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937) ; Norman v. Lewis, 100
W. Va. 432, 130 S.E. 913 (1926) ; Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 307
(1908).
150. McCombs v. Stevenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867 (1907); Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa.
195, 62 A. 832 (1906) ; Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292,
86 A.L.R. 966 (1932). See Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d
412 (8th Cir. 1958) ; MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957) ; Burdette v. Bruen,
118 W. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937) ; Horse Creek Land & Min. Co. v. Midkiff, 81 W. Va
616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918).
151. United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972); Western
Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 562 (1955).
152. Cronkhtte v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396, 398 (Okla. 1960).
153. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.,V.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
154. Id. at 660-61.
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but their objective intent, which is to be determined by considering
the common meaning of the word mineral at the date of the instru-
ment in question.'""
Words may shift in meaning over a peroid of time, but in con-
struing an instrument they must be read in the sense in which they
were commonly used when the instrument was written and in which
the parties then understood them.15 6
2. Intent
In construing a deed or other instrument granting or reserving
minerals the courts usually say that the purpose of construing an in-
strument is to give effect to the intention of the parties; 157 that in
construing a grant or reservation of minerals it is necessary, if pos-
sible, to ascertain the intention of the parties; 158 that the intention of
the parties controls, 59 or at least is a primary consideration,6 0 in
the interpretation of an instrument; that where the intention of the
parties can be ascertained from the instrument, arbitrary rules of
construction will not be used; 161 and that even where the words used
by the parties have a well-defined technical meaning, the context
may qualify the technical meaning so as to construe it to conform
to the intention of the parties.182
The difficulties with determining the "intention of the parties" is
that in the typical case which comes before the court the parties
have given no thought whatever to whether the substance in question
should be included in or excluded from the grant or reservation of
minerals. The court must therefore determine the "intention of the
parties" by determining, as best it can, what the intention of the
parties would have been had they thought about the matter. In so
doing, the court must look first to the language of the instrument
itself, and the express language of an instrument, taken as a whole,
will overcome any supposed intention. 13
In the typical case the court is presented with the problem of
155. Thomas v. Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 4,98 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
156. Franklin Fluorspur Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454 29 S.W.2d 665 (1931); Carothers
v. Mills, 233 S.W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
157. Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684,
17 A.L.R. 144 (1918).
158. Clements v. Morgan, 307 Ky. 496, 221 S.W.2d 164 (1948); Brady v. Smith, 181
N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am. St. Rep. 531, 2 Ann. Cas. 636 (1905); Gibson v. Tyson,
5 Watts 34, 13 Morr. Min. Rep. 72 (Pa. 1836).
159. Clements V. Morgan, 307 Ky. 496, 211 S.W.2d 164 (1948); Hudson v. McGuire, 188
Ky. 712, 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148 (1920); Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832
(1906) ; Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955) ; Murphy v. Van
Voorhis, 94 W. Va. 475, 119 S.E. 297 (1923).
160. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949); Schreier
v. Chicago & N. Ry., 96 II. App. 2d 425, 239 N.E.2d 281 (1968); Cronkhlte v. Falken-
stein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960).
161. Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955).
162. Murphy v. Van Voorhis, 94 W. Va. 475, 119 S.E. 297 (1923).
163. Id.
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determining whether one or more particular substances, not specifi-
cally mentioned in the instrument itself, are to be included within
the meaning of the word "minerals." The efforts of the court are
thus directed toward determining the nonexistent intention of the
parties with respect to the particular substances in question, rather
than the general intent of the parties with respect to their use of
the word "minerals." For example, in McKinney's Heirs v. Central
Kentucky Natural Gas Co.,114 the Kentucky court said as follows:
[Tihe only question to be considered is whether the con-
veyances referred to include natural gas. It will be observed
that gas is not specifically mentioned in either of the deeds;
but in all of them the word "minerals" is used, which coun-
sel for the parties concede, when given its broadest meaning,
includes natural gas. But the question to be determined is:
What was the intention of the parties to the deeds at the
times they were made? Did the grantors understand at that
time that oil and gas were minerals and would pass with the
other minerals named in the conveyances; and did they in-
tend to convey the gas? In other words, did the minds of
the parties to the conveyances meet upon the question? Did
the one understand that he was conveying, and the other that
he was purchasing, the gas thereunder? If not, the gas did
not pass with the conveyances. 65
This mineral-by-mineral approach manifests itself in discussions
of the knowledge of the parties to a conveyance of the presenceof
the particular substance in the land in question, or of its value if
its presence be known,'166 or of the absence or existence of develop-
ment of the particular substance in the vicinity.167 The "mineral by
mineral" approach to determining the "intention" of the parties
will seldom result in a finding that a substance not specifically
named is deemed to be a mineral, for the courts apply a sort of
beg-the-question rule of construction by holding that a particular
substance is not included in a grant or reservation of "minerals" on
the ground that if the parties had intended to include the substance
they would have mentioned it specifically. 68 For example, in McKin-
ney's Heirs the court said as follows:
[I]f the excitement at that time was caused by the discovery
of natural gas, it is strange that in drawing the conveyances
they did not use words which would have, without doubt, in-
cluded natural gas.... If natural gas was in the minds of the
parties at the time of the execution of the conveyances, we
164. 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314, 20 Ann. Cas. 934 (1909).
165. Id. at - , 120 S.W. at 315.
166. See notes 258-72 infra, and text accompanying.
167. See notes 273-78 infra, and text accompanying.
168. Wulf v. Shultz. 211 Kan. 724. - , 508 P.2d 896. 901 (1973) ("Surely, if the parties
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would expect to find expressions or terms which would refer
specifically to the rights and privileges necessary to the de-
velopment of it.169
Notwithstanding decisions such as these, it must be recognized that
a determination that the parties did not have a particular substance
in mind is not a solution of the problem of whether that substance is
included in the term "minerals," but is merely a statement of the
problem.
If the interpretation of an instrument is governed by a positive
rule of law, the intention of the parties is, of course, immaterialY.7 0
3. Ejusdem Generis
Courts sometimes apply the rule of construction known by the
Latin phrase ejusdem generis; that is, "of the same kind.'' 1 7 Under
this rule, where general words follow the enumeration of particular
minerals, 72 the general words will be construed as applicable only
to minerals of the same general character or class as those enumer-
ated.'73 For example, in holding that water is not included in a grant
had contemplated that the lease was to cover minerals other than oil and gas, or related
substances, they would have mentioned them specifically in. the lease.") ; McKinney's
Heirs v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, - , 120 S.W. 314, 316 20 Ann.
Cas. 934, - (1909) ("We may here remark that. if the excitement at time was caused
by the discovery of natural gas, it is strange that in drawing the conveyances they did not
use words which would have, without doubt, include! natural gas.") : Holloway Gravel
Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, - , 9 So. 2d 228, 234 (1942) ("It would have been a very
simple matter, granting that all the parties agreed to the reservation of sand and. gravel,
to have used those words in addition to the words 'minerd, oil and gas rights'."); Detlor
v. Holland, 57 Ohio 492, 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A. 266 (189) ("If [oil was intended to be
included in the conveyanc], apt words wounuht have been used to express such intention."):
Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964): Bundy v. Myers, 372 Pa. 583, 94
A.2d 724 (1953): Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882)("More-
over, we may be very sure that when Wood & Co. made their contract with Kirkpatrick,
they did not intend to reserve the mineral oil that might afterward be found In the land.
otherwise that intention would have been expressed in no doubtful terms.") ; Beury v. Shel-
ton, 151 W. Va. 28, - , 144 S.F. 629, 633 (1928)("If It had been in.tended to reser'e
limestone, Iti seems rather ('lear that it would have been done explicitly .. "): Murphy
v. Va n Voorhis, 94 W. Vai. 475, -, 119 S.E. 297, 299 (1923) ("If it was intended to re-
serve the ga.q, coal, clay.s, manganese, or any other mineral of like kind or character,
world It not Ie ineumbent upon the grantor to so state? Can we write these other words
Into the reservation?). Sec Keller v. Ely, 192 Kan. 69R, 391 P.2d 132 (1964) ("had the
grlntor (Ely) intendled to reserve gypsum It would have been very easy to have specifi-
cally sahl so In the quite lengthy reservation").
I;9. 134 Ky. at 1--, 20 S.W\. -it 316. The mineral-by-mineral approach in MclKinney's
lfeirq seems to have been rejected by the Kentu'ky courrt in the subsequent case of Ken-
tureky Diamtond Min. & Itevelopin (o. v. Eentneiky '"rans'aal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97,
1:2 S.W. 397, Ann. Cas. 1912t'! 417 (1910). R,; note 270 iifrn, and text accompanying.
170. Rfeed] v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1977).
1.71. lBnmpns v. Tnited States, 325 ,.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963) State Land Bd. v. State
Dep't of Fish & (.lm, 17 lIt:b 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965) ; West Virginia Dep't of High-
ways v. Fartrer, 228 S.E.2d 717 (V. Va. 1976).
172. Thn runle does riot aiply where the gene'ral words precede the enuineration of spe-
cifi minuerals. Anderson E,(rr Drilling" Co. v. lrnhlmeyer, 1.14 Tex. 574, 13G S.W.2d 800,
127 A. ,.R. 1217 (1940). Contr, Holloway Gravel Co. v. MeKowun, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d
22R (1942).
173. Bturmprrs v. Tnited Stath, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963) : Wulf v. Shnltz, 211 Kari.
724. 50R P.2d 996 (197.) ; Keller v. Ely, 192 Kan. 698, 391 P.2d 132 (196.1) : Cronkhite v.
Fnlkensteln. 352 1'.2d 3.9 (t)kin. 1910): Wolf v. Blickwell Oil & Gas Co., 77 Okla. 81.
186 P. 484 (1320) ; Right of Way Oi Co. v. Gladys City Oil Co.. 106 Tex. 94, -, 157
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of "oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt and all other minerals of every
kind or character" the Oklahoma court in Vogel v. Cobb1"4 said as
follows:
The minerals specifically named in the deeds (coal, oil,
petroleum, gas and asphalt) are of a species or class which
does not include water. The former are valuable minerals of
a somewhat similar chemical composition, existing in limited
amounts, which are ordinarily extracted from the earth and
sold for profit, but which serve no useful function in connec-
tion with the use and enjoyment of the surface. Water, on the
other hand, is of quite a different chemical composition, is
not ordinarily thought of as valuable, but is necessary to
life and the use and enjoyment of the surface. 175
The difficulty in applying the rule of ejusdem generis comes in
determining what general character of the named minerals must be
found in the other minerals. For example, the general character of
coal may be that it is a hydrocarbon,'7 6 that it is primarily used for
fuel, 1'77 that it is usually the subject of prospecting and mining,"78 or
that it is a solid mineral in place,'7 9 requiring mining for its removal
instead of drilling, 80 among others. As a Texas court said in Luse v.
Boatman: 'l8
If we should 'ipply. the rule of ejusdem generis, what
qualities or peculiarities of the specified type, "coal," shall
be considered in determining the classification intended by
the use of the word "mineral"? Are we to classify according
to value? If so, can it be said that oil and gas on the one
hand and coal on the other are of different kinds or species
of minerals? If we classify as to use, is it not true that all
S.W. 737, 740 (1913) (the phrase "timber, earth, stone and mineral" does not include oil
and gas because "the general words wil not include any of a class superior to that to
which the particular words belong"); State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish and Game,
17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965). See Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La.
917, 9 So. 2d 228 (1942). The naming of but one mineral is not an enumeration. Shell Oil
Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1943).
174. 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943).
175. Id. at - , 141 P.2d at 280. Cf. People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E.
59, 16 L.R.A. 443, 31 Am. St. Rep. 433 (1892) ("Water, petroleum, oil, and gas are gen-
erally classed by themselves as minerals possessing in. some degree a kindred nature"),
176. Sce Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1943); Christman v. Emineth,
212 N.W,.2d 543 (N.D. 1973) (lignite) ; %Vaugh v. Thompson Land) & Coal Co., 103 W. Va.
567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927).
177. See Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1943); Christman v. Emineth, 212
N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973) (lignite).
17,. State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish and Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707
(1965).
179. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973) (lignite).
180. Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922). Tn
Federal Gas, Oil & Coal v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941), the grant was of
"coal salt-water and minerals". The court held that the doctrine of ejusdcln generis did
not exclude oil and gas because "the deed conveys both solid and liquid minerals and It
is within the common knowledge of mankind that oil Is usually found in salt-water, or at
least in close proximity thereto." Id. at -, 161 S.W.2d at 48.
181. 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Cir. App. 1919).
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three are used, for fuel? Shall the classification be deter-
mined by the form, density, color, weight, value, or uses of
the particular species mentioned? Taking either value, use,
or nature of origin as the basis of the classification men-
tioned, can we say that oil and coal do not belong to the
same class? It is true that coal in its commercial form is
found in a solid state, while oil is a liquid. But are we just-
ified in limiting the minerals intended to be included in the
reservation to those only which are found in a solid state?
Such evident difficulty in applying the rule of ejusdem generis
to the terms of the reservation under consideratiion renders
it an unsafe guide, and we do not believe any aid in the in-
terpretation of the terms used in the reservation will be af-
forded by such rule. 82
For the reasons expressed in the foregoing quotation, some courts
have rejected the rule. 85
In Bundy v. Myers'84 it was contended that under the rule
of ejusdem generis natural gas should, be included in a reserva-
tion of "oil, coal, fire clay and minerals," but the Pennsylvania
court held that it was not included, saying as follows: "If oil and
gas were intended to be included in the 'minerals' reserved, then
why was the oil expressly reserved? Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."' 'I s This curious bit of judicial reasoning not only does away
with the rule of ejusdem generis, but effectively nullifies the phrase
"and minerals," for it might be said of any mineral sought to be
brought within the scope of the reservation, why was that mineral
excluded, while coal, or oil, or fire clay was expressly reserved?
The problem of determining the "general character" of the named
minerals is of particular importance in applying the rule of ejusdem
generis to grants or reservations of, or leases for, "oil, gas and
other minerals." Some courts have held that the term "other min-
erals" is limited to hydrocarbons,' 8' while other courts have limited
it to minerals, whether hydrocarbon or non-hydrocarbon, produced
as a component or constituent of oil and gas,' 87 or to minerals that
182. Id. at 1099.
183. Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.
1964); Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1097 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Western Dev. Co. v.
Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d' 452 (1955). See Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365 (7th
CIr. 1943); Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973); Acker v. Gulnn, 464
S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
184. 372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724 (1953).
185. Id. at -, 94 A.2d at 726.
186. West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 228 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1976). See
Norman v. Lewis, 100 W. Va. 432, 130 S.E. 913 (1926). Contra, Sloan v. Peabody Coal
Co., 547 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1977) (chemical similarity between coal and oil does not ren-
der them of the same general character.)
187. Allen v. Farmers Union Co-operative Royalty Co.. 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975):
Panhandle Co-operative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971); West v.
Aetna Life Insurance Co., 536 P.2d 393 (Okla. App. 1974). In Panhandle the Oklahoma
court said, "we did not use ejusdem generis In our interpretation of this deed," but rather
held that the phrase "other minerals" Is unambiguous and served solely the "special
purpose" of extending the connotation of oil and gas to include cewinghead gas and "other
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can be produced in connection with, and as an incident of the pro-
duction of oil and gas by means of a well.188 The North Dakota courts,
relying upon other provisions of the instrument to be construed,
have rejected both limitations. 189
The problem of determining the appropriate general character
of the named minerals can be avoided, of course, by the simple ex-
pedient of merely stating that the substance in question is not of the
same general character as the named minerals, without attempting
to state exactly what that general character is.190
The rule of ejusdem generis is a rule of construction only, and
therefore there are a number of circumstances in which it should
not be applied. First, the rule should not be applied to avoid giving
the words of a statute or instrument their ordinary meaning. In
Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County,' 9 the Utah court expanded
upon this principle as follows:
The doctrine of ejusdem generis is, however, only a rule of
construction, and, like all rules, is resorted to only as an
aid to the courts in ariving at the true intent of the lawmaker.
These rules must not be applied so as to make them masters,
since they are designed as servants merely. No rules of con-
struction, however, can be permitted to override the funda-
mental principle underlying all rules which requires that all
words contained within a statute must, if possible, be given
their ordinary meaning, and that the intention of the law-
maker must be gathered from the language employed in the
light of the context and of the subject-matter to which it
is applied, and when such intention is clear it must prevail
notwithstanding some rules to the contrary. 192
Second, the rule should not be applied where the intention is
clear and unambiguous.' 9' The general words following the enumer-
minerals produced as oil or gas or produced as a component or constituent thereof." In
Allen, however, the Oklahoma court said that in Panhandle "we used the rule of ejusdem
generis."
188. River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878 (La.
App. 1976). Cf. Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 228 (1942)("the
reservation indicates that only minerals likened unto oil and gas, and not to solids, such
as sand and gravel, were in the contemplation of the parties") ; Witherspoon v. Campbell,
219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384 (1954)(in the phrase "oil, gas, and other minerals" the term
"other minerals" refers to "other minerals of like kind and character which are not a
part of the soil, such as the oil and gas specifically mentioned").
189. Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958)
MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957).
190. Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan.
724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973); Keller v. Ely, 192 Kan. 698, 991 P.2d 132 (1964); Cronkhite
v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960) ; Wolf v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 77 Okla. 81,
186 P. 484 (1920) ("oil and other minerals" does not Include gas because "other minerals"
must be construed to be minerals "of like character"); Highland v. Commonwealth, 400
Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960) ; Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960).
191. 33 Utah 114, 93 P. 53, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1043 (1907).
192. Id. at - , 93 P. at 56.
193. Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 108, 109 So. 2d 628 (1959); Anderson Kerr Drilling
Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R. 1217 (1940); Burdette v.
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ation of particular minerals may be so all-encompassing as to indi-
cate that the rule should not be applied. For example, a reservation
of named minerals "and all other minerals of any kind whatsoever"
is not a proper case for the application of the rule. 194
Third, conversely, where the particular things enumerated are
complete so that there remain no others of like kind, then the things
which fall within the general words must be assumed to be of a
different kind, and the rule of ejusdem generis is not applicable. 95
At times a court, although not appying the rule of ejusdern
generis, will be influenced by an enumeration of substances. 196 For
example, in Henry v. Lowe,' 97 a statute providing for treble damages
against any person who digs, quarries, or carries away "any stones,
ore or mineral, gravel, clay or mould, roots, fruits or plants" was
held to include coal, the court saying as follows:
The statute does not undertake to enumerate the various ores
or minerals, for the disturbance or removal of which it al-
lows damages, but it embraces all minerals. Coal is a well
known mineral of great value, which has been mined in this
State from an early period, and it would appear strange in-
deed if the law should punish the removal of stone, gravel
or clay with treble damages, and allow only single damages
for the wrongful removal of coal. 198
Occasionally the reservation itself will incorporate language in-
dicating that the "other minerals" must be similar to those enumer-
ated. For example, a reservation of "all of the oil, gas and kindred
minerals" does not include uranium. 99
4. Grant or Reservation of Operating or Mining Rights
The grant or reservation of a mineral estate includes by neces-
sary implication the grant or reservation of the right to use so much
of the surface as is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the
mineral estate.2 0 0 If the deed by which the mineral estate is severed
also undertakes to grant or reserve specific operating or mining
rights, and if those rights are granted or reserved by language having
reference to a particular mineral or kind of mineral, it may be con-
Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937). See Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. V.
Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971).
194. Watkins v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 231 S.W.2d 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
But see Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943).
195. Nenhi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 P. 53, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1043 (1907).
196. See Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.3d
1137 (1973).
197. 73 Mo. 96 (1880).
198. Id. at 99.
199. Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973).
200. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966
(1932).
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tended that the grant. or reservation of the specific rights was in-
tended to be a limitation upon the generality of the word "min-
erals."201
Some courts, therefore, look to the grant or reservation of oper-
ating or mining rights for an indication of the intention of the parties,
and the fact that the rights granted or reserved are not appropriate
to the development of the mineral in question has been held to
demonstrate a lack of intention to grant or reserve that particular
mineral. 20 2 Thus, where a reservation of mines and minerals was ac-
companied by a reservation of the right to "dig and carry the same
away," the court said "the word 'dig' has a technical meaning,
when the context is considered, and does not apply to open quarrying
and blasting. ' '20 3 Similarly, the phrase "the right to mine and raise
the same" has been interpreted as showing that a reservation was
intended to be limited to minerals which could be mined and raised
by underground workings without destruction of the surface.204 One
case has gone so far as to hold that the granting of a right-of-way
leading to "the deposit" evidences an intent that the lease cover
only the minerals specifically named, notwithstanding the inclusion
of the phrase "and all other minerals or mineral derivatives. '20 5
The more modem trend is to interpret the grant or reservation of
mining rights as placing no limitations or restrictions upon the grant
or reservation of minerals.20 6 In light of these two lines of authority,
the Utah court has held that a reservation of mining rights renders
the deed ambiguous, thus allowing the consideration of extrinsic evi-
dence regarding the situation of the parties at the time of execution,
201. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966
(1932)(grant of mining rights did not indicate an Intention to limit mineral grant to
coal only); Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97
S.E. 684, 17 A.L.R. 144 (1918). See Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
202. Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944.) ; McKinney's
Heirs v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314, 20 Ann. Cas. 934
(1909) ; Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228 (1942) ; Hue Hodge
Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922) ; Detlor v. Holland, 57
Ohio St. 492, 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A. 266 (1898) ; Gordon v. Carter Oil Co., 19 Ohio App.
319 (1924) ; Rock House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97
S.E. 684, 17 A.L.R. 144 (1918). The inference arising from the grant or reservation of
mining rights cannot prevail over the express language of the grant or reservation. Fed-
eral Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941).
203. Brady v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, - , 73 N.E. 963, 964, 106 Am. St. Rep. 531, - , 2
Ann. Cas. 636, - (1905).
204. Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Il1. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923). See
Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 147 N.Y. 495, 42 N.E. 186, 49 Am. St. Rep
683, 18 Morr. Min. Rep. 279 (1895).
205. Davis v. Plunkett, 187 Kan. 121, 353 P.2d 514 (1960).
206. Delta Drilling Co. v. Arnett, 186 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1950) ; Rowe v. Chesapeake
Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365 (7th Cr.
1943); Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1960) ; Shell Oil Co.
v. Moore, 382 Ill. 556, 48 N.E.2d 400 (1943) ; Schreier v. Chicago & N. Ry., 96 Ill. App.
2d 425, 239 N.E.2d 281 (1968) ; Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky.
1952) ; Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941); Ken-
tucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v. Preece, 260 Ky. 601, 86 S.W.2d 163 (1935).
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the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the intent of the
parties .2 07
The verb "mine" is broad enough to include drilling for oil,208
and indeed is now commonly used to include the extraction of oil and
gas by means of wells.20 9 Therefore, there is no particular significance
in the fact that an oil, gas, and other minerals lease authorizes the
lessee to "mine, 2 10 or that a grant or reservation of oil, gas, and
other mineral's includes the right to "mine. 2 11 Nevertheless, the
verb "mine" is an all-inclusive word which in its ordinary sense in-
cludes every operation by which usable materials are extracted from
the earth, and the use of the word in a lease does not suggest an
interpretation limited to the extraction of oil and gas, but rather an
unlimited interpretation, if such interpretation is not otherwise in-
hibited.2 112 On the other hand, the provisions of an oil, gas, and other
minerals lease may be so completely directed toward the production
of oil and gas by means of wells as to negate any suggestion that
hard minerals are included.2 13
In State Land Board v. State Department of Fish & Game21' the
Utah court construed a statutory reservation of the right to "prospect,
mine, and to remove" deposits of "all coal and other mineral" as
plainly indicating that the reservation was intended to apply to
seeking and finding "precious metals and other minerals of that
character," not sand and gravel.
5. Effect of Royalty Clause
In construing a grant or reservation of minerals, whether by
deed or lease, in which a royalty is reserved, it may be necessary
to consider the royalty clause in order to determine what substances
207. Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955).
208. Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
209. Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958)
Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.3d 1137
1937); River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878
(La. App. 1976); MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957); Gill v. Weston, 110
Pa. 312, 1 A. 921 (1885) ("[Petroleum] is a mineral substance obtained from the earth
by a process of mining and lands from which it is obtained may, with propriety, be called
mining lands.").
210. Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958)
River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878 (La. App.
1976) ; MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957).
211. Besing .v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.Sd
1137 (1973).
212. Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958)
MacM.aster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957).
213. Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973)(adroitly explaining away the
fact that royalty was payable "near the mouth of the well or wells or at the mouth of
the pit or shaft"); River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331
So. 2d 878 (La. App. 1976). See Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d
698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). But see River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of
Minn., - La.-, 337 So. 2d 221 (1976) (Dixon J., dissenting: "CL]ignite is a 'mineral'
clearly included in the o. & g. lease and covered by the royalty clause: 'On all other
minerals or kindred products mined,' etc.").
214. 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965).
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were intended to be included in the term "minerals" or "other min-
erals."2 15 For example, a grant of "all mineral rights" which reserved
a production payment of ten percent "of all minerals reserved by
this deed as determined by gross receipts less haulage allowance
and penalties for high lime content" and further referring to the
production payment as an "ore payment" has been held not to in-
clude oil and gas. 216 If an oil, gas, and other minerals lease provides
for a royalty on sulfur, the term "other minerals" cannot be limited
to hydrocarbons 217 or to minerals produced in connection with and as
an incident to the production of oil and gas by means of a well. 218
An oil, gas, and other minerals lease may provide that the lessee
"shall deliver free of cost to the lessor in pipe lines or tanks one
eighth of all the oil or other minerals." This type of royalty clause
has been held to negate the possibility that solid minerals, such as
sand and gravel, were included in the term "other minerals. ' 21 9
6. Effect of Clause Limiting Liability of Mineral Owner
for Damage to Surface
When the mineral estate is severed from the surface estate, the
owner of the mineral estate will frequently cause the conveyance to
contain a clause limiting or negating his liability for injury to the
surface estate. Such a clause will give the courts ample cause to
limit the reservation of minerals to those substances which can be
removed without injury to the surface estate. 220
7. Deletions on Form Instruments
The deletion of the words "salt water, oil, gas" from a granting
clause in a form instrument which originally read "coal, salt water,
oil, gas and mineral" does not constitute a reservation of the min-
erals deleted, if the grantor so intended. 221
8. Construction Against Grantor
Sometimes the courts refer to the principle that a deed admitting
of more than one construction will be construed most strongly against
the grantor, 222 particularly if the grantor is himself an attorney.228
215. Doster v. Friedensville Zinc Co., 140 Pa. 147, 21 A. 251 (1891),.
216. Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264, 358 P.2d 88 (1961).
217. Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958);
MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957).
218. Id. Contra, River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So.
2d 878 (La. App. 1976).
219. Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
220. Carson v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97, 1 A.L.R.2d 784 (1948).
221. Rowe v. Chesapeake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1946).
222. Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co., 296 F. 320 (6th Cir. 1924); McCombs v.
Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867 (1907); Keller v. Ely, 192 Kan. 698, 391 P.2d 182
(1964) ; Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97 S.W.2d 35 (1936) ; Franklin Fluorspar Co. v.
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In a few cases this principle is the deciding factor, 224 but the reliance
placed upon this principle is usually but a make-weight factor.
If the deed is not shown to have been prepared by the grantor,
the rule does not apply. 2 5 The circumstances of the preparation and
execution of the deed may be such that the principle should not be
applied.226 For example, in Patterson v. Wilcox 227 the Utah court said
as follows:
We agree that generally speaking, language in instruments
of grant is construable more strongly against the grantor.
But also there is this: that where a lawyer solicits a purchase
contract from one unlearned in the law, unrepresented by le-
gal counsel, and who trusts and permits such lawyers to be-
come amanuensis, author and draftsman for such an unlearned
one, good conscience and common sense dictate that any of
the terms of the contract, if nuclear, incomplete or subject
to more than one interpretation that interpretation that most
favors the layman will prevail. This, even though such layman
be a grantor and even though there exists the general rule
mentioned above. We think that under the circumstances of
this case where there was a solicitation by an interested at-
torney for the purchase of land from a rancher in the middle
of the night in a remote camp, with only ore in mind, lend
themselves to the application of such principle.2 8
In any event, the rule is not applicable where the intent of the par-
ties appears from the instrument 229 or may otherwise be shown, 230
and some courts reject the rule entirely, looking solely to the intent
of the parties.231
In at least two states, by statute, a reservaton is to be construed
in favor of the grantor.232
Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S.W.2d 665 (1931) ; Kentucky Diamond Min. & Developing Co. v.
Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910); Mack Oil Co. v.
Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964) ; Bundy v. Myers, 372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724 (1953) ;
Cam pbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674 (1924); Beuiy
v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928) ; West Virginia DeP't of Highways v. Farmer,
228 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1976); Murphy v. Van Voorhis, 94 W. Va. 475, 119 S.E. 297
(1923) ; Horse Creek Land & Min. Co. v. Midkiff, 81 W. Va. 616, 94 S.E. 26 (1918). See
Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 S.E.2d 228 (1942).
223. Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384 (1954).
224. Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 128, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229
(1854) : "Perplexed with doubts, I found I could only extricate myself from a difficulty
by making most of the maxim, 'The words of an instrument shall be taken most strongly
against the party using them'."
225. Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.3d
1173 (1973).
226. Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264, 358 P.2d 88 (1961).
227. 11 Utah 2d 264, 358 P.2d 88 (1961).
228. Id. at - , 358 P.2d at 91.
229. Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249, 167 P. 468 (1917).
230. Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.3d
1173 (1973).
231. Vang v. Mount, 300 Minn. 393, 220 N.W.2d 498 (1974).
232. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1069 (West 1954) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-09-13 (1960).
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9. Other Rules of Construction
In one case the rule that the first clause governs unless the in-
tention to qualify clearly appears has been applied. 23 3 The rule expres-
sio unius est exclusio alterius has been used in holding that a reserva-
tion of "oil, coal, fire clay and minerals" did not include natural
gas.23
D. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
1. Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence
If a deed or other instrument is free from ambiguity, the inten-
tion of the parties must be gathered from an inspection of the instru-
ment itself, 235 without the aid of extrinsic evidence, 23 6 but if the instru-
ment is so ambiguous as to leave the mind in doubt as to what the
parties, intended, extrinsic evidence may be resorted to as an aid in
the construction of the instrument, 237 even though no effort is made
to reform the instrument on the ground of mistake.2 3
Some courts consider a reservation of "minerals" to be ambigu-
ous, 2 39 particularly where minerals such as sand and gravel2 40 or com-
mon rock 241 are involved. Other courts find that a reservation of
"minerals" is unambiguous and refuse to admit extrinsic evidence
of the intention of the parties.2 42 The Oklahoma courts, evidencing
an attitude perhaps understandable in light of the importance of petro-
233. McCombs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867 (1907).
234. Bundy v. Myers, 372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724 (1953).
235. Gibson v. Sellars, 252 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1952); Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97
S.W.2d 35 (1936) ; Praeletorian Diamond Oil Asan'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929) ; Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927).
236. Rowe v. Chesapeake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d' 752 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Roth v. Huser, 147
Kan. 433, 76 P.2d 871 (1938); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.%V.2d 994 (1949) ;
Anderson Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R. 1217
(1940); Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Bruen v. Thaxton,
126 W. Va. 330, 28 S.E.2d 59 (194.3). In Heinatz, however, the court in determining
whether limestone was included in a grant of minerals, looked to "the evidence as to, the
nature of the limestone, its relation to the surface of the land, its use and value, and the
method and effect of its removal."
237. Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co., 296 F. 320 (6th Cir. 1924); Besing v.
Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.3d 1137 (1973); Fed-
eral Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S W.2dl 46 (1941) ; Rice v. Blanton,
232 Ky. 195, 225 S.W.2d 580 (1929); Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9
So. 2d 228 (1942); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929) ; Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928) ; Weyerhauser Co. v. Bur-
lington Northern, Inc., 15 Wash. App. 314, 549 P.2d 54 (1976) ; Waugh v. Thompson Land
& Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927).
238. Hudson v. McGuire, 188 Ky. 712, 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148 (1920).
239. Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.3d
1137 (1973); Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944); Vang
v. Mount, 300 Minn. 393, 220 N.W.2d 498 (1974). See Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.W. 155
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
240. United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972).
241. Weyerhauser Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 15 Wash. App. 314, 549 P.2d 54
(1976).
242. Sloan v. Peabody Coal Co., 547 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1977); New Mexico & Arizona
Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956) Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642,
113 S.W.20 13 (1938) ; Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) ; Warner
V. Patton, 19 S.W.2d 1111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)
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leum in that state, hold that a grant or reservation of "oil, gas and
other minerals" is unambiguous (the "other minerals" being limited
primarily to casinghead gas) ,243 but that a grant or reservation of
"oil, gas, coal and other minerals" is ambiguous.244
In construing a reservation of minerals, the entire instrument
must be considered, and the question is not whether the granting
clause or the reservation is ambiguous but whether the instrument
itself is ambiguous. 245 Thus, the inclusion of specific language relating
to mining rights may render ambiguous an otherwise unambiguous
grant or reservation. 246 The West Virginia court has held that a
reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals" is ambiguous when "con-
sidered along with the surrounding circumstances and past activities
concerning this property, 2 4 7 thus apparently countenancing the use
of extrinsic evidence to create an ambiguity in an otherwise unam-
biguous reservation.
Extrinsic evidence may not be used to show that the parties in-
tended that a grant of "minerals," unambiguous in itself; have a
more restrictive meaning for the purposes of the particular instru-
ment. 248 As the New Jersey court said in Hartwell v. Camman: 249
No extrinsic evidence is admissible for the purpose of
showing that the grantor intended to confine the words
"mines and minerals" to copper ore only. If the grantor can
do this, then it follows he may, by parol evidence, show
that the parties fixed an arbitrary meaning to words upon
which the whole efficacy of the deed depends, contrary to
their natural and ordinary import and popular acceptation.2 5 0
In particular, self-serving testimony regarding the unexpressed sub-
jective intention of the grantor cannot be admitted. 2 51
Extrinsic evidence might, under some circumstances, be admis-
243 Allen v. Farmers Union Co-operative Royalty Co., 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975),
Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971); West v.
Aetna Life Insurance Co., 536 P.2d 393 (Okla. App. 1974).
244. Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971).
245. But see Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, - 144 S.E. 629, 631 (1928), where the
court stated as follows:
"But the necessity of resorting to the description of the rights reserved along with
the substance reserved is in itself some indication that what is included in the substance
reserved Is not clear."
246. Hudson v. McGuire, 188 Ky. 712, 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148 (1920); Western
Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 255 P.2d 452 (1955).
247. Vest Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 228 S.E.2d 917 (V. Va. 1976).
248. Lovelace v. Southwest Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513 (6th Cir. 1920); Roth v. Huser,
147 Kan. 433, 76 P.2d 871 (1938) ; Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky.
1952); Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 128, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229
(1854); Armstrong v. La.ke Champlain Granite Co., 147 N.Y. 495, 42 N.E. 186, 49 Am. St.
Rep. 683, 18 Morr. Min. Rep. 279 (1895); Warner v. Patton, 19 S.WV.2d 1111 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929). But see Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). Contra,
Nance v. Donk Brothers Coal & Coke Co., 13 111. 2d 399, 151 N.E.2d 97 (1958) (four jus-
tices disagreeing).
249. 10 N.J. Eq. 128, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229 (1854).
250. Id. at -, 64 Am. Dec. at 452-53.
251. Vang v. Mount, 300 Minn. 393, 220 N.W.2d 498 (1974).
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sible in an action between the parties to reform the instrument
where it would not be admissible for the purpose of determining
the rights of the parties under the instrument as written. 52
2. Circumstances of Execution
Where extrinsic evidence is used as an aid in construing a grant
or reservation of minerals, the intention of the parties must bede-
termined in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time of
the execution of the instrument to be construed. 25 .3 Of particular im-
portance, of course, is the meaning which the parties themselves
placed upon the langugae of the grant or reservation. 25' Among the
circumstances to be considered is the business in which the grantor
or grantee, as the case may be, is engaged.255 Thus, the fact that
at the time of the execution of a conveyance reserving minerals the
grantor is not engaged in any business which would render a deposit
of gravel of any use to him has been considered, among other factors,
as indicating that the gravel was not included in the reservation.2 8
Similarly, a deed executed at the height of the uranium boom and
containing language tailored to the circumstances of uranium mining
on the Colorado Plateau has been held not to include oil and gas, the
court saying that "the language used in the atmosphere of the time
justified a determination by the court of the intentions of the par-
ties."2 57
3. Knowledge of Presence or Value of Mineral
Some cases, in holding that a particular substance is not in-
cluded in a grant or reservation of minerals, refer to the fact that
the parties did not know that the particular substance was present
in the land or that it had any commercial value, 258 and hence did
not intend to include it in the grant or reservation. 25 9 For example,
in Deer Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 260 the Michigan court
252. Stewart Oil Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 202 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Ill. 1962); Arm-
strong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 147 N.Y. 495, 42 N.E. 186, 49 Am. St. Rep. 683,
18 Morr. Min. Rep. 279 (1895). See Nance v. Donk Brothers Coal & Coke Co., 13 Ill. 2d
399, 151 N.E.2d 97 (1958) (concurring opinions of Justices House and Bristow).
253. Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971).
254. Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34, 13 Morr. Min. Rep. 72 (Pa. 1836). See Rice v. Blan-
ton, 232 Ky. 195, 22 S.W.2d 580 (1929).
255. Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944).
256. Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384 (1954).
257. Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264, 358 P.2d 88 (1961).
258. On the question of commercial value in fact, see supra notes 73-86, and text ac-
companying.
259. Carson v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97, 1 A.L.R.2d 784 (1948)
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941) ; Kinder v. LaSalle
County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Il. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923); Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio
St. 492, 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A. 266 (1898). See Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.W. 155 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921). Cf. Hart v. Associated Oil Co., 261 S.W. 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (ex-
pressly declining to decide case on this ground).
260. 89 Mich. 180, 50 N.W. 807 (1891).
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held that because iron was the only valuable mineral known at the
time of the execution of the deed, a reservation of "all mines and
ores of metals" would not include quarries or deposits of marble,
since the reservation would include only "mines and ores of metals
and minerals in common use, and commonly known as such." This
holding has been referred to as a "singular conclusion" and criticized
on the ground that such an interpretation, would defeat the prime ob-
ject of a large proportion of the reservations and grants of mineral
rights. 61
In Arkansas the concept that the intention of the parties is to
be determined in light of their knowledge of the presence of partic-
ular minerals in the land has been developed to the point where it
has become virtually a rule of law based upon the accepted meaning
of the word "minerals" in the area. In Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Stro-
hacker262 a reservation of "all coal and mineral deposits" was held
not to include oil and gas on the ground that oil and gas were not
commonly recognized as minerals on the date the deed containing
the reservation was executed. 2 3 Although the Arkansas courts refer
to the Strohacker rule as a means for determining, as a question
of fact,2" the intent of the parties, the recent cases indicate that it
is not the subjective intent of the parties that controls, but rather
whether the particular substance in question was commonly recog-
nized as a mineral on the date the deed containing the grant or
reservation of minerals was executed. 26 5 The determination of wheth-
er a particular substance was commonly recognized as a mineral
on the date of the deed appears at first to have been made on a state-
wide basis.2 68 Subsequent cases, however, have indicated that a sep-
arate determination must be made for each county,2 67 and a recent
federal case holds that a reservation of minerals includes only those
261. McCombs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867 (1907). A close reading of the
reservation in Deer Lake, however, would suggest that in any event it was limited to
metallic minerals only.
262. 202 Ark. 645, 152 SW.2d 557 (1941).
263. Accord, Western Coal & Min. Co. v. Middleton, 362 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1966): Moth-
ner v. Ozark Real Estate Co., 300 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Thomas v. Markham & Brovn,
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (pulaskite); Mining Corp. of Arkansas v. Inter-
national Paper Co., 324 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (mercury) ; Singleton v. Missouri
Pac. Ry., 205 P. Supp. 113 (E.D. Ark. 1962); Stegall v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d
251 (1958); Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949) ; Carson v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97, 1 A.L.R.2d. 784 (1948) (bauxite); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Furqueron, 210 Ark. 460, 196 S.W.2d 588 (1946).
264. Western Coal & Min. Co. v. Middleton, 362 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1966); Singleton v.
Missouri Pac. ly., 205 F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Ark. 1962); Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark.
870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949).
265. Thomas v. Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1973) Singleton
v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 205 F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Ark. 1962) ; Ahne v. Reinhardt & Donovan
Co., 240 Ark. 691, 401 S.W.2d 565 (1968) ; Stegall v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251
(1958).
266. Carson v. Missouri Pac. Ry.. 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97, 1 A.L.R.2d 784 (1948)
Missouri Pac. By. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941).
267. Ahne v. Reinhardt & Donovan Co., 240 Ark. 691, 401 S.W.2d 565 (1966) ; Stegall
v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251 (1958).
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minerals known to exist "in the area embraced, by the deed. ' 268
The better rule is that in a grant or reservation of minerals it
is immaterial what minerals were known or supposed at the time
of the conveyance to be present in the land.269 As the Kentucky court
said in Kentucky Diamond Min. & Developing Co. v. Kentucky Trans-
vaal Diamond Co.: 270
The deed here simply conveys "all the minerals." These
general words aptly include very kind of mineral found on
the land. Would it be doubted that, if gold had been dis-
covered, it would have passed by this deed, although Rat-
cliff at the time thought he would find silver. Or if he had
failed to find silver and had found lead, would it be doubted
that this would pass by the deed? It may be true that, when
the deed was made, the parties did not know what minerals
were under the land, but the fact that they did not have
diamonds in mind in no manner affects the conveyance when
by it they conveyed all the mineral. When the language of
the deed is broad enough to cover everything that may be
found on the land, it is not material to the effect of the deed
that the parties in fact contemplated at the time that a
particular thing might be found on the land. They well knew
it was a matter of doubt what would be found. To make
the tests shafts had to be sunk, and the different strata had
to be examined. What would be found they could only guess,
and, when under these circumstances the parties conveyed
all the mineral, the grantee is entitled to the precious stones
found no less than he would be if he had found platinum or
radium, which is perhaps more precious than diamonds. 27 1
The knowledge of the parties is material only in ascertaining
their intentions. If under some positive rule of law a substance is
determined not to be a mineral, the knowledge of the parties regard-
ing its presence or absence is immaterial.272
4. Local Mineral Development
The absence or existence of local development of a particular
268. Mining Corp. of Arkansas v. International Paper Co., 324 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Ark.
1971).
269. Rowe .v. Chesapeake Min. Co., 156 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1946); Stowers v. Hunting-
ton Dev. & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934) ; New Mexico & Arizona Land Co. v.
Elkins, 197 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956) Geothermal Kinetics v. Union Oil Co., ------Cal.
App. 3d- , 141 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1977) Renshaw v. Happy Valley Water Co., 114 Cal.
App. 2d 521, 250 P.2d 612 (1952) ; Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky.
1952) ; Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13 (1938) ; Kentucky Diamond Min.
& Developing Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397, Ann.
Cas. 1912C 417 (1910) ; Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 147 N.Y. 495, 42 N.E.
186, 4.9 Am. St. Rep. 683, 18 Morr. Min. Rep. 279 (1895) ; Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1964); Cain v. Neuman, 316 S.W.2d 915
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ; Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E.
895 (1927) ; Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 307 (1908).
270. 141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397, Ann. Cas. 1912C 417 (1910).
271. Id. at -. 132 S.W. at 398.
272. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
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substance at the time of the execution of the instrument in which
the grant or reservation of minerals appears is frequently asserted
to be indicative of an intention to exclude that particular substance
from or include it within the meaning of the word "minerals."
Some cases hold that the absence of local development of a particular
mineral is sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the mineral
was not intended to be included in a grant or reservation of min-
erals.2 73 It has been said, however, that the inferences which may
be drawn from the absence of such development are too uncertain
and even contradictory to make evidence of such development help-
ful, 774 and many cases hold that the mere fact that a particular min-
eral has not been discovered or developed in the vicinity would not
preclude the granting of rights to that mineral or limit a grant to
something less general than all the substance legally cognizable
as minerals.2 75 Conversely, the existence of local development
of a particular substance is not a circumstance from which it can
be inferred that the parties intended to include that substance in a
grant or reservation of minerals.2 7 6
In Texas, under the rule of Acker v. Guinn,277 it is immaterial
that the substance in question was being produced in the vicinity by
underground mining methods if the portion of the substance located
at or near the surface would have been extracted only by a method
which would have destroyed the surface. 278
5. Prior or Contemporaneous Grants or Reservations
A grant of minerals by the owner of the fee may be followed
by a grant of the fee itself, excepting or reserving the minerals
273. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941) ; Hule Hodge
Lumber Co. V. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922); Detlor v. Holland,
57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N.E. 690, 40 A.L.R. 266 (1898). See Clements v. Morgan, 307 Ky. 496,
211 S.W.2d 164 (1948): Hollaway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228
(1942). Some cases holding that a particular substance is not a mineral mention the ab-
sence of local development without according that fact any particular significance. See,
e.g., Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co., 296 F. 320 (6th Cir. 1924); Farrell v.
Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954); River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Re-
sources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 1976).
274. Dingess v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 271 F. 864 (4th Cir. 1921). See Sellars
v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1952) ("this evidence may be said to
'cut both ways' ").
275. Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955) Rowe v. Chesa-
peake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1946) ; Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 113
S.W.2d 13 (193S); Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955). See
People ex rel. Carrell v. Bell, 237 Il. 332, 86 N.E. 593, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 746, 15 Ann.
Cas. 511 (1908)(act relating to taxation of "mining right, or the right to dig for or ob-
tain . . . mineral" held applicable to oil and gas, even though when act was pased in
1861 "petroleum was not as extensive an article of commerce in this state as it has since
become"); Gill v. Weston., 110 Pa. 312, 1 A. 921 (1885) (act relating to mining lands
held applicable to petroleum lands, even though act was passed before discovery of pe-
troleum).
276. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949); Cole v.
McDonald, 236 'As. 168, 109 So. 2d 628 (1959) ; Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co.,
64 Okla. 249, 167 P. 468 (1917). Contra, Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832 (1906).
277. 464 S.'W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
278. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.V.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
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granted. If the words used to grant the minerals are different from
the words subsequently used to except or reserve the minerals, a
question may arise as to whether the exception or reservation was in-
tended to be coextensive with or greater than the previous grant of
minerals. In such cases, the courts tend to construe the exception
or reservation as being coextensive with the previous grant.279 For
example, where a grant of "all the coal and mining rights and privi-
leges" (which was agreed to convey coal only) was followed by a
reservation of "all the coal and mineral privilege," the latter phrase
was held to be equivalent to the former.2 80
If a grant of "minerals" is accompanied by a contemporaneous
grant of the "surface, ' 281 and if it clearly appears that the intention
of the grantor is to convey the entire fee simple title, the word "min-
erals" would include everything except the surface. 282 The same re-
sult follows where a grant of "minerals" is accompanied by an ex-
press reservation of the "surface, ' 283 or where a grant of the "sur-
face" is accompanied by an express reservation of "minerals.1 28 '
The fact that a particular substance is the subject of a reserva-
tion which is separate from but contemporaneous with a reservation
of "minerals" may indicate that the parties did not interpret the
reservation of "minerals" as including that substance or similar sub-
stances.
28 5
A grant of minerals by the owner of the mineral estate may use
language different from the language of the grant by which he ac-
quired the mineral estate. In one such case, the court found that the
inclusion of natural gas in the grant to the owner of the mineral
estate and the omission of natural gas from the subsequent grant
by the owner of the mineral estate indicated that natural gas was
not intended to be included in the second grant.2 8 6
6. Subsequent Conduct of the Parties
It is, of course, proper to consider the construction which the
parties themselves have placed upon the language of the grant or
reservation.2 7 Actions or statements of one or both of the parties to
279. Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co., 296 F. 320 (6th Cir. 1924).
280. Clements v. Morgan, 307 Ky. 496, 211 S.W.2d 164 (1948) ("Can there be any dif-
ference here except the difference between tweedledee and tweedledum?").
281. The word "surface," when used without any qualifying language, ordinarily signi-
fies only the superficial part of the land. Drummond v. White Oak Fuel Co., 104 W. Va.
368, 140 S.E. 57, 56 A.L.R. 303 (1927).
2q2. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164, S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966
(1932).
283. Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941).
284. Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 382 Ill. 556, 48 N.E.2d 400 (1943).
285. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005
(1904) (separate reservation of gravel held to Indicate that sand was not Included in gen-
eral reservation of "minerals").
286. Highland v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960).
287. Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923).
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a conveyance may throw light upon the interpretation of a grant or
reservation of minerals contained in the instrument of conveyance. 288
Such evidence is relevant in determining the interpretation adopted
by the parties at the time of the conveyance. 289 For example, if cer-
tain substances are being removed and sold by the owner of the sur-
face estate and the vwner of the mineral estate knows of the surface
owner's actions and does not complain, the mineral owner's ac-
quiescence may be taken as evidence that he construed the grant
or reservation of minerals as not including the substances removed
and sold by the surface owner.2 90 The conduct need not always be
such as would constitute an admission against interest. For ex-
ample, the fact that a grantor who reserved "all minerals" has
received royalties upon clay has been held to be indicative of an in-
tent to reserve gravel, which is similar to clay in that both are a
conglomeration of minerals. 291
Subsequent leases or conveyances, either by the owner of the
mineral estate or by the owner of the surface estate, may indicate
the interpretation placed upon the grant or reservation by one or
both of the parties,2 92 but leases or conveyances executed long after
a grant or reservation of minerals are of little value in interpreting
the grant or reservation.293 Subsequent conveyances of other lands
by the same grantor which use different words of grant or reserva-
tion are of little use in the construction of prior conveyances by the
grantor.29 4
Articles of incorporation executed long prior to the date of a con-
veyance by a corporation can have no bearing upon the construction
of a reservation of minerals contained in the conveyance.2 5 Similar-
288. United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972); Franklin
Fluospar Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S.W.2d 665 (1931) ; Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land
Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966 (1932).
289. United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972). But see
Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, -, 270 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1954): "The trial court was
led afield and away from the original grant by the side transactions that followed ...
[Tlhe rights of all parties involved are distinctly fixed by the original deed, and the
reservation therein."
290. Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923)
Monan Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944); Holloway Gravel
Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228 (1942) ; Darvill v. Roper, 3 Drew. 294, 61 Eng.
Rep. 915, 10 Morr. Min. Rep. 406 (Ch. 1855).
291. United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972). Cf. Farrell
v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954) (grantor held not to have reserved sand and
gravel despite subsequent receipt of royalties on sand and gravel).
292. United States v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d, 1177 (10th Cir. 1972); Winsett
v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112
W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292 86 A.L.R. 966 (1932). See Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Moore,
290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941).
293. See Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971).
294. Lovelace v. Southwest Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513 (6th Cir. 1920); Western Devel.
Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 2S8 P.2d 452 (1955) ("However, more careful draftsmanship
in instruments subsequent to the ones in question can scarcely be regarded as an admis-
sion.").
295. Western Devel. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955) ; Waugh v. Thomp-
son Land & Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927). Buit cf. Praeletorlan Diamond
Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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ly, the fact that a corporate grantee of minerals is not authorized by
its articles of incorporation to acquire oil and gas is immaterial in
construing a grant to the corporation. 298 On the other hand, where
minerals are granted to a corporation in exchange for stock, the
fact that the articles of incorporation authorized the corporation to
develop stone ha's been held to shed some light upon whether sand-
stone was intended to be included in the grant.297
7. Acts of Others
While the manner in which minerals are assessed by the local
taxing authorities is not controlling as against either party to a grant
or reservation of minerals, it may properly be looked to as indicative
of the construction which the parties themselves placed upon their
respective holdings.- 8
VI. PARTICULAR SUBSTANCES
The following discussion is not intended to be a detailed analysis
of the treatment accorded to particular substances which have been
asserted to be minerals, but is designed merely to serve as an aid
in locating the authorities dealing with those substances.
A. METALLIC OR METALLIFEROUS MINERALS
There is rarely any question raised as to whether metallic or
metalliferous substances are minerals, and some early decisions held
or at least assumed that only metallic or metalliferous substances
could be included within the meaning of the term "minerals."
When illustrating an opinion with an example or hypothetical situa-
tion regarding the interpretation of the term "minerals," the courts
of course select for that purpose substances which are undeniably
minerals. The minerals so selected are invariably metallic or metal-
liferous minerals, such as gold.300 Nevertheless, the Oklahoma courts
have stringently applied the rule of ejusdem generis to exclude all
metallic and metalliferous minerals from grants or reservations of
"all oil, gas, and other minerals."301
1. Bauxite
Bauxite has been said to be a mineral,302 but it has been held not
296. Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1943); Hurley v. West Kentucky
Coal Co., 204 Ky. 96, 171 S.W.2d 15 (1943).
297. Kalberer v. Grassham, 282 Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d, 940 (1940).
298. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966
(1932).
299. See supra notes 89-93, and text accompanying.
300. See supra notes 109 & 271, and text accompanying.
301. Allen v. Farmers Union Co-operative Royalty Co., 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975); Pan-
handle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1971).
S02. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Arthur, 144 Ark. 114, 222 S.W. 729
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to be within the scope of a reservation of "mineral deposits" where
it would be removed by surface mining methods.803
2. Iron
Iron ore is generally considered to be a mineral . 0 4 In Texas,
however, iron ore has been held not to be a mineral where it must
be removed by surface mining methods. 0 5
3. Rutile and Similar Minerals
Metallic minerals such as rutile, ilmenite, monazite, zircon, and
titanium have been held to be included in a grant of the right to
explore for "oil, gas and other minerals. 308
4. Uranium
As a general rule, uranium would be included in a grant or
reservation of "minerals." Thus, uranium has been held to be in-
cluded in a reservation of "all mineral rights. °3 0 7 The uranium
boom of the 1950's found many prospectors searching for uranium
in areas thought to be valuable for oil and gas or covered by oil
and gas leases. A question naturally arose as to whether a grant or
reservation of "all oil, gas and other minerals" includes uranium.30 8
The cases generally hold that uranium is included in such a grant
or reservation.309 A North Dakota statute provides that no convey-
ance of mineral rights or royalties separate from the (surface rights
shall be construed to grant or convey to the grantee any interest in
and to any uranium unless the intent to convey such interest is
specifically and separately set forth in the instrument of convey-
ance. 10
5. Mercury
In Arkansas, cinnabar or mercury would not be included in a
reservation of "all minerals, coal, oil and gas" if those minerals
were not known to exist in the area embraced by the deed at the
time of execution of the deed.311
(1920).
303. Carson v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97, 1 A.L.R.2d 784 (1948).
304. Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U.S. 11 (1885).
305. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971). One can but wonder how such a de-
cision would have been received had it been handed down by the Minnesota court.
306. Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1960).
307. Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264, 358 P.2d, 88 (1961).
308. See Lange, Does The Phrase 'Oil, Gas and Other Minerals' in a Mineral Lease In-
clude Uranium?, 2 NAT. REs. LAW. 360 (1969).
309. New Mexico and Arizona Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956)
Cain v. Neuman, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). Uranium Is not Included in a
reservation of "oil, gas and kindred minerals." Dawson v. Melke, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo.
1973).
310. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (Supp. 1977).
311. Mining Corp. of Arkansas v. International Paper Co., 324 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Ark.
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B. NONMETALLIC AND NONMETALLIFEROUS MINERALS IN GEN-
ERAL
The question of whether the word "mineral" is limited to metal-
lic or metalliferous minerals only has been discussed in an earlier
part of this article. 12 Soon after the enactment of the Mineral Loca-
tion Law of 1872 31 it was concluded that diamond was a mineral
subject to location under the mining laws, 3 14 and thereafter a number
of decisions of the Commission of the General Land Office -held that
nonmetallic minerals were subject to location under the mining laws.
As a general rule, therefore, the word "minerals," whether used in
public land statutes or in private conveyances, includes not only
metallic and metalliferous minerals but also nonmetallic and non-
metalliferous minerals.
C. PETROLEUM
Petrofeum is a liquid consisting of a mixture of several hydro-
carbon compounds, and is therefore not considered by mineralogists
to be a mineral.315 Economic geologists, however, classify petroleum
as a mineral fuel,316 and in a broad sense oil and gas, as petroleum
is usually referred to, are considered to be minerals.
3 1 7
1971).
312. See supra notes 89-93, and text accompanying.
313. 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970).
314. 14 Op. A'rr'Y GEN. 115 (1872).
315. E. DANA, A TEXTBOOK OF MINERALOGY 1 (4th ed. 1932). See also id. at 777.
316. A. BATEMAN, ECONOMIC MINERAL DEPOsITs 652 (2d ed. 1950).
317. Crain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1928) ;In re Great Western Petroleum
Corp., 16 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Cal. 1936) ; Carter Oil Co. v. Blair, 256 Ala. 650, 57 So. 2d
64 (1951) ; Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912)
(natural gas) ;Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co., 147 Cal. 659, 82 P. 317 (1905) ; Standard Pipe
& Supply Co. v. Red Rocfl Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 897, 135 P.2d 659 (1943); Cornwell v.
Buck & Stoddard, 28 Cal. App. 2d 333, 82 P.2d 516 (1938) Failonl v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 30 Il1. 2d 258, 195 N.E.2d 619 (1964); Murgarger v. Franklin, 18 Ill. 2d 344, 163
N.E.2d 818 (1960) ; Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 382 Ill. 556, 48 N.E.2d 400 (1943) ; Jilek V.
Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47 N.E.2d 96, 146 A.L.R. 871
(1943); Ohio Oil Co. v. Daughtee, 240 Ill. 361, 88 N.E. 818, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1108
(1909); People ex rel. Carrell v. Bell, 237 Ill. 332, 86 N.E. 593, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 746, 15
Ann. Cas. 511 (1908); Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908) ; Watford Oil & Gas
Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N.E. 53, 122 Am. St. Rep. 144 (1908); Jones v. Johnson,
16 Ill. App. 3d 996, 307 N.E.2d 222 (1974); Manufacturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana
Natural Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912, 50 L.R.A. 768 (1900) (natural gas);
People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59, 16 L.R.A. 443, 31 Am. St. Rep. 433
(1892); Shaffer v. Kansas Farmers Union Royalty Co., 146 Kan. 84, 69 P.2d 4 (1937);
Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 68 Kan. 691, 75 P. 995, 1 Ann. Cas. 403 (1904); Bigge v.
Tallent, 539 S.W.2d 288 (Ky. 1976); Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 397
(Ky. 1952); Beckett-Iseman Oil Co. v. Backer, 165 Ky. 818, 178 S.W. 1084 (1915); Mc-
Kinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314, 20 Ann.
Cas. 934 (1909); Rice Oil Co. v. Toole County, 86 Mont. 427, 284 P. 145 (1930); Mid-
Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 65 Mont. 414, 211 P. 353 (1922); Wagner v. Mallory, 169
N.Y. 501, 62 N.E. 584 (1902) ; Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio 492, 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A. 266
(1898): Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio 317, 49 N.E. 399, 39 L.R.A. 765, 63 Am. St. Rep.
721 (1897); Fourth & Central Trust Co. v. Woodley, 31 Ohio App. 259, 165 N.E. 742
(1928); Cuff v. Koslosky, 165 Okla. 135, 25 P.2d 290 (1933); City of Erie v. Public
Service Comm'n, 278 Par. 512, 123 A. 471 (1924); Hamilton v. Foster, 272 Pa. 95, 116 A.
50 (1922) ; McIntosh v. Ropp, 233 Pa. 497, 82 A. 949 (1912) ; Jennings v. Bloomfield, 199
Pa. 638, 49 A. 135 (1901); Ridgway Light & Heat Co. v. Elk County, 191 Pa. 465, 43 A.
323 (1899) (gas); Blakley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425, 34 A. 564 (1896); Westmoreland &
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Petroleum is considered to be a mineral under the United States
public land laws.3 18 Prior to the enactment of the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920,819 and even prior to the enactment of the Oil Placer Act
of 1897,320 petroleum was considered to be a mineral locatable under
the United States mining laws.3 2 1
Except in Pennsylvania, oil and gas are usually held to be in-
cluded in a grant or reservation of "minerals. ' 322 The Pennsylvania
courts have established as a rule of property the Dunham rule which
provides that if, in connection with the conveyance of land, there
is a grant or reservation of "minerals" without any specific mention
of oil or natural gas, a rebuttable presumption arises that the word
"minerals" was not intended by the parties to include oil or natural
gas. To rebut this presumption there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the parties to the conveyance intended to include oil
Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724 (1889) (gas); Stoughton's Ap-
peal, 88 Pa. 198 (1878); Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229, 7 Morr. Min. Rep. 203 (1866);
Thompson v. Noble, 3 Pitt. 201 (Ct. C.P. Erie Co. 1970) ; Schrieber v. National Transit
Co., 21 Pa. Co. 657 (Ct. C.P. Venango Co. 1898); Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Ameri-
can Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1964); Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil &
Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290, 29 A.L.R. 566 (1923) ; Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co,
98 Tex. 597, 86 S.W. 740, 69 L.R.A. 986, 8 Ann. Cas. 1117 (1905) ; Gulf Production Co.
v. Warren, 99 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; Kadane v. Clark, 99 S.W.2d 448 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939); Crawford v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 62 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) (gas) ; Ferguson v. Steen, 293 S.W. 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); American Refining
Co. v. Tidal Western Oil Corp., 264 S.W. 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Carothers v. Mills,
233 S.W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921): Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Howard', 212 S.W. 735
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; Southern Oil Co. v. Colequitt, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 292, 69 S.W. 169
(1902) ; Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278, 50 S.E. 236 (1905) ; Williamson v. Jones, 39
W. Va. 231, 19 S.E. 436 (1894). See United States v. Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Co., 172
U.S. 339 (1899) ; Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. State, 125 Mont. 258, 234 P.2d 452
(1951) ; State ex rel. Rausch v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 78 N.D. 247, 49 N.W.2d 14
(1951) ; Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717, L.R.A. 1917F 489 (1915);
Caulk v. Miller, 18 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). Contra, J. M. Guffey Petroleum
Co. v. Murrel, 127 La. 466, 53 So. 705 (1910).
318. Burke v. Southern Pac. Ry., 234 U.S. 669 (1914) ; Skeen v. Lunch, 48 F.2d 1044
(10th Cir. 1931) ; Roselle v. Harn & Campbell, 60 I.D. 167 (1948) ; Chino Land & Water
Co. v. Harmaker, 39 Cal. App. 274, 178 P. 738 (1918).
319. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
320. 29 Stat. 526 (1897).
321. McQuiddy v. California, 29 L.D. 181 (1899); Union Oil Co., 25 L.D. 351 (1897),
on rehearing, reversing Union Oil Co., 23 L.D. 222 (1896) ; Comm'r Burdett to Surveyor-
General, San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 30, 1875, in H. CoPP, U.S. MINERAL LANDs 160 (2d ed.
1882).
922. Mothner v. Ozark Real Estate Co., 300 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1962) Rowe v. Chesa-
peake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1946); Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365 (7th
Cir. 1943) ; Stowers v. Huntington Devel. & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Dingess
v. Huntington Devel. & Gas Co., 271 F. 864 (4th Cir. 1921) ; Singleton v. Missouri Pac.
Ry., 205 F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Ark. 1962) : Stewart Oil Co. v. Sohlo Petroleum Co., 202 F.
Supp. 952 (E.D. I1. 1962) : Schreier v. Chicago & N. Ry., 96 Ill. App. 2d 425, 239 N.E.2d
281 (1968) : Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1952) ; Hurley v. West
Kentucky Coal Co., 294 Ky. 96, 171 S.W.2d 15 (1943); Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v.
Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941) (rehearing denied 1942) : Sloan v. Kentcky-
West Virginia Gas Co., 289 Ky. 623, 159 S.W.2d 993 (1942) ; Maynard v. McHenry, 271
Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13 (1938); Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v. Preece, 260 Ky. 601.
86 S.W.2d 163 (1935) Bolen v. Casebolt, 252 Ky. 17, 66 S.W.2d 19 (1933) (gas); Scott
v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 151 S.W. 81, 13 A.L.R. 369 (1919) ; Weaver v. Richards, 156 Mich.
320, 120 N.W. 818 (1909): Bulger v. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316, 138 N.W.2d 18 (1965);
Barker v. Campbell-Ratliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249, 167 P. 468 (1917): Gill v. Weston,
110 Pa. 312, 1 A. 921 (1885): Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S.W. 355, 66 Am. St
Rep. 740, 39 L.R.A. 249. 19 Morr. Min. Rep. 169 (1897) ; Anderson Kerr Drilling Co. v.
Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R. 1217 (1940): Rio Bravo Oil Co
v. McEntire, 128 Tex. 124, 95 S.W.2d 381, 96 S.W.2d 1110 (Tex. Comm. App. 1936)I
THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MINERALS" 467
or natural gas within the meaning of the word "minerals. '32 3 Out-
side of Pennsylvania, the cases holding that oil and gas are not
included in a grant or reservation of minerals are usually based upon
the particular language of the instrument in question or the circum-
stances of its execution.324 In Indiana, an estate in oil and gas is
an incorporeal hereditament, and for that reason a grant or reser-
vation of minerals has been held to be ambiguous with respect to
oil and gas. 825
D. COAL AND SIMILAR SUBSTANCES
1. Coal
As in the case of petroleum, coal is a mixture of several hydro-
carbon compounds and is therefore not considered by mineralogists
to be a mineral.326 It is classified as a mineral fuel by economic
geologists.3 27 Lands valuable for coal are mineral lands under the
public land laws of the United States. 28
Coal is generally considered to be a mineral.8 29 In Adams County
v. Smith8°30 the North Dakota court said as follows: We have found
no cases holding that coal is not a mineral. Wherever the question
has been considered the courts have construed the term "mineral"
to include coal.33' In several cases, however, coal has been held not
to be included within the meaning of the term "minerals" as used
Elliott v. Nelson, 251 S.W. 50.1 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); Luse v. Farmer, 221 S.W. 1031
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; Western
Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955); Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Co.,
166 Va. 524, 186 S.E. 20 (1936) ; Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937) ;
Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927) ; Norman v.
Lewis, 100 W. Va. 432, 130 S.E. 913 (1926) ; Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317,
61 S.E. 307 (1908). See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1440 (1954).
323. New York Nat. Gas Corp. v. ,Swan-Finch Gas Devel. Corp., 278 F.2d 577 (3rd Cir.
1960) ; Highland v. Commonwealth, 4,00 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960) ; Bundy v. Myers,
372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724 (1953) (natural gas); Preston v. South Penn Oil Co., 238 Pa.
301, 86 A. 203 (1913) ; Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832 (1906) ; Dunham v. Kirk-
patrick, 101 Pa. 96, 47 Am. Rep. 696 (1882).
324. Western Coal & Min. Co. v. Middleton, 362 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1966) ; Kentucky Coke
Co. v. Keystone Gas Co., 296 F. 320 (6th Cir. 1924) ; Stegall v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 310
S.W.2d 251 (1958) ; Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949) ; Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Furqueron, 210 Ark. 460, 196 S.W.2d 588 (1946) ; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Stro-
hacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941) ; Davis v. Plunkett, 187 Kan. 121, 353 P.2d
514 (1960); Rice v. Blanton, 232 Ky. 195, 22 S.W.2d 580 (1929); Huie Hodge Lumber
Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922) ; Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio
492, 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A. 266 (1898) ; Gordon v. Carter Oil Co., 19 Ohio App. 319
(1924) ; Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil Co., 106 Tex. 94, 157 S.W. 737 (1913) ;
Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264, 358 P.2d 88 (1961) ; Horse Creek Land & Min. Co.
v. Midkiff, 81 V. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918). A reservation of "oil" does not include
natural gas. Murphy v. Van Voorhis, 94 W. Va. 475, 119 S.E. 297 (1923).
325. Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E. 672 (1944).
326. E. DANA, A TEXTBOOK OF MINERALOGY 775-78 (4th ed. 1932).
327. A. BATEMAN, ECONOMIC MINERAL DEPOSITs 634 (2d ed. 1950).
328. Mullan v. United States, 118 U.S. 271 (1886).
329. Henry v. Lowe, 73 Mo. 96 (1880) ; Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972)
Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946) ; Griffin v. Fellows, 081
(32 P. F. Smith) Pa. 114 (1873).
330. 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946).
331. Id. at 624. 23 N.W.2d at 875.
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in the particular instrument. In Oklahoma, the rule of ejusdem gener-
is has been applied to exclude coal from a reservation of "oil, gas
and other minerals, ' 3 2 and the rule has been applied in Kansas with
like results. 3 3 The same result has been reached on similar reasoning
in Indiana.3 3 4 In Texas, although a reservation of "all oil, gas and
other minerals" would ordinarily include coal and lignite, under the
rule of Acker v. Guinn3 35 it has been held not to include coal or lig-
nite.3s6 Coal has been held not to be included in an agreement relating
to "minerals" where, at the time the agreement was entered into,
the coal on the lands in question was of no appreciable value for
lack of an outlet to the market. 37
A North Dakota statute provides that no conveyance of mineral
rights or royalties separate from the surface rights shall be construed
to grant or convey to the grantee any interest in and to any coal
unless the intent to convey such interest is specifically and separately
set forth in the instrument of conveyance.3 3 8
2. Lignite
Lignite has been held not to be a mineral under an oil, gas, and
minerals lease. 3 9 The Texas case on lignite has been mentioned
above.34 0
3. Peat
Neither peat or peat moss- is a mineral subject to location under
the United States mining laws.3 41 A Florida statute provides that
the word "minerals" used in any deed, lease, or other contract in
writing after the date of the statute shall not include peat unless
expressly provided therein.3 42
E. ROCK AND STONE
The word "mineral," in its ordinary and common meaning, is
a comprehensive term including every description of stone and rock
deposit.3 43
332. Sloan v. Peabody Coal Co., 547 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1977).
333. Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973).
334. Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.3d
1137 (1973).
335. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
336. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
337. White v. Sayres, 101 Va. 821, 45 S.E. 747 (1903).
338. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (Supp. 1977).
339. River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878 (La.
App. 1976).
340. See supra note 336, and text accompanying.
341. United States v. Toole, 224 F. Supp. 440 (D. Mont. 1963).
342. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.20 (West 1969).
343. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966
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1. Rock
Common rock has been held not to be a mineral under the public
land laws of the United States.3 4 4 On the other hand, trap rock has
been held to be a mineral subject to location under the United States
mining laws.3 45 Rock has been held not to be included in a grant of
minerals,3 4 6 but silicated rock used in the manufacture of cement
has been held to be a mineral. 347
2. Stone
Even prior to the enactment of the Building Stone Law of 1892348
building stones was held to be a mineral locatable under the United
States mining laws.14 9 Stone has been held to be a mineral.350
3. Limestone
Lands valuable for limestone are mineral lands under the public
land laws of the United States.3 51 A pure form of recrystallized lime-
stone, valuable as a flux in smelting, for use in sugar factories for
clarifying sugar, and for making portland cement and white plaster
has been held to be a mineral within the meaning of the United
States public land laws.3 52 Prior to the enactment of the Common
Varieties Act,3 53 it was held that limestone was a mineral subject
to location under the United States mining laws.35
The word "minerals" as used in a private conveyance does not
ordinarily include limestone, 55 particularly if the limestone is used
(1932). See Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955); Walugh v.
Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927).
344. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971).
345. Stephen E. Day, Jr., 50 L.D. 489 (1924).
846. Steinman Devel. Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Va. 1922),
aff'd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir. 1923) ; Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973)
Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
347. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907).
348. 30 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).
349. VanDoren v. Plested, 16 L.D. 508 (1893); McGlenn v. Wienbroeer, 15 L.D. 370
(1892) ; H. P. Bennett, Jr., 3 L.D. 116 (1884) ; Freezer v. Sweeney, 8 Mont. 508, 21 P. 210
(1889) Johnston v. Harrington, 5 Wash. 78, 31 P. 316 (1982) ("That stone is a mineral
will hardly be disputed.") Contra, Conlin v. Kelly, 12 L.D. 1 (1891).
350. Griffin v. Fellows, *81 (32 P. F. Smith) Pa. 114 (1873); Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone
Land Co., 112 W. Va. 300, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966 (1932).
351. Morril v. Northern Pac. Ry., 30 L.D. 475 (1901). Contra, Southern Pac. v. Kaweah
Limestone Ledge, July 15, 1880, in H. CoPP, U.S. MINERAL LANDS 297 (1881).
352. Dunbar Lime Co. v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 17 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1926).
353. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1970).
354. Vivia Hemphill, 54 I.D. 80 (1932) ; Shepherd v. Bird, 17 L.D. 82 (1893); Comm'r
Burdett to H. C. Rolfe, June 28, 1875, in H. CoPP, U.S. MINERAL LANDS 176 (2d ed. 1882).
Contra, as to limestone valuable only for road building purposeS: Gray Trust Co., on r-
hearing, 4 L.D. 18 (1919); Hughes v. Florida, 42 L.D. 401 (1913) (coquina or shell rock);
Holman v. Utah, 41 L.D. 314 (1912). Contra, Wheeler v. Smith, 5 Wash. 704, 32 P. 784
(1893).
355. Little v. Carter, 408 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1966); Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97
S.W.2d 35 (1936); Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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only for building purposes.3 5 6 But if the limestone is close enough to
a market to have value, it may be included in a grant or reservation
of minerals.3 57 Limestone has been held not to be included in a grant
or reservation of minerals where it is on or near the surface,3 58
but deposits of limestone found substantially beneath the surface of
the ground have been held to be included in a mineral lease.3 59 Lime-
stone used in the manufacture of cement has been held to be a
mineral.36 0
4. Gypsum
Lands valuable for gypsum are mineral lands under the public
land laws of the United States.3 6 1 Gypsum is a mineral subject to
location under the United States mining laws. 62 Gypsum is usually
considered to be a mineral, 363 but unedr the rule of ejusdem generis
it has been held not to be included in a lease of "all of the oil, gas
and other minerals ' 36 4 or a reservation of gas, oil and mineral
rights." 69
5. Caliche
Caliche has been held not to be included in a reservation of "oil,
gas and other minerals." 366 On the other hand, caliche has been said
to be a mineral, but not a metalliferous mineral. 67
6. Marble
Lands valuable for marble are mineral lands under the public
356. Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512,
217 S.W.2d 994 (1944); Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
357. See H-endler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005
(1904).
358. Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923) ; Wulf
v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973); White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E.
1065, 140 Am. St. Rep. 618 (1910) ; Brady v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am.
St. Rep. 531, 2 Ann. Cas. 636 (1905); French v. Lansing, 73 Misc. 80, 132 N.Y.S. 523
(1911) ; Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674. (1924) ;
Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d
206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) ; Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)
Beury v. Shelton, 151 W. Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928).
359. See Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Secretary of the Army, 315 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Fla.
1970).
360. Staee ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907).
361. Phifer v. Heaton, 27 L.D. 57 (1895).
362. W. H. Hooper, 1 L.D. 560 (1881) ; Madison v. Octave Oil Co., 154 Cal. 768, 99 P.
176 (1908). Contra, Comm's 1,illiamson to Z. T. Duvall, Dec. 15, 1880, dn H. CoPp, U.S.
MINERAL LANDS 320 (1881).
363. White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 1065, 140 Am. St. Rep.- 618 (1910); French
v. Lansing, 73 Misc. 80, 132 N.Y.S. 523 (1911) ; Nenhi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County,
33 Utah 114, 93 P. 53, 14 L.I.A. (N.S.) 1043 (1907). See Certain-Teed Products Corp.
v. Conly, 54 Wyo. 79, 87 P.2d 21 (1939) (gypsite).
364. Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 895 (Okla. 1960). See Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan.
724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973).
865. Keller v. Ely, 192 Kan. 698, 391 P.2d 132 (1964).
366. Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
367. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Roosevelt County v. Good, 44, N.M. 495, 105 P.2d 470
(1940).
THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MINERALS"
land laws of the United States.3 68 Marble has been held to be a
mineral locatable under the United States mining laws.36 9 It has been
said that a reservation of minerals would include a vein of fine
marble.80
7. Shale
Shale has been held to be included in a grant or reservation of
minerals.3 7 1 On the other hand, shale has been held not to be included
in a grant or reservation of minerals. 72  Paintstone, describedt as
being "a substance resembling in general appearance red snale"
,has been held to be a mineral2 73
8. Slate
Lands valuable for slate are mineral lands under the public land
laws of the United States.3 7 4 Slate has been held to be a mineral
locatable under the United States mining laws3 75 Slate has been held
to be a mineral .
3 7
9. Sandstone
Lands valuable for sandstone are mineral lands under the public
lands laws of the United States.3 7 7 A grant of "all the minerals of
every kind and character" has been held to include sandstone. 87 8
10. Granite
Lands valuable for granite are mineral lands under the public
land laws of the United Statse.3 7 9 Granite has been held not tobe
included in a grant or reservation of minerals,3 80 but it has been said
368. Schrimpf v. Northern Pac. fly., 29 L.D. 327 (1899); Pacific Coast Marble Co. v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 25 L.D. 233 (1897).
369. Henderson v. Fulton, 35 L.D. 652 (1907); Pacific Coast Marble Co. v. Northern
Pac. Ry., 25 L.D. 233 (1897) ; Comm'r Burdett to H. C. Rolfe, June 28, 1875, in H. Cotep,
U.S. MINERAL LANDS 176 (2d ed. 1882).
370. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1901).
But see Deer Lake Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 89 Mich. 180, 50 N.W. 807 (1891).
871. Bibby v. Bunch, 176 Ala. 585, 58 So. 916 (1912) ; McCombs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala.
109, 44 So. 867 (1907).
372. Steinman Devel. Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Va. 1922),
aff'd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir. 1923); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962).
373. H-artwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 129, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229
(1854).
374. Schrimpf v. Northern Pac. Ry., 29 L.D. 327 (1899).
375. Acting Comm'r Curtis to Stockton, California, Office, Oct. 23, 1874, in H. Copi,
U.S. MINERAL LANDS 143 (2d ed'. 1882).
376. McCombs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867 (1907).
377. Beaudette v. Northern Pac. Ry., 29 L.D. 248 (1899); Hayden v. Jamison, on re-
view, 26 L.D. 373 (1898) ; Beaudette v. Northern Pac. Ry., 29 L.D. 248 (1899).
378. IRalberer v. Grassham, 282 Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d 910 (1940).
379. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903) ; Meiklejohn v. F. A. Hyde &
Co., 42 L.D. 144 (1913).
380. Thomas v. Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (pulaskite)
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that if granite is close enough to a market to have value, it would
be included in a reservation of minerals.3 81
F. SAND AND GRAVEL
8 2
In the broadest sense, the word "minerals" includes sand and
gravel. 8 3 A reservation of minerals contained in a grant by the United
States will include sand and gravel, 38 4 and prior to the enactment of
the Common Varieties Act,138 5 sand and gravel were held to be min-
erals subject to location under the United States mining laws.386
Where sand and gravel comprise the surface of the land, a pri-
vate grant or reservation of minerals in general terms will not in-
clude sand and gravel, 38 7 particularly where their removal would
destroy the surface388 and render it unfit for agricultural purposes. 389
As a general rule, therefore, sand and gravel are usually held not
to be a mineral in private grants or reservations of minerals. 390 A
Florida statute provides that the word "minerals" used in any deed,
lease, or other contract in writing after the date of the statute shall
Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 147 N.Y. 495, 42 N.E. 186, 49 Am. St. Rep.
683, 18 Morr. Min. Rep. 279 (1895).
381. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904).
382. See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 843 (1964).
383. Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963) ; La Rowe v. McGee, 171
Ga. 771, 156 S.E. 591 (1931) (sand) State Land Bd. .v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17
Utah 2d 237, 4,08 P.2d 707 (1965) West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 229
S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1976). See Commonwealth v. Hipple, 7 Pa. Dist. 399 (1898). Cf. Cline
V. Henry, 239 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (execution of a deed for sand and gravel
did not waive homestead, since the execution of an oil and gas lease does not waive the
homestead and "sand and gravel in place are in the nature of a mineral substance Such
as coal, iron, gas and oil and should receive a like classification.").
384. United States v. Isbell Construction Co., 4 IBLA 205 (1972).
385. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1970).
386. United States v. Schaub, 163 F. Supp. 875 (D. Alaska 1958); Loney v. Scott, 57
Ore. 378, 112 P. 172, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 466 (1910) ; Layman v. Ellis, 52 L.D. 714 (1929),
overruling Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 L.D. 310 (1910). Contra, Anchorage Sand &
Gravel Co. v. Schubert, 114 F. Supp. 436 (D. Alaska 1953), aff'd on ofther grounds sub noa
Superior Sand & Gravel Min. Co. v. Alaska, 224 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1955); United States
v. Aitken, 25 Phil. 7 (1913) (gravel not locatable under Philippine mining law).
387. Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954) ; Resler v. Rogers, 272 Minn.
502, 139 N.W.2d 379 (1965) ; Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ;
West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 228 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1975). See Winett
v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). But see United States ex rel. Tennessee
Valley Authr. v. Harris, 115 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1940) (granting a condemnation award of
$1.00 per acre for a gravel deposit "of little commercial value.").
388. Harper v. Talladega County, 279 Ala. 365, 185 So. 2d 388 (1966).
389. Bambauer v. Menjoulet, 214 Cal. App. 2d 871, 29 Cal. Rptr. 874, 95 A.L.R.2d 839
(1963); Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923);
Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973); Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen,
200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228 (1942); Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384
(1954).
390. Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Steinman Development Co.
v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Va. 1922), aff'd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir.
1923); Harper v. Talladega County, 279 Ala. 365, 185 So. 2d 388 (1966); Salzseider v.
Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1959); State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Hendrix,
196 Okla. 596, 167 P.2d 43 (1946); Beck v. Harvey, 196 Okla. 270, 164 P.2d 399 (1944)
Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904)
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., 128 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939); Praeletorian Diamond Oil A.s'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
See Lillington Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 203 N.C. 151, 165 S.E. 351 (1932); Whittle v.
Wolff, 249 Ore. 217, 437 P.2d 114 (1968).
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not include sand unless expressly provided therein. 91 A North Dakota
statute provides that no conveyance of mineral rights or royalties
separate from the surface rights shall be construed to grant or con-
vey to the grantee any interest in and to any gravel unless the intent
to convey such interest is specifically and separately set forth in the
instrument of conveyance.392
Sand suitable for making glass is a mineral subject to location
under the United States mining laws.3 93 Although there is no decision
specifically so holding, the courts are agreed that sand valuable for
making glass is included in a grant or reservation of minerals.3 94
G. CLAY395
Clay has been held to be a mineral subject to location under the
United States mining laws.3 96 Clay used for making brick is usually
not considered to be included in a grant or reservation of minerals3 97
Similarly, clay used for highway construction is not a mineral within
the commonly understood meaning of that term in a reservation of
mineral rights.3 98 Clay used in the manufacture of cement has been
held to be a mineral.399 It has been said that if near enough to a
market to have a value, potter's or porcelain clay would be included
in a reservation of minerals. 40 0 A Florida statute provides that the
word "minerals" in any deed, lease, or other contract in writing
after the date of the statute shall not include common clay unless
expressly provided therein. 40 1 A North Dakota statute provides that
no conveyance of mineral rights or royalties separate from the sur-
face rights shall be construed to grant or convey to the grantee any
391. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.20 (West 1969).
892. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (Supp. 1977).
393. United States V. Kosanke Sand Corp., 80 I.D. 538 (1973). But cf. Florence D. De
laney. 17 L.D. 120 (1893).
394. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904)
Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
395. See Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 843 (1964).
396. United States v. Barngrover, on rehearing, 57 I.D. 533 (1942) (clay vafluable for
making ds-illing mud); Fred B. Ortman, 52 L.D. 467 (1928) (colloidal clay valuable prin-
cipally for filtering oils In process of refining); Alldritt v. Northern Pac. Ry., 25 L.D.
349 (1897) ("fire clay of a superior quality"); Dobbs Placer Mine, 1 L.D. 565 (1883)
(fire clay) ; Comm'r Burdett to J. D. M. Crockwell, June 28, 1875, in H. Copp, U.S. MiN-
ERAL LANDS 176 (2d ed. 1882) (kaolin) ; Comm'r Drummond to G. Billings, July 10, 1873,
in H. CoPP, U.S. MINING DECIsIoNs 209 (1874) (fire clay). See Jose v. Houck, 171 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1968) (montmorillontte) ; Mesmer v. Geith, 22 F.2d 690 (S.D. Cal. 1927)
(fire clay); Mills v. Royse, 25 Ariz. App.. 36, 540 P.2d 767 (1975); Chittim v. Belle
Fourche Bentonite Products Co., 60 Wyo. 235, 149 P.2d 142 (1944) (bentonite). Contra,
as to common clay or brick clay: United States v. Peck, 29 IBLA 357, 84 I.D. 137 (1977) ;
United States v. O'Callaghan, 79 I.D. 689 (1972); United States v. Gunn, 79 I.D. 588
(1972); Holman v. Utah, 41 L.D. 314 (1912); King v. Bradford, 31 L.D. 108 (1901)
Dunluce Placer Mine, 6 L.D. 761 (1888). See United States v. Mattey, 67 I.D. 63 (1960).
397. Hans v. Great Bend Brick & Tile Co., 172 Kan. 478, 24,1 P.2d 475 (1952). See
Wulf V. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973).
398. Resler v. Rogers, 272 Minn. 502, 139 N.W.2d 379 (1965).
399. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907) (referred to variously as "clay" and "silicated clay").
400. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904).
401. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.20 (West 1969).
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interest in and to any clay unless the intent to convey such interest
is specifically and separately set forth in the instrument of convey-
ance.4 0 2 Bentonite has been held to be a mineral. 40 3 Montmorillonite
has been considered to be a mineral subject to location under the
United States mining laws1. 40
4
H. EARTH AND SIMILAR SUBSTANCES
Earth is usually not considered to be a mineral.40 5 A Florida
statute provides that the word "minerals" in any deed, lease, or
other contract in wiriting after the date of the statute shall not in-
clude humus, muck, or topsoil unless expressly provided therein.4 0 6
I. WATER
Lands containing sulfur springs,4 7 hot springs, 40 8 or mineral
springs °9 have been held not to be mineral lands under the United
States public land laws. In 1961, the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior concluded that geothermal steam is not a mineral mater-
ial.410 However, in United States v. Union Oil Co.,411 the ninth circuit
said that the purpose of the Stockrai:sing Homestead Act in reserving
to the United States "all coal and other minerals" was to "retain
government control of subsurface fuel resources, appropriate for
purposes other than stock-raising or forage farming. 4 12 The court
held that since "all the elements of a geothermal system-magma,
porous rock strata, even water itself-may be classified as 'min-
erals,' " the words of the mineral reservation in the Stockraising
Homestead Act "are capable of bearing a meaning that encompasses
geothermal resources. 41
In Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co.,41 4 the United
402. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (Supp. 1977).
403. Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 168, 109 So. 2d 628 (1959); Chittim v. Belle Fourche
Bentonite Products Co., 60 Wyo. 235, 149 P.2d 142 (1944) (locatable under United' States
mining laws).
404. Jose v. Houck, 171 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1949).
405. Steinman Development Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290, F. 832 (W.D. Va.
1922), afj'd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir. 1923). See United States v. Toole, 224 F. Supp. 440 (D.
Mont. 1963); Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973) (dirt, argillaceous ma-
terial). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 30, § 168 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (soil, sod, dirt,
turf).
406. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.20 (West 1969).
407. Comm'r Wilson to Fairplay, Colo., Office, Aug. 25, 1869, in H. CoPP, U.S. MINING
DECIsIONs 22 (1874).
408. Morrill v. Margaret Min. Co., 11 L.D. 563 (1890).
409. Pagosa Springs, 1 L.D. 562 (1882). See 43 C.F.R. § 3826.2-4 (1976).
410. OP. SOL., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, M-36625 (Aug. 28, 1961).
411. 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977).
412. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970).
413. Accord, Geothermal Kinetics v. Union Oil Co., ----Cal. App. 3d- , 141 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1977) (holding that by conveying "minerals" parties intended to convey "commer-
cially valuable, underground, physical resources").
414. - U.S.- , 46 U.S.L.W. 4561 (1978).
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States Supreme Court held that water is not a mineral subject to
location under the United States mining laws.
Although some courts haye recognized that a broad general
meaning of the word "mineral" would include water,4 15 water is
usually not considered to be included in a grant or reservation of
minerals.4
18
In Stephen Hays Estate, Inc. v. Togliatti,417 it was contended that
water containing copper in solution is a mineral and, as such, title
to the water was reserved by a deed which reserved "all minerals
on or in the land conveyed." In holding that the mineralized water
was not a mineral within the scope of the reservation, the court
said as follows:
No case is cited by plaintiff and we have been unable to
find an adjudicated case holding that water is a mineral
within the meaning of a reservation such as that contained
in the deed . .. The characteristics of water containing
copper in solution are so unlike the characteristics of min-
erals that to say water is a mineral would be to extend the
meaning of the word "mineral" beyond what is generally
understood by that term.4 18
The court then said that, even if it be conceded that water containing
copper is a mineral, the water in question was: not within the reserva-
tion, inasmuch as it was not "on or in the land conveyed" but
rather percolated into the property from mining operations further
up the canyon. The court thus, by implication, declined to apply the
rule of capture to mineralized waters. In holding that the water was
not included within the mineral reservation, the court was careful
to note that the decision did not apply to any water that might
be encountered by the mineral owner in conducting mining operations
for the extraction of reserved minerals.
A Colorado statute provides that a reference to minerals or min-
eral rights in an instrument executed prior to May 17, 1974, is pre-
415. People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59, 16 L.R.A. 4,43, 31 Am. St.
Rep. 433 (1892); Goodloe v. City of Richmond, 272 Ky. 100, 113 S.W.2d 834 (1937);
Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 100 Minn. 481, 111 N.W. 391, 9
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1250, 10 Ann. Cas. 843 (1907); Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
194 N.Y. 326, 87 N.E. 504, 128 Am. St. Rep. 553, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 436, 16 Ann. Cas.
989 (1909) ("subterranean waters have always been treated as a mineral in the decisions
relating to their use and enjoyment"); State Land Bd. v. State DeP't of Fish & Game;
17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965). Contra, J. M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Murrel, 127
La. 466, 53 So. 705 (1910) (mineral waters).
416. Steinman Dev. Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Pa. 1922),
affrd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir. 1921) ; Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964);
Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 412 S.W.2d
680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), ajf'd, 424 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1965) ; Fleming Foundation v.
Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ App. 1960). Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 30, § 168
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
417. 85 Utah 137, 38 P.2d 1066 (1934).
418. Id. at -, 38 P.2d at 1068.
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sumed not to include geothermal resources unless geothermal re-
sources are specifically mentioned, and a reference to minerals or
mineral rights in an instrument executed on or after May 17, 1974,
does not include geothermal resources unless geothermal resources
are specifically mentioned. 410
J. MISCELLANEOUS
Chromate of iron,420 diamonds,4 21 borax,42 2 salt,4 23 carbonate of
soda,424 nitrate of soda, 425 sulfur426 alum,427 asphalt, 428 gilsonite,'4
umber.42 0 mica42 ' phosphate,432 guano,4 3  magnesite, 4 3 fluorspar,2 3
and silica43 6 have been held to be minerals. Novaculite, a very hard,
fine grained siliceous rock of sedimentary origin used for producing
whetstones, has been held to be a mineral.4 37 Shell rock,43 8 stalag-
tites, stalagmites, and other "natural curiosities, ' 439 and remains of
prehistoric animals" 0 have been held not to be minerals.
VII. PARTICULAR LANGUAGE
A. GENERALLY
A grant or reservation of specifically named minerals, with no
general words such as "and other minerals," cannot be construed
to include minerals not named,"' but where a grant or reservation
of specifically named minerals is followed by general words such as
419. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-121 (Supp. 1976).
420. Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34, 13 Morr. Min. Rep. 72 (Pa. 1836).
421. Kentucky Diamond Min. & Developing Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co.,
141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910) ; 14 OP. ATTY. GEN. 115 (1872).
422. Comm'r Drummond to Los Angeles, Cal., office, Apr. 18, 1873, in 11. Copp, U.S.
MINING DECISIONS 194 (1974) ; Circular, July 15, 1973, in H. Copp, U.S. MINING DECISIONS
816 (1847).
423. State v. Parker, 61 Tex. 265 (1884).
424. Circular, July 15, 1873, in H. COPP, U.S. MINING DECISIONS 316 (1874).
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Webb v. American Asphaltum Co., 157 F. 203 (8th Cir. 1907).
430. Comm'r Burdett to Win. Clayton, Jan. 30, 1875, in H. COPP, U.S. MINERAL LANDS
161 (2d ed. 1882).
431. Comm'r Burdett to William A. Arnold, Dec. 3, 1875, in H. Copp, U.S. MINERAL
LANDS 176 (2d ed. 1882).
432. Florida C. & P.R., 26 L.D. 600 (1898) : Gary v. Todd, 18 L.D. 58 (1894).
433. OP. SOL., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, MINERAL CHARACTER OF BAT GUANO DEPOSITS ON
PAPAGO INDIAN RESERVATION, 60 T.D. 45 (1947) : Richter v. Utah, 27 L.D. 99 (1898).
434. State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wash. 2d 1, 182 P.2d' 643 (1947).
435. Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosiek, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S.W.2d 665 (1931).
436. People v. Silver, 16 Cal. 2d 714, 108 P.2d 4 (1940) ; State ex rel. Atkinson. v. Evans,
46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163 (1907).
437. Dierke Lumber & Coal Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
4.8. Hughes v. Florida. 42 L.D. 401 (1913).
439. South Dakota Mn Co. v. McDonald, 30 L.D. 357 (1900). Butt see United States v.
Bolinder, 83 I.D. 12 (1976) (geodes).
440. Earl Doiglass, 44 L.D. 325 (1915).
441. Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (19221
Bruen v. Thaxton, 126 W. Va. 330, 28 N.E.2d 59 (1943).
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"and other minerals," or "and minerals," the general words indicate
an intent to include minerals other than those named.
4 4 2
1. "All"
The word "all" as used in a grant or reservation of minerals
may be used in two different senses. When the word "all" precedes
the language of grant or reservation, it may represent a description
of the quantum of the estate granted; i. e., a grant of "all the min-
erals" may indicate that the entire mineral estate is being granted,
as distinguished from a grant of an undivided interest in the minerals.
Alternatively, the word "all" may be the expression of an intent
that the grant be all inclusive, and that no substance legally cogniz-
able as a mineral is to be excluded from the grant. Thus, in a reser-
vation of "all minerals or magnesia," the word "all" has been held
to indicate that the parties did not intend to restrict the reservation
to magnesia only."
Where the word "all" does not precede the language of grant or
reservation, it cannot be taken as a measure of the quantum of the
estate granted, but must be looked upon as an indication of the kind
of minerals to be included. Some courts have accorded significance
to the fact that an instrument uses the phrase "oil, gas, and all,
other minerals, ' ' 4 4 or some similar phrase,44 5 rather than merely
"oil, gas, and other minerals." As the North Dakota court said:
"No word is more inclusive than 'all' and it is difficult to see
why, if the parties intended a restricted construction to be placed
upon the reference to other minerals, they :should use a word so com-
pletely unrestricted in its meaning.4 4 7 Other courts accord no sig-
nificance to the use of the word "all." For example, a Louisiana
court has said as follows: "We find no real distrinction between the
phrase 'all other minerals' and the phrases 'and other minerals' or
'all the mineral . .. rights.' ",448
442. Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937). But see Davis v. Plunkett,
187 Kan. 121, 353 P.2d 514 (1960) (lease granted for the purpose of mining "Volcanic
Ash, and all other minerals or mineral derivatives" and granting the right to mine "Vol-
canic Ash, Gypsum, and other minerals or mineral derivatives" held limited to volcanic
ash and gypsum).
443. Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34, 13 Morr. Min. Rep. 72 (Pa. 1836).
444. Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958,
MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1957).
445. New Mexico & Arizona Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N. Mex. 1956) ("all
oil, gas and minerals"); Cain v. Neuman, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) ("all of
the oil, gas, coal and other minerals").
446. In Besing, v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, ,59 A.L.R.3d
1137 (1937), the court found a conveyance of "oil, gas and other minerals" to be am-
biguous, suggesting as one interpretation "that by use of 'other minprals,' as opposed to
'all other minerals'," the grantor intended to convey some but not all other minerals.
447. MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 1957).
448. River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878, 882
(La. App. 1976).
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2. Punctuation
If the word "minerals" is connected to (or separated from) the
substances particularly named by a comma only, difficulties in in-
terpretation arise. On the one hand, an exception of "minerals, sand,
rock, or gravel heretofore conveyed" indicates that the parties did
not consider that the term "minerals" included sand, rock, or grav-
el.449 On the other hand, the substances particularly mentioned may
be considered to have been placed in apposition to the word "min-
erals." Thus, in a reservation of "all minerals, coal, iron, etc.," the
words "coal" and "iron" are a partial enumeration of minerals,
and "etc." is used in the sense of "and the rest. 4 5 0 If no general
term such as "etc." is used, the word "minerals" may be limited
by the substances placed in apposition to it.451 Thus, a reservation
of "minerals, coal" has been limited to coal. 4 2 This interpretation
is subject to the criticism that the word "minerals" is thereby
rendered superfluous. The phrase "minerals, metals, iron, coal, or
fire clay" has been interpreted to include limestone, rock, and clay.4 5'
In a proper case, a comma will be inserted.4 54
3. "Or"
If the word "minerals" is connected to the substances particu-
larly named by the word "or," difficulties similar to those mentioned
in the preceding paragraph may arise. For example, it has been
contended that in a reservation of "all mineral or magnesia of any
kind," the word "magnesia" is merely an explanation and restriction
of the word "minerals." This contention was rejected on the ground
that magnesia was not usually considered to be a mineral, and the
words "or magnesia" were intended to include magnesia as an ad-
dition to "all mineral." '45
4. "Other Minerals' ' 6
449. Finsett v. Watson, 206 S.V.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Cf. Steinman Dev.
Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Va. 1922), affrd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir.
1923) (reservation of "all the coal, Iron ore and other minerals and fine clay").
450. Norman v. Lewis, 100 W. Va. 432, 130 S.E. 913 (1926). Accord, Anderson. Kerr
Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R. 1217 (1940) ("all
Minerals Paint Rock").
451. Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228 (1942).
452. Horse Creek Land & Min. Co. v. Midkiff, 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918).
453. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907).
454. Berry v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 198 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1946); Hurley v. West
Kentucky Coal Co., 294 Ky. 96, 171 S.W.2d 15 (1943) (grant of "coal minerals and mining
rights" held to be equivalent to "coal, minerals and mining rights"); Franklin, Fluorspar
Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S.W.2d 665 (1931) (reservation of "coal minerals and min-
ing privileges" held to be equivalent to "coal, minerals and mining privileges"); Ander-
son & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.V.2d, 800, 127 A.L.R. 1217
(1940). But see Rice v. Blanton, 232 Ky. 195, 22 S.W.2d 580 (1929) (no comma Inserted
in phrase "all the coal minerals and mineral products").
455. Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34, 13 Horr. Min. Rep. 72 (Pa. 1836).
456. See Beck, "And Other Minerals" as Interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court,"
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The phrase "other minerals" has been said to be equivalent to
the phrase "all other minerals. '457 It necessarily means other min-
erals than those named, but it need not always have the same mean-
ing throughout the instrument. For example, in a lease of "oil and
gas potash or other minerals" where the royalty clause provides for
royalties on "oil" and on "potash and other minerals," the phrase
"other minerals" in the royalty clause includes gas.458 A North Da-
kota statute provides that no lease of mineral rights shall be con-
strued as passing any interest to any minerals except those specifical-
ly included and set forth by name in the lease, and that the use of
the words "all other minerals" or similar words of an all-inclusive
nature in any lease shall not be construed as leasing any minerals
except those minerals specifically named in the lease and their com-
pounds and by-products. 4 9 Another North Dakota statute provides
that the use of the word "minerals" or the phrase "all other min-
erals" or similar words or phrases of an all-inclusive nature in any
deed, grant, or conveyance in which all or any portion of the min-
erals are reserved and excepted shall be interpreted to mean only
those minerals specifically named in the deed, grant, or conveyance
and their compounds and by-products. 460
5. "Of Any Kind" and Similar Phrases
The use of the phrase "of any kind" in a mineral grant or reser-
vation tends to indicate, at the very least, that more than one partic-
ular mineral is intended to be included in the grant or reservation, 461
and it has been said that it is difficult to conceive of general language
more comprehensive than that found in a grant of "all the minerals,
metals, and mineral substances of every kind and character," espe-
cially in view of the final clause.4 6 2 Nevertheless, the courts donot
usually place any particular emphasis upon such language, treating
the grant or reservation as though it were of "minerals" only.46 3
6. "In, On, or Under"
The courts generally appear to accord no particular significance
52 N.D. L. REv. 633 (1976).
457. River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878
(La. App. 1976). See Nance v. Donk Brothers Coal & Coke Co., 13 Ill. 2d 399, 151 N.E.2d
(1958) ("all coal and other mineral" means "all coal and all other mineral"); Christman
V. Emneth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973) ("all oil, gas, and other minerals" is equivalent
to "all oil, all gas and all other minerals").
458. Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.
1964). See also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Connellee, 11 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Comm. App.
1928).
459. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (Supp. 1977).
460. Id. § 47-10-25 (Supr. 1977).
461. Gibson v. Tyson, 5 'Watts 34, 13 Morr. Min. Rep. 72 (Pa. 1836).
462. Lovelace v. Southwestern Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513 (6th Cir. 1920).
463. New York State Nat. Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Devel. Corp., 278 F.2d 577
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to such phrases as "in, on, or under the surface of said lands."
'46
'
The preposition "on" has a broader meaning than "on the surface
of." To say that gold or oil has been found on a tract of land may
mean that it has been discovered on the surface, but usually dis-
covery beneath the surface is meant. 465 Therefore, the fact that a
reservation is of minerals "on" the land (rather than the more com-
mon "on, in, and under" the land) does not limit the reservation
to those minerals that are on the surface.4 66 Conversely, a reservation
of minerals "in, on, and under the land" has been held not to be
limited to minerals which can be removed by underground mining
methods.4 67
7. "Which May be Found"
The phrase "which may be found" has been held to indicate an
intent not to include minerals occurring on the surface of the ground
and lying open to view.46 18
8. Spelling
Errors in spelling are unimportant in construing a grant or reser-
vation of minerals.46 9
B. PARTICULAR LANGUAGE OF GRANT OR RESERVATION
In Appendix 11 there is set forth the particular language -of a
number of different grants or reservations of minerals, together with
(3rd Cir. 1960) ("all the coal, coal oil, fire clay and other minerals of whatever nature
and character"); Dingess v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 271 F. 864 (4th Cir . 1921)
("all the minerals, mineral substances and oils of every sort and description"); Kinder
v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923) ("oil and minerals
of every description"); Kalberer v. Grassham, 282 Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d 940 (1940) ("all
the minerals of every kind and character"); Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co. v. Preece,
260 Ky. 601, 86 S.W.2d 163 (1935) ("all coal, salt water, and minerals of every descrip-
tion"); Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384, (1954) ("all the minerals
now owned by me of every kind and nature, both liquid and solid"); Highland v. Com-
monwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1969) ("all the coal, coal oil, fire clay and other
minerals of every kind and character") ; Bundy v. Myers, 372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724 (1953)
("oil, coal, fire clay and minerals of every kind and character"); Psencik v. Wessels,
205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ("all mines and wells of, and all minerals of what-
soever description") ; Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 166 Va. 524, 186 S.E. 20 (1936) ("all
the coal and minerals of every description"); Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629
(1928) ("all the metals and minerals of every kind and character whatsoever"); Weyer-
hauser Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 15 Wash. App. 314, 549 P.2d 54 (1976) ("all min-
erals of any nature whatsoever").
464. Sloan v. Peabody Coal Co., 547 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1977). But see Stephen Hays
Estate, Inc. v. Togliatti, 85 Utah 137, 38 P.2d 1066 (1934), discussed in text accompanying
supra notes 417-18.
465. Anderson Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 139 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R.
1217 (1940).
466. Id.
467. Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97 S.W.2d 35 (1936). Contra, Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
468. Brady v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am. St. Rep. 531, 2 Ann. Cas. 636
(1905).
469. Anderson Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 139 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R.
1217 (1940).
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an indication of those substances which have been held to be included
in, or excluded from, the grant or reservation. This material is not
intended to constitute an analysis of the language of any particu-
lar grant or reservation of minerals, but rather it is designed a's an
index whereby the decisions interpreting such language may be
found. In using this material, it should always be kept in mind that,
in any particular case, the ultimate decision as to whether the sub-
stance in question was held to be included in or excluded from the
grant or reservation of minerals may have depended upon a number
of factors other than the mere language of the grant or reservation
itself.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The cases interpreting the word "minerals" constitute a chronicle
of the continuing struggle between conveyancers and the courts. 4 0
At a time when it was uncertain whether a grant or reservation of
"minerals" included oil and gas, prudent conveyancers began to use
the phrase "oil, gas and other minerals" to make it absolutely cer-
tain that oil and gas were intended to be included. In some localities
the word "minerals" became virtually synonymous with oil and gas,
and it then became uncertain as to whether the word "minerals" in-
cluded anything other than oil and gas.4 7 1 In attempting to state, in
some fashion acceptable to the courts, that the term "all minerals"
meant "all minerals," conveyancers used such phrases as "all min-
erals of every kind" or "all minerals of every description." These
attempts were singularly unsuccessful, for the all-inclusive language,
referring as it did only to the term "all minerals," was deemed
wholly inapplicable to substances determined not to be minerals.
Naming the particular minerals to be included was attempted, lead-
ing to such unwieldy phrases as "all minerals such as coal, iron,
silver, gold, copper, lead, bismuth, anitmony, zinc, or any other
mineral of any marketable valve .... ,,472 These efforts were suc-
cessful where the mineral in question was one of those named, but
the obvious care which the parties gave the drafting of such language
presented the courts with ample opportunity to say "it is strange
that in drawing the conveyance they did not use words which would
have, without doubt, included [the mineral in question] .' 473 Para-
doxically, the most all-inclusive reservation appears to be a reserva-
470. Needless to say, title examiners are caught squarely in the middle of this struggle.
471. See Fleck, Severed Mineral Interests, 51 ND. L. REv. 369, 372-75 (1974); "Early
decisions were concerned with whether the term 'minerals' included oil and gas . ...
More important at the present time Is the question of whether or not the grant of 'oil,
gas and other minerals' includos coal."
472. McKinney's He'rs v. Central Kentucky Nat. Gas Co., 132 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314,
20 Ann. Cas. 934 (1909).
473. Id. (holding that natural gas was not Included).
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tion merely of "all minerals," unaccompanied by langugae purport-
ing to explain or expand the meaning of that term or the rights im-
plicit in such a reservation. This, conclusion is well illustrated by the
following language of the West Virginia court in Bruen v. Thaxton: 4 74
If, in 1854, neither Bruen nor Thaxton knew of the exist-
ence or commercial value of oil or gas, how could either
have had them in mind when they consummated their sale
and purchase? If they did know, why were they not men-
tioned, or covered by the general term 'mineral" or other-
wise? We realize, of course, that a broad reservation of min-
erals would have included all minerals, whether their exist-
ence was or was not then known to either party to a deed or
to a contract; but when a grantor makes a reservation of
specific minerals, as in this case, is it not reasonable to as-
sume that he had those special minerals in mind, and not
minerals of whose existence and value he may have been
wholly unaware?4 75
The struggle between conveyancers and the courts continues on
new ground as the courts develop the technique of using the defini-
tion of the word "minerals" as a device by which environmental
and social policies may be implemented. The conveyancers have the
first move, and must exercise not only skill and judgment but a
large measure of foresight. Nevertheless, the courts ultimately de-
termine the meaning of the word "minerals," and all too often the
only reliable rule appears to be that the word "minerals" means
what the courts say it means.
474. 126 W. Va. 330, 28 S.E.2d 59 (1943).
475. Id. at_-, 28 S.E.2d at 68.
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APPENDIX I: STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
I. ARIZONA
An Arizona statute dealing with the Department of Mineral Re-
sources provides as follows: " 'Minerals' includes metals and min-
erals, exclusive of hydrocarbons."' A statute dealing with the Bu-
reau of Geology and Mineral Technology provides as follows: " 'Min-
erals' means all metallic, nonmetallic and fuel minerals. ' 2 A statute
dealing with the location of mineral claims on state lands provides
as follows: "The term 'mineral' includes mineral compound and
mineral aggregate.''
II. ARKANSAS
An Arkansas statute dealing with the rights of co-owners of min-
eral lands provides as follows: "The word 'mineral' as used herein
shall include oil, gas, asphalt, coal, iron, zinc, lead, cinnabar, baux-
ite, and salt water whose naturally dissolved components (solutes)
are used as a source of raw materials for bromine and other pro-
ducts derived therefrom in bromine production.' '4
III. CALIFORNIA
A California statute applicable to mines and mining generally
provides as follows: " 'Minerals' means any naturally occurring
chemical element or compound, or groups of elements and com-
pounds, formed from inorganic processes and organic substances,
including, but not limited to, coal, peat, and bituminous rock, but
excluding geothermal resources, natural gas, and petroleum."'
IV. COLORADO
The Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Act provides as follows:
"Mineral" means an inanimate constituent of the earth
in a solid, liquid, or gaseous state which, when extracted
from the earrth, is usable in its natural form or is capable
of conversion into a usable form as a metal, or a raw material
compound, a chemical, an energy source, or a raw material
for manufacturing or construction material. For the purposes
of this article, this definition does not include surface or sub-
surface water, geothermal resources, or natural oil and gas
together with other chemicals recovered therewith, but does
include oil shale.6
1. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-101(4) (1976).
2. Id. § 27-150(4) (Supp. 1977).
3. Id. § 27-231(B) (1976).
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 52-201 (Supp. 1975).
5. 5 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 2005 (West Supp. 1977).
6. CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-32-103(7) (Supp. 1976).
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V. GEORGIA
The Georgia Surface Mining Act of 1968 provides as follows:
"Mineral means clay, istone, gravel, sand, phosphate, rock, met-
allic ore, and any other solid material or substance of commercial
value found in natural deposits on or in the earth."7
VI. HAWAII
The Hawaii strip mining statute provides as follows:
"Mineral" or "minerals" means any or all of the oil,
gas, coal, phosphate, sodium, sulphur, iron, titanium, gold,
silver, bauxite, bauxitic clay, diaspore, boehmite, laterite,
gibbsite, alumina, all ores of aluminum and, without limita-
tion thereon, all other mineral substances and ore deposits
whether solid, gaseous, or liquid, in, on, or under any land;
but does not include sand, rock, gravel, and other materials
suitable for use and used in road construction.8
The Hawaii statute dealing with the reservation and disposition of
government mineral rights provides as follows:
"Minerals" means any or all of the oil, gas, coal, phos-
phate, sodium, sulphur, iron, titanium, gold, silver, bauxite,
bauxitic clay, diaspore, boehmite, laterite, gibbsite, alumina,
all ore of aluminum and, without limitation thereon, all other
mineral substances and ore deposits whether solid, gaseous,
or liquid, including all geothermal resources in, on, or under
any land, fast or submerged; but does not include sand, rock,
gravel, and other materials suitable for use and used in
general construction. 9
VII. IDAHO
An Idaho statute relating to mineral rights in state lands provides
as follows:
The terms "mineral lands," "mineral," "mineral depos-
its," "deposit," and "mineral right," as used in this chap-
ter, and amendments thereto shall be construed to mean and
include all coal, oil, oil shale, gas, phosphate, sodium, as-
bestos, gold, silver, lead, zinc, copper, antimony and all oth-
er mineral lands, minerals or deposits of minerals of what-
soever kind or character.10
VIII. ILLINOIS
7. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1403(b) (1974).
8. HAW. REV. STAT. § 181-1 (1968).
9. Id. § 182-1(1) (Supp. 1975).
10. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 47-701 (1977).
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The Illinois Mines Inspection Act provides as follows:
The term "mineral" when used in this Act shall mean
whatever is recognized by the standard authorities as min-
eral, whether metalliferous or non-metalliferous but shall not
be held to embrace or include silica, granite, marble, salt,
sand, gravel, clay, rock, coal, lignite, gas, oil or any sub-
stance extracted in solution or in the molten state through
bore holes.11
IV. MICHIGAN
The Kammer Recreational Land Trust Fund Act of 1976 provides
as follows: " 'Mineral' means an inorganic substance that can be
extracted from the earth, except for oil or gas, and includes rock,
metal ores, coal, and mineral water.' '1 2
The Michigan mined land reclamation act provides as follows: " 'Min-
eral' means coal, gypsum, stone, metallic ore or material mined for
its metallic content and other similar solid material or substance to
be excavated from natural deposits on or in the earth for commer-
cial, industrial or construction uses. It does not include clay, gravel,
marble, peat, or sand.' 13
A statute dealing with the rights of co-owners of mineral property
provides as follows: " 'Mineral'-the term mineral, when em-
ployed in a conveyance is understood to include every inorganic
substance that can be extracted from the earth for profit whether
it be solid, as rock, fire clay, the various metals and coal, or fluid,
as mineral waters except oil and gas.' '14
X. MISSISSIPPI
A Mississippi statute dealing with the ad valorem taxation of
nonproducing gas, oil, and mineral interests provides as follows:
Whenever the term "oil, gas and other minerals" is used
in sections 27-31-71 to 27-31-87, the same shall include oil, gas
petroleum, hydro-carbons, distillate, condensate, casinghead
gas, other petroleum derivatives, sulphur and all other simi-
lar minerals of commercial value which are usually pro-
duced or mined by the drilling, boring or sinking of wells. 5
XI. MONTANA
The Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation Act pro-
11. ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 93, § 94 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
12. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 13.1095(22) (b) (Supp. 1977).
13. Id. § 18.594(1)(h).
14. Id. § 26.1252(b) (1970).
15. MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-31-71 (1972).
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vides as follows: " 'Mineral' means coal and uranium; . .1.6.The Montana mined land reclamation act provides as follows:
"Mineral" means any ore, rock, or substance, other than
oil, gas, bentonite, clay, coal, sand, gravel, phosphate rock,
or uranium, taken from below the surface or from the sur-
face of the earth for the purpose of milling, concentration,
refinement, smelting, manufacturing, or other subsequent use
or processing or for stockpiling for future use, refinement,
or smelting."
XII. NEW YORK
The New York Public Lands Law provides as follows: " 'Min-
erals' means all minerals and rocks, more particularly any inorganic
substance which can be extracted from the earth, excepting gas,
oil and water."'18
The New York Mined Land Reclamation Law provides as follows:
"Mineral" means aggregate, cement rock, clay, coal,
curbing, dimension stone, dolostone, emery, flagstone, garnet,
gem stones, gravel, gypsum, iron, lead, limestone, marble,
marl, metallic ore, paving blocks, peat, riprap, toadstone,
salt, sand, sandstone, shale, silver, slate, stone, talc, titanium,
trap rock, wollastonite, zinc or any other solid material or
substance of commercial value found in natural dpeoits in or
on the earth. 9
XIII. NORTH CAROLINA
The North Carolina Mining Act of 1971 provides as follows:
'Minerals' means soil, clay, coal, stone, gravel, sand phosphate,
rock, metallic ore, and any other solid material or substance of
commercial value found in natural deposits on or in the earth. ' 2 0
XIV. NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota statute providing for the lease of minerals on
public lands provides as follows: " 'Mineral' shall mean and include
any valuable inert or lifeless substance formed or deposited in its
present position through natural agencies, and which is found within
the earth or beneath the soil, except that it shall not mean oil or
gas, topsoil, or surface rocks." 2' 1
The North Dakota statute providing for reports of surface mining
16. MONT. REV. CODES § 50-1036(1) (Supp. 1977).
17. Id. § 50-1203(7) (SLIpp. 1977).
18. N.Y. PUB. LANDS LAW § 80(3) (McKinney 1951).
19. N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW § 23-2705(7) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-49(6) (1975).
21. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11-01(2) (Supp. 1977).
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operations provides as follows: " 'Mineral' includes cement rock,
clay, gravel, limestone, manganese, molybdenum, peat, potash, pumi-
cide, salt, sand, scoria, sodium sulfate, stone, zeolite, or other min-
erals, but does not include coal.
' 22
The North, Dakota Surface Mining Act provides as follows: " 'Min-
erals' shall mean coal.'"
2 3
XV. OKLAHOMA
The Oklahoma Mining Lands Reclamation Act proclaims as fol-
lows:
"Minerals" means asphalt, clay, coal, copper, granite,
gravel, gypsum, lead, marble, salt, sand, shale, stone, tirpoli,
volcanic ash and zinc, or any other !substance commonly rec-
ognized as a mineral, and includes ores or rock containing
any such substance, but excludes oil, gas and any other min-
eral found naturally in a liquid or gaseous state.
2
'
4
XVI. OREGON
The Oregon statute establishing the State Department of Geology
and Mineral industries provides as follows: " 'Mineral' includes any
and all mineral products, metallic and nonmetallic, solid, liquid or
gaseous, and mineral waters of all kinds. 25
The Oregon mined land reclamation act provides as follows: " 'Min-
erals' includes soil, coal, clay, stone, sand, gravel, metallic ore and
any other solid material or substance excavated for commercial,
industrial or construction use from natural deposits situated within
or upon lands in this state. '26
XVII. PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation
Act provides as follows:
"Minerals" shall mean any aggregate or mass of mineral
matter, whether or not coherent, which is extracted by sur-
face mining, and shall include but not be limited to lime-
stone and dolomite, sand and gravel, rock and stone, earth,
fill, slag, iron ore, zinc ore, vermiculite, clay, and anthra-
cite and bituminous coal.2 7
XVIII. SOUTH CAROLINA
22. Id. § 38-16-01(4) (SupP. 1977).
23. Id. § 38-18-05(3) (Supp. 1977).
24. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 723(d) (West Supp. 1977).
25. OR. REV. STAT. § 516.010(2) (1975).
26. Id. § 517.750(6) (1977).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1396.3 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
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The South Carolina Mining Act provides as follows: " 'Min-
eral' means soil, clay, coal, stone, gravel, sand, phosphate, rock,
metallic ore, and any other solid material or substance found in
natural deposits on or in the earth.
' 28
XIX. SOUTH DAKOTA
The South Dakota Surface Mining Land Reclamation Act pro-
vides as follows:
Terms as used in this chapter, unless the context other-
wise plainly requires, shall mean:
(3) "Mineral," those specified in subdivision (9) of this sec-
tion, but excluding oil and gas;
(9) "Surface mining," removal by means of surface entry
of coal, clay, stone, sand, gravel and other minerals and
mineral deposits, and the removal, disposition and deposit
of overburden disturbed in connection therewith; . . ..
XX. TENNESSEE
The Tennessee Surface Mining Law provides as follows: " 'Min-
eral' means coal, clay, stone, gravel, sand, phosphate rock, metallic
ore, and any other solid material or substance of commercial value
found in natural deposits on or in the earth, but does not include
limestone, marble, chert or dimension stone." 30
The Tennessee Mineral Test Hole Regulatory Act provides as fol-
lows: " 'Mineral' as used in this chapter means any substance
with economic value whether organic or inorganic that can be ex-
tracted from the earth, but excluding oil and gas."3 1
XXI. TEXAS
The Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act provides as follows:
"The term 'mineral' as used herein is limited to oil and gas. ' '3
2
XXII. VIRGINIA
The Virginia Mined Land Reclamation Act contains the following
definition: "Mineral-Ore, rock, and any other solid homogeneous
28. S.C. CODE § 48-19-30(d) (1976).
29. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 45-6A-2 (Supp. 1977).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1541(b) (Supp. 1976).
31. Id. § 58-1903(c) (Supp. 1977).
32. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.002(1) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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crystalline chemical element or compound that results from the in-
organic processes of nature other than coal." 33
XXIII. WASHINGTON
The Washington surface mining act provides as follows: " 'Min-
erals' shall mean coal, clay, stone, sand, gravel, metallic ore, and
any other similar solid material or substance to be excavated from
natural deposits on or in the earth for commercial, industrial, or
construction uses.'
'3
XXIV. WEST VIRGINIA
The West Virginia Surface Mining Act provides as follows: " 'Min-
erals' as used in this article shall mean coal, clay, manganese,
iron ore. ' 3 5
XX. WISCONSIN
A Wisconsin statute relating to mine safety provides as follows:
'Mineral' means a product recognized by standard authorities as
mineral, whether metalliferous or non-metalliferous." 36
The Wisconsin Metallic Mining Reclamation Act provides as follows:
" 'Minerals' mean [sic] unbeneficiated metallic ore but does not
include mineral aggregates such as stone, sand and gravel."3 7
XXVI. WYOMING
.The Wyoming mine safety act provides as follows: "[T]he
term 'mines' and 'minerals' shall not include coal mines or coal." 's
33. VA. CODE § 45.1-180(1) (Supp. 1977).
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 78.44.030(4) (1976).
35. W. VA. CODE § 20-6-2(e) (1973).
36. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 101.15(2) (a) (2) (West Supp. 1977).
37. Id. § 144.81(4) (1974).
38. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-36 (1967).
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APPENDIX II: PARTICULAR LANGUAGE OF GRANT
OR RESERVATION
A. THE WORD "MINERALS" APPEARING ALONE
1. Mineral
The term "the mineral" includes: oil and gas.1 The word min-
eral does not include natural gas.
2
2. Minerals
The word "minerals" includes: oil and gas.3 The word "min-
erals" does not include: topsoil, much, peat, humus, sand, and com-
mon clay,' or geothermal resources.5
3. All Mineral
The phrase "all the mineral" includes: coal' and diamonds.,
4. All Minerals
The phrase "all minerals" or "all the minerals" includes: oil
and gas8 and geothermal resources.9 The phrase "all minerals of
every kind and character" includes: sandstone. 10 The phrase "all
minerals. . . of every kind and nature, both liquid and solid" does
not include: gravel."
B. THE WORD "MINERALS" FOLLOWED BY SPECIFICALLY NAMED
SUBSTANCES
1. All Minerals, Coal
The phrase "all minerals, coal" does not include: oil and gas.' 2
2. All Mineral or Coal.
1. Slone v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co., 289 Ky. 623, 159 S.W.2d 993 (1942).
2. Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 A. 832 (1906).
3. Stowers v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934).
4. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.20 (West 1969). For the use of the word "minerals" In a
reservation or exception in a deed, grant, or conveyance in North Dakota, see text at
supra note 125.
5. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-121 (Supp. 1976).
6. Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co., 296 F. 320 (6th Cir. 1924).
7. Kentucky Diamond Min. & Developing Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 141
Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910).
8. Lovelace v. Southwest Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513 (6th Cir. 1920) ; Singleton v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry., 205 F. Supp. 113 (E.D. Ark. 1962) ; Elliott v. Nelson, 251 S.W. 501 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1923) ; Suit v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 307 (1908).
9. Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, - Cal. App. 3d- , 141
Cal. Rptr. 879 (1977).
10. Kalberer v. Grassham, 282 Ky. 430, 138 S.W.2d 980 (1940).
11. Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 69 So. 2d 384 (1954).
12. H rse Creek Land & Min. Co. v. Midkiff, 81 W. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918).
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The phrase "all the mineral or coal" does not include: natural
gas.18
3. All Minerals, Coal, and Oil Privileges
The phrase "all minerals, coal and oil privileges" includes: oil
and natural gas.14
4. All Minerals, Coal, Iron, etc.
The phrase "all minerals, -coal, iron, etc." includes: oil and gas. 15
5. Minerals, Metals, Iron, Coal, or Fire Clay
The phrase "minerals, metals, iron, coal or fire clay" includes:
limestone, silica, silicated rock, and clay.1 6
6. All Minerals, Paint Rock, etc.
The phrase "all Minerals Paint Rock etc." includes: oil and
gas."
7. All Mineral or Magnesia
The phrase "all mineral or magnesia of any kind" includes:
chromate of iron."8
8. All Minerals and Oils
The phrase "all minerals and oils" does not include: gravel. 9
9. All Mineral, and Oil Rights
The phrase "all mineral, and oil rights" does not include: grav-
el.20
10. Mineral and Timber and Oil
The phrase "mineral and timber and oil" includes: gas.21
11. All Minerals, Including Oil and Gas
13. McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Nat. Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314, 20
Ann. Cas. 934 (1909).
14. Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13 (1938).
15. Norman v. Lewis, 100 W. Va. 432, 130 S.E. 913 (1926).
16. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 46 Wash. 219, 89 P. 565, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163
(1907).
17. Anderson Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d 800, 127 A.L.R.
1217 (1940).
18. Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34, 13 Morr. Min. Rep. 72 (Pa. 1836).
19. Bambauer v. Menjoulet, 214 Cal. App. 2d 871, 29 Cal. Rptr. 874, 95 A.L.R.2d 839
(1963).
20. Id.
21. Bolen v. Casebolt, 252 Ky. 17, 66 S.W.2d 19 (1933).
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The phrase "all minerals, including oil and gas" includes: sand
and gravel.22
12. All Minerals, Coal, Oil, and Gas
The phrase "all minerals, coal, oil and gas" does not include:
cinnabar or mercury. 3
13. All Minerals Including Iron, Coal, Bauxite, Silica and
Other Metals and Minerals
The phrase "all minerals including iron, coal, bauxite, silica
and other metals and minerals" includes: gravel.2 4
14. All Minerals, Including Coal, Iron, Natural Gas, and
Oil
The phrase "all minerals of any nature whatsoever, including
coal, iron, natural gas and oil" is ambiguous when applied to ande-
site rock.2 5
15. All Minerals Such as Coal, Iron, Silver, Gold, Copper
Lead, Bismuth, Antimony, Zinc, or Any Other Mineral
The phrase "all minerals such as coal, iron, silver, gold, copper,
lead, bismuth, antimony, zinc or any other mineral of any market-
able value" does not include: natural gas.2 6
C. THE WORD "MINERALS" FOLLOWED BY GENERAL TERMS
1. All Mineral and Mineral Rights
The phrase "all mineral and mineral rights" does not include:
sand and gravel. 27
2. All Minerals and Mining Rights
The phrase "all minerals and mining rights" includes: shale.2 8
3. All Minerals, mineral substances, and Oils
The phrase "all the minerals, mineral substances and oils" in-
cludes: natural gas.-
22. United States .v. 1,253.14 Acres of Land', 455 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1972).
23. Mining Corp. of Arkansas v. International Paper Co., 324 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Ark.
1971).
24. United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth.. v. Harris, 115 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1940).
25. Weyerhauser Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 15 Wash. App. 314, 549 P.2. 54
(1976).
26. McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Nat. Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314, 20
Ann. Cas. 934, (1909).
27. Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190- (1954).
28. Bibby v. Bunch, 176 Ala. 585, 58 So. 916 (1912).
29. Dingess v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 271 F. 864 (4th 01r. 1921).
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4. All Minerals, Metals, and Mineral Substances
The phrase "all the minerals, metals, and mineral substances
of every kind and character" includes: oil and gas.30
5. Mineral Deposits
The phrase "mineral deposits" includes: oil and gasA'
D. PHRASES INCLUDING THE TERM "MINERAL RIGHTS" AND
SIMILAR TERMS
1. Mineral Rights
The phrase "mineral rights" is much broader and is more in-
clusive than the term "oil and gas. ' ' 32 The phrase "mineral rights"
includes novaculite.3 3 The phrase "mineral rights" does not include:
limestone,3 geothermal resources, 35 sand, clay, or other nonmetal-
lic minerals. 6
2. All Mineral Rights
The phrase "all mineral rights" has been said to be equivalent
to the phrase "other minerals. '3 1 The phrase "all mineral rights"
includes oil and gas.3 8 The phrase "all mineral rights" does not
include: oil and gas 39 or water.4 0
3. Mineral Rights and Minerals
The phrase "mineral rights, and minerals . . . including iron,
asphalt, sylica, or quartz" includes: gravel.4 1
4. All Mineral Right and Coal Privileges
The phrase "all of the mineral right and coal privileges" in-
cludes: oil and gas.4 2
30. Lovelace v. Southwest Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513 (6th Cir. 1920).
31. Roth v. Huser, 147 Kan. 433, 76 P.2d 871 (1938).
32. Federal Oil, Gas & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941).
33. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Meyer, 85 F. Supp. 157 (W.D. Ark. 1949).
94. Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549 (Okla 1975) ; Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217
S.W.2d 994 (1949).
35. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-121 (Supp. 1976).
36. MICIH. STAT. ANN. § 13-441 (1973).
37. River Rouge Minerals, Inc. .v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878 (La.
App. 1976).
38. Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249, 167 P. 468 (1917).
39. Paterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264, 358 P.2d 88 (1961).
4.0. Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964).
41. United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Harris, 115 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1940).
For the phrase "all mineral and mineral rights," see supra note 27, and text acconpany-
ing. For the phrase "all mines, minerals, and mineral rights," see note 50 infra, and text
accompanying.
42. Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 151 S.W. 81, 13 A.L.R. 369 (1919). For the phrase
"coal and mineral rights," see note 68 infra, and text accompanying. For the phrase "all
coal mineral rights," see note 69 inifra, and text accompanying.
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5. Mineral, Oil, and Gas Rights
The phrase "mineral, oil and gas rights" does not include: sand
and gravel.
43
6. Mineral Interest
The phrase "mineral interest" does not include: oil and gas."
E. PHRASES INCLUDING THE TERM "MINING RIGHTS"
1. Any Mining Right
The phrase "any mining right, or the right to dig for or obtain
iron, lead, copper, coal, or ,other mineral" includes: oil and gas.'
5
F. PHRASES INCLUDING THE TERM "MINES AND MINERALS
1. Mines and Minerals
The phrase "mines and minerals" includes: coal and stone.4
6
The phrase "mines and minerals" does not include limestone.
7
2. All Mines and Minerals
The phrase '"all mines and minerals" includes: paintstone.' 8 The
phrase "all mines and minerals"or "all the mines or minerals"
does not include: limestone.' 9
3. All Mines, Minerals, and Mineral Rights
The phrase "all the mines, minerals, and mineral rights what-
soever" includes: oil and gas. 50
4. All Mines, Minerals, and Metals
The phrase "all mines, minerals, and metals" includes: petro-
leum. 51
43. Holloway Gravel Co. v. MeKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228 (1942). For the phrase
"all oil and mineral rights," see note 97 infra, and text accompanying. For the phrase
"all gas, oil and mineral rights," see note 133 in/ra, and text accompanying.
44. Stegall v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251 (1 9 58 ). For the phrase "all coal and
mineral interests and privileges," see note 77 infra, and text accompanying.
45. People ex rel. Carrell v. Bell, 237 111. 332, 86 N.E. 593, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 746, 15
Ann. Cas. 511 (1908). For the phrase "all minerals and mining rights," see supra note
28, and text accompanying. For the phrase "all the coal minerals and mining rights,"
see note 74 infra, and text accompanying.
46. Griffin v. Fellows, *81 (32 P. F. Smith) Pa. 114 (1873).
47. White v. Miller, 200 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 1065, 140 Am. St. Rep. 618 (1910).
48. Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N.J. Eq. 129, 64 Am. Dec. 448, 3 Morr. Min. Rep. 229
(1854).
49. Brady v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am. St. Rep. 531, 2 Ann. Cas. 636
(1905); Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W.2d 674
(1924).
50. Warner .v. Patton, 19 S.W.2d 1111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). For the phrase "all
coal, gold, silver, lead, copper, and other precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and
mining rights," see note 93 infra, and text accompanying.
51. Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S.W. 355, 66 Am. St. Rep. 740, 39 L.R.A. 249,
THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MINERALS"
5. All Mines and Wells of, and All Minerals
The phrase "all mines and wells of, and all minerals of what-
soever description, be the same gaseous, liquid, or solid" does not
include: sand and gravel. 5
2
6. All Mines and Mineral Substances
The phrase "all mines and mineral substances" includes: salt.
5 8
G. PHRASES INCLUDING THE TERM "METALS"
1. All Metals and Minerals
The phrase "all the metals and minerals of every kind and
character whatsoever" does not include: limestone.
5
'
H. PHRASES INCLUDING THE WORD "COAL"
1. Coal and Mineral
The phrase "coal and mineral" includes: oil and gas.55
2. All Coal and Mineral
The phrase "all coal and mineral," or "all the coal, and min-
eral" or "all the coal and mineral" includes: oil and gas,56 and
stone. 57
3. All Coal and Minerals
The phrase "all the coal and minerals of every description" in-
cludes: oil and gas. 58 The phrase "all the coal, and minerals" does
not include: natural gas.55
4. All Coal and Other Mineral
The phrase "all coal and other mineral" includes: oil and gas.2
19 Morr. Min. Rep. 169 (1897).
52. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
53. State v. Parker, 61 Tex. 265 (1884).
54. Beury v. Shelton, 151 Pa. 28, 144 S.E. 629 (1928). For the phrase "all mines, min-
erals, and metals," see supra note 51, and text accompanying. For the phrase "all the
coal, ores, and other minerals and metals," see note 92 infra, and text accompanying.
55. Mothner v. Ozark Real Estate Co., 300 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1962).
56. Rowe v. Chesapeake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1946); Luse v., Parmer,
221 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919).
57. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land Co., 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292, 86 A.L.R. 966
(1932).
58. Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 166 Va. 524, 186 S.E. 20 (1936). For the phrase
"all minerals, coal," see supra note 12, and text accompanying. For the phrase "all min-
erals, coal, oil and gas," see supra note 23, and text accompanying.
59. Highland v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960). For the phrase "all
mineral or coal," see supra note 13, and text accompanying.
60 Stewart Oil Co. v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 202 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
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5. All Coal and Other Minerals
The phrase "all coal and other minerals" or "all the coal and
other minerals" includes: oil and gas. 61 The phrase "all coal and
other minerals" or "all the coal and other minerals" does not in-
clude: oil and gas,6 2 common sand 3 or sand and gravel."
6. All Coal, Coal Oil, and Other Minerals
The phrase "all the coal, coal oil, and other minerals of every
kind and character" does not include: natural gas.6 5
7. All Coal, Coal Oil, and All Other Minerals
I
The phrase "all the coal, coal oil and all other minerals of every
kind and character" does not include: natural gas.66
8. Coal, Mineral, Stone, or Other Valuable Deposits
The phrase "coal, mineral, stone or other valuable deposits" in-
cludes: oil and gas.6 7
9. Coal and Mineral Rights
The phrase "coal and mineral rights" includes: oil and gas. 68
10. All Coal Mineral Rights
The phrase "all coal mineral rights" includes:. oil and gas.69
11. Coal and Mineral Privilege
The phrase "coal and mineral privilege" includes: coal only.70
12. All Coal and Mineral Deposits
61. Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1943); Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 382 Il1.
556, 48 N.E.2d 400 (1943) ; Shreier v. Chicago & N. Ry., 96 Il1. App. 2d 425, 239 N.E.2d
281 (1968) ; Sellars v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1952). See Adkins v.
Adams, 152 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1945) ("all the coal and other minerals or mineral sub-
stances").
62. Gordon v. Carter Oil Co., 19 Ohio App. 319 (1924).
63. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 58 A. 486, 103 Am. St. Rep. 1005 (1904).
64. State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish and Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707
(1965).
65. Highland v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960). For the phrase, "any
mining right, or the right to dig for or obtain iron, lead, copper, coaJ, or other mineral,"
see supra note 45, and text accompanying.
66. Highland v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960).
67. Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. McEntire, 128 Tex. 124, 95 S.,V.2d 381, af/'d in part, rev'd in
part on rehearing, 128 Tex. 124, 96 S.W.2d 1110 (Tex. Comm. App. 1936).
68. Gibson v. Sellars, 252 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1952).
69. Berry v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 198 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1946).
70. Clements v. Morgan, 307 Ky. 496, 211 S.W.2d 164. (1948). For the phrase "all of
the mineral right and coal privileges," see supra note 42, and text accompanying. For the
phrase "all minerals, coal and oil privileges," see supra note 14, and text accompanying.
THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MINERALS"
The phrase "all coal and mineral deposits" does not include: oil
and gas,'1 or bauxite.7 2
13. Coal and Mining Rights
The phrase "coal and mining rights" includes: oil and gas.78
14. All Coal Minerals and Mining Rights
The phrase "all the coal minerals and mining rights" includes:
oil and gas.7
15. All Coal Minerals and Mining Privileges
The phrase "all the coal minerals and mining privileges" in-
cludes: fluorspar75
16. All Coal Minerals and Mineral Products, Fire and
Potters Clay, All Iron and Iron Ore, All Stone
The phrase "all the coal minerals and mineral products, fire and
potters clay, all iron and iron ore, all stone" does not include: oil
and gas.7e
17. All Coal and Mineral Interests and Privileges
The phrase "all the coal and mineral interests and privileges"
does not include: natural gas.7 7
18. All Veins of Coal and Mineral
The phrase "all veins and coal & mineral" includes: oil and gas.18
19. All Coal, Salt-Water, and Minerals
the phrase "all the coal salt-water and minerals" includes: oil
and gas.79
20. All Coal, Salt-Water, and Minerals of Every Descrip-
tion
71. Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949); Missouri Pac. Ry. v.
Furqueron, 210 Ark. 460, 196 S.W.2d 588 (1946); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Strohacker, 202
Ark. 645, 152 S.WV.2d 563 (1941).
72. Carson v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97, 1 A.L.R.2d 784 (1948),
73. Delta Drilling Co. v. Arnett, 186 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1950).
74. Hurley v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 294 Ky. 96, 171 S.W.2d' 15 (1943).
75. Franklin Fluorspar Co. v. Hosick, 239 Ky. 454, 39 S.W.2d 665 (1931).
76. Rice v. Blanton, 232 Ky. 195, 22 S.W.2d 580 (1929).
77. McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Nat. Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314, 20
Ann. Cas. 934 (1909).
78. Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 95 (1927).
79. Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.W.2d 46 (1941).
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The phrase "all coal, salt-water, and minerals of every descrip-
tion" includes: oil and gas.80
21. All Coal, Iron, and Minerals
The phrase "all coal, iron, and minerals" includes: oil and gas.81
22. All Coal and Iron Minerals
The phrase "all the coal and iron minerals" does not include:
oil and gas.8
2
23. All Coal, Iron Ore, and Other Minerals
The phrase "all the coal, iron ore, and other minerals" does not
include: sand and gravel. 3
24. All Coal, Iron Ore, and All Other Minerals, and Fire
Clay
The phrase "all the bituminous and other coals, iron ore and all
other minerals, and fire clay" does not include: sand, rock, shale,
water, or earth.8
25. All Coal, Fire Clay, and Minerals
The phrase "all the coal and fire clay and minerals" does not
include: oil and gas.8
5
26. Coal, Fire Clay, and Other Minerals
The phrase "coal, fire clay and other minerals" does not in-
clude: oil and gas.,
27. All Coal, Coal Oil, Fire Clay and Other Minerals
The phrase "all the coal, coal oil, fire clay and other minerals of
whatever nature or character" includes: natural gas.8 7 The phrase
"all the coal, coal oil, fire clay and other minerals of every kind and
character" does not include: natural gas.8 8
SO. Kentucky-"rest Virginia, Gas Co. v. Preece, 260 Ky. 601, 86 S.W.2d 163 (1935).
81. Burdette v. Bruen, 118 V. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 860 (1937). For the phrase "all min.
erals, coal, iron, etc.," see supra note 15, and text accompanying.
82. Bruen v. Thaxton, 126 W. Va. 330, 28 S.E.2d 59 (1943).
83. Harper v. Talladega County, 279 Ala. 365, 185 So. 2d 388 (1966).
84. Steirman Dev. Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 F. 832 (W.D. Va. 1922),
afl'd, 290 F. 841 (4th Cir. 1923).
85. Monon Coal Co. v. Riggs, 115 Ind. App. 236, 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944).
86. Western Coal & Min. Co. v. Middleton, 362 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1966).
87. New York State Nat. Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas Dev. Corp., 278 F.2d 577
(3d Cir. 1960).
88. Righland v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 261, 161 A.2d 390 (1960)(reciting an Intention
THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MINERALS"
28. All Coal, Fire Clay, Iron Ore, and Other Minerals
The phrase "all the coal, fire clay, iron-ore and other minerals"
does not include: natural gas.'
29. All Coal, Fire Clay, Limestone, Iron Ore and Other
Minerals
The phrase "all the coal, fire clay, limestone, iron ore and other
minerals" or "all the coal, iron ore, limestone, fire clay, and other
minerals" does not include: natural gas.90
30. All Coal of Every Variety, and All the Iron Ore, Fire
Clay, and Other Valuable Minerals
The phrase "all the coal of every variety, and all the iron ore,
fire clay, and other valuable minerals" does not include: oil and
gas.9 1
31. All Coal, Ores, and Other Minerals and Metals
The phrase "all the coal, ores, and other minerals and metals"
includes: slate. 2
32. All Coal, Gold, Silver, Lead, Copper, and Other Pre-
cious and Valuable Ores, Minerals, Mines, and Mining
Rights
The phrase "all the coal, gold, silver, lead, copper and other
precious and valuable ores, minerals, mines and mining rights" in-
cludes: oil and gas.9 3
I. PHRASES INCLUDING THE TERM "IRON" OR "IRON ORE"
1. Iron, Coal, and Other Minerals
The phrase "iron, coal, and other minerals" does not include:
oil and gas.
J. PHRASES INCLUDING THE TERM "OIL"
to convey "all the land, coal, coal oil, fire clay, natural gas, and other minerals").
89. Id. For the phrase "minerals, metals, iron, coal or fire clay," see &Upra note 16,
and text accompanying.
90. Id.
91. Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio 492, 49 N.E. 690, 40 L.R.A. 266 (1898).
92. McCombs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 44 S.W. 867 (1907).
93. Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955). For other phrases
Including coal, see supra notes 24-26, and text accompanying; see notes 94, 98, 127 & 130
Zfra, and text accompanying.
94. Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922).
For other phrases including "iron ore," see supra notes 15, 16, 24-26, 76, 81-84, 89-91,
and text accompanying.
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1. Oil and Minerals
The phrase "oil and minerals of every description" does not in-
clude: sand, gravel, or limestone. 5
2. All Oil or Other Minerals
The phrase "all oil or other minerals" does not include: gas."
3. All Oil and Mineral Rights
The phrase "all oil and mineral rights" includes: gas.9 7
4. Oil, Coal, Fire Clay and Minerals
The phrase "oil, coal, fire clay and minerals of every kind and
character" does not include: gas. 98
5. All Oil Privileges
The phrase "all of the oil privileges" does not include: natural
gas. 99
K. PHRASES INCLUDING THE TERMS "OIL" AND "GAS" 100
1. Oil, Natural Gas, and/or Mineral
The phrase "oil, natural gas, and/or mineral" includes: coal.101
2. All Oil, Natural Gas, or Minerals
The phrase "all oil, natural gas or minerals" includes: coal.102
3. All Oil, Gas, and Minerals
The phrase "all the oil, gas and minerals" is equivalent to the
phrase "all oil, gas and other minerals."103 The phrase "all oil, gas
and minerals" includes: uranium, thorium, and associated minerals.1 0 4
95. Kinder V. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 IUl. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923). For
the phrase "all minerals and oils," see supra note 19, and text accompanying. For the
phrase "all minerals and timber and oil," see supra note 21, and text accompanying. For
the phrase "all the minerals, mineral substances, and oils" see supra note 29, and text
accompanying.
96. Wolf v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 77 Okla. 81, 186 P. 484 (1920).
97. Bulger V. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316, 138 N.W.2d 18 (1965).
98. Bundy v. Myers, 372 Pa. 583, 94 A.2d 724 (1953).
99. Murphy V. Van Voorhis, 94 W. Va. 475, 119 S.E. 297 (1923). For the phrase "all
minerals, coal, and oil privileges," see supra note 14, and text accompanying.
100. See Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 1146 (1974); Lange, Does the Phrase "Oil, Gas and Other
Minerals" in a Mineral Lease Include Uranium?, 2 NAT. RES. LAw. 360 (1969).
101. Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946).
102. Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972).
103. Sloan v. Peabody Coal Co., 547 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1977).
104. New Mexico & Arizona Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956). For
the phrase "all minerals, including oil and gas," see supra note 22, and text accompanying.
THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MINERALS"
The phrase "all the oil, gas and minerals" does not include: coal'.105
4. All Oil, Gas and Mineral Rights
The phrase "all oil, gas and mineral rights" is equivalent to the
phrase "all oil, gas and other minerals."'' 0 6 The phrase "all oil, gas
and mineral rights" does not include: copper, gold, silver, lead, or
other types of metallic ores or metallic metals,1 0 7 or granite. 0 8
5. Oil, Gas or Other Minerals
The phrase "oil and gas or other minerals" includes: bentonite. 10 9
6. Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals
The phrase "oil, gas and other minerals" includes: metallic
minerals such as rutile, ilmenite, monazite, zircon, and titanium."0
The phrase "oil, gas and other minerals" does not include: lime-
stone, caliche, or shale"' or sand and gravel. 1 2
7. All Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals
The phrase "any and all oil, gas and other minerals" includes:
lignite. 1 3 The phrase "all oil, gas and other minerals" or "all the oil,
gas and other minerals," or "all of the oil, gas and other minerals:
does not include: coal," 4 lignite," s sand," 6 gravel," 7  rock, 1 8 gyp-
sum,129 clay, 20 or water.' 21
8. Oil, Gas, and All Other Minerals
The phrase "all other minerals" is equivalent to the phrases
"other minerals" and "all the mineral rights.' 22 The phrase "oil,
105. Sloan v. Peabodry Coal Co., 547 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1977).
106. Allen v. Farmers Union Co-operative Royalty Co., 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975).
107. Id. For the phrase "mineral, oil and gas rights," see supra note 43, and text ac-
companying.
108. Thomas v. Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 4,98 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
109. Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 168, 109 So. 2d 628 (1959).
110. Collins v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 118 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1960).
111. Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
112. West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Farmer, 228 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1976).
113. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
114. Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 293 N.E.2d 510, 59 A.L.R.3d
1137 (1973) ; Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
115. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
116. Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
117. Bumpus v. United States, 325 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1963); Praeletorlan Diamond Oil
Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
118. Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
119. Cronkhite v. Falkenstein, 352 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960).
120. Hans v. Great Bend Brick & Tile Co., 172 Kan. 478, 241'-P.2d 475 (1952).
121. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 412 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), aff'd, 424 S.W.2d
616 (Tex. 1968). See Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943) ; Fleming Founda-
tion v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
122. River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878 (La.
App. 1976).
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gas and all other minerals" does not include: building sand123 or lig-
nite. 24
9. Oil, Gas, Casinghead Gasoline, and all Other Minerals
The phrase "oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline, and
all other minerals" includes: all minerals, not only those which can
be produced by means of an oil and gas well. 125
10. All Oil, Gas, Casinghead Gas, and Other Minerals
The phrase "all oil, gas, casinghead gas and other minerals"
does not include: limestone. 126
11. All Oil, Gas, Coal, and Other Minerals
The phrase "all of the oil, gas, coal and other minerals" in-
cludes: uranium.' 27
12. Oil and Gas, Fire Clay, and All Other Minerals
The phrase "oil and gas, . . . fire clay, . . . and all other min-
erals" does not include: limestone. 128
13. All Oil, Petroleum, Gas, Coal, Asphalt, and All Other
Minerals
The phrase "all of the oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt and all
other minerals of every kind and character" does not include: grav-
el"2 or water. 30
14. All Oil, Gas, and Kindred Minerals
The phrase "all of the oil, gas and kindred minerals" does not
include: uranium. 3 1
L. MISCELLANEOUS PHRASES
1. Volcanic Ash, and All Other Minerals or Mineral De-
rivatives
123. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., 128 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939).
124. See River Rouge Minerals, Inc. v. Energy Resources of Minnesota, 331 So. 2d 878
(La. App. 1976).
125. Evangelical Luth. Church v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 251 F.2d 4,12 (8th Cir. 1958).
126. Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
127. Cain v. Newman, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). For the phrase "all min-
erals, coal, oil, and gas," see supra note 23, and text accompanying. For the phrase "all
minerals, including coal, iron, natural gas and oil," see supra note 25, and text accom-
panying.
128. Little v. Carter, 408 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1966).
129. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Hendrix, 196 Okla. 596, 167 P.2d 43 (1946).
130. See Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla. 64, 141 P.2d 276 (1943).
131. Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo. 1973).
THE MEANING OF THE WORD "MINERALS"
The phrases "volanic ash, and all other minerals or mineral
derivatives" does not include: oil and gas. 1 2
2. All Gas, Oil, and Mineral Rights
The phrase "all gas, oil and mineral rights" does not include:
gypsum. 183
3. Natural Gas, Petroleum, and Other Mineral Substances
The phrase "natural gas, petroleum and other mineral sub-
stances" does not include: coal, clay, gypsum, limestone, gravel,
rock, dirt, or argillaceous materials. 1'3 4
4. Timber, Earth, Stone, and Mineral
The phrase "timber, earth, stone and mineral" does not include:
oil and gas. 35
132. Davis v. Phinkett, 187 Kan. 121, 353 P.2d 514 (1974).
133. Keller v. Ely, 192 Kan. 698, 391 P.2d 132 (1964).
134. Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973).
125. Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil Co., 106 Tex. 94, 157 S.W. 737 (1913).
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